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IPART ONE
GENERALIA
CHAPTER ONE:
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE
IMMUNITY AND ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
UP TO THE 1970s
I. INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of this study certain key words or
terms such as "jurisdiction", and "State immunity" appear
to require definitions. Jurisdiction is manifestation of
State sovereignty.^ The term "jurisdiction des Etats" in
French language means the general power of control which
a State has within its territory or some other designated
space.^ In the context of a case against a foreign State,
in a municipal court, the term jurisdiction or competence
refers to "the judicial competence or power of a tribunal
to adjudicate or to settle disputes by adjudication".^
Such judicial competence will cover also other types of
jurisdiction not necessarily judicial in nature, such as
executive and administrative power exercised sometimes by
the court and sometimes by the police or administrative
authorities.^
^ Bowett,D.W.,"Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of
Authority Over Activities and Resources", BYIL, 1982, p.l.
^ Dictionaire de la terminologie du droit
international, Publie sous le patronage de 1'Union
Academic International, Sirey, 1960 (Preface de j.
Basdevant), pp.354-357 (quoted by Brownlie, AIDI vol.62.I.
1987, at p.14), where different meanings for jurisdiction
are given.
^ Sucharitkul, S., Special Rapporteur,
"Preliminary Report on jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property", Yrbk. ILC., (1979), vol. II, part 1.
p.227, at p.238.
^ Sucharitkul, S. , "Second Report on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property", Yrbk.ILC.1980,
vol.11, part I, p.199, at.2 06.
By the doctrine of State immunity it is meant that
the forum State neither has nor exercises any power over
a foreign sovereign State. In other words the defense of
sovereign immunity prevents the courts of territorial
State from entertaining jurisdiction over a foreign State
or its property.^ The courts can not implead the foreign
State against its will to become a party to legal
proceedings or to an attempt to seize or encumber a
property under its control, possession or ownership.'
Thus, as many writers make it clear the immunity is from
local jurisdiction, not from legal responsibility^ and it
can be waived by the State concerned. The Concept covers
the entire judicial process including investigation,
examination, rendering judgments and measures of
constraint for the execution of judgments.® Although
sovereign immunity and State immunity are almost regularly
and indiscriminately confused there is, theoretically, a
distinction between the two concepts. Sovereign immunity,
in its strict sense, refers to the immunity which a
personal sovereign or head of State enjoys while present
at the territory of another State.' Due to the said
® Sucharitkul, S., "Immunities of Foreign States
Before National Authorities", Recueil Des Cours, 1979,
Tom. 149, p. 85, at p. 95.
' Sucharitkul, 2nd Rep., op cit, fn. 4, at p.216.
^ Like Brownlie, I., Principles of Public
International law, 4th ed. 1990, pp. 323&340; Idem,
"Contemporary Problems Concerning the jurisdictional
Immunities of States", Preliminary Report, AIDI, vol.62,
T.I. p.7. at p.18.
® Sucharikul, Preliminary Rep. op cit fn. 3, at
p.238.
' Niboyet is of the view that it is only in such
cases that immunity, in its proper sense, is at issue
because the immunity is granted by virtue of capacity or
character (ratione personae) of the person of sovereign or
diplomatic agent despite the territorial sovereignty of
the host State. Other types of immunity are not instances
of immunity in proper sense, but rather they are cases of
confusion the majority of writers continue to treat the
immunities of States with those of foreign sovereigns,
despite the fact that the immunities of sovereigns are
more comparable to the immunities enjoyed by diplomatic
agents than they are to the immunities enjoyed by States
or State agencies^®.
Sovereign immunity has attracted a huge bulk of
commentary" and has been subject of too many judgments in
different countries. Indeed in the ongoing development of
public international law, few subjects are more perplex
than the immunities of foreign States^^.
Immunities are classified into different categories^^
according to their contents. However, this study will be
incompetence d'attribution. For instance, when an
administrative act of a foreign State is at issue in a
French civil court, the matter will be outside the
province of that court not because of the doctrine of
State immunity, but because such French courts lack
competence d'attribution to deal with the matter. See:
Niboyet J.P., "Immunite de jurisdiction et incompetence
d'attribution" Rev. crit. d.i.p. XXXIX-1950, pp.139 et
seq.
Sinclair Sir Ian, "The Law of Sovereign
Immunity, Recent Developments", Recueil Des Cours, T. 167
(1980, II), p. 115, at p. 197.
" For a list of selected bibliography, old and
recent, see Brownlie, op cit, fn. 7, pp. 226-327;
Rousseau Charles, Droit International Public, Tome IV,
1980, pp. 8-9. The literature is so immense that some
publicists such as Hirsch Lauterpacht, regarded it to have
"tended to infuse an element of artificiality into
international law". See Lauterpacht H., "The Problem of
Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States". BYIL. 28
(1951), p. 220.
Sucharitkul, op cit, fn. 5, p. 93.
Ibid, pp. 115-121.
5confined to cover immunity^^ of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities in civil
proceedings before the courts of Germany, France and the
United States of America. The content of the cases under
study, as will be seen in next chapters of this work,
involves immunity of the Iranian Government and its
agencies from judicial process and from execution
measures. Immunity of the properties belonging to the
Iranian Government and its agencies from enforcement
measures constitute a great part of the work dealing with
seizure of the Iranian properties including, but not
limited to, huge amounts of its central bank funds,
pursuant to pre-judgment attachments and injunctions. The
object of the work will be to study the impact on the
development of the immunity law of the Iranian cases
decided by the French, German and the United States
courts. To have a clear picture of that impact it seems
appropriate first to have a look at the main issues and
topics ordinarily dealt with in the filed of immunity law.
II. IMMUNITY AND COMPETENCE
When a case is brought before a municipal court
against a foreign State the primary question to be
examined and determined is evidently the competence of the
judge who is called upon to render a judgment against
another foreign State or to take measures of constraint
affecting its property or its sovereign authority. This is
where, the question of international jurisdiction of the
forum State will arise and the Judge has to respond to the
preliminary question that whether the judicial system of
the forum State as a whole is competent to adjudicate the
Since most judgments involving the Islamic
Republic of Iran, have used the terms "State immunity" and
"sovereign immunity" invariably and indiscriminately,
these terms will be used in the same manner throughout
this work.
6case at hand in the name of the forum Stated® The
international jurisdiction or competence {CompStence
d^attribution; International Zusandigkeit) of the domestic
court, is distinct from its internal jurisdiction.^^ The
former, though relative to the rights of other States, and
not merely a question of basic competence, is usually
determined by the court in accordance with the rules of
private international law applicable in the forum State
Each forum State defines through legislation, case law, or
otherwise what kinds of actions with extraterritorial
ingredients may be adjudicated by its courts.^®
In immunity cases, due to the fact that a foreign
element, the defendant being a foreign State, is present,
the question of the international competence or the scope
of the reach of jurisdiction of the forum State would
arise. In other words, every immunity case will entail
questions of international competence but not every case
relating to international competence will involve immunity
determinations since the defendant could be a foreign
private law person, rather than a foreign State.
Therefor, immunity from jurisdiction of the forum
State must be distinguished from the international
Mayer Pierre, Droit International Priv6, 5th.
Ed. Monchrestien, 1994, no.277, where he contrasts the
international competence (or general competence) of the
French courts with their internal competence (or special
competence).
Rigaux Frangois. Droit International Priv6 ,
Tome I, 1987, No.171 (Tome II with Fallen Marc, 1993)
Mayer, op cit, fn. 15, at nos.276-282
For various methods see: Fragistas C.N., "La
competence international en droit prive", Recueil Des
Cours, vol.104 (1961 III), pp.159-271, at pp. 205 et seq.
competence of the forum State^'. Immunity is based on
different considerations. It protects a certain class of
defendants, i.e. foreign States and sometimes their
emanations, from the jurisdiction of otherwise competent
courts, either because of the character of the defendant
or because of the nature of the act which has given rise
to a claim. While the rules of State immunity are a part
of international law, the rules of international
competence of the courts are viewed as a part of domestic
law.^° However, since in cases against foreign States, the
Steinberger, "State Immunity" in Encyclopedia of
Public International Law, (R. Bernhard et al. eds, 1987),
vol. 10, p.428.; Paussmeyer C. H., "German Court Practice
on Sovereign Immunity with Special Reference to Current
Trends in the Federal Republic of Germany", German Year
Book of International Law, vol. 25 (1982), p. 417, at p.
429; Shaumann W. & Habscheid W. , Die Immunit&t
ausHindisCher Staaten nach V61kerrecht und deutschem
Zivilprozessrecht,(the immunity of foreign States
according to public international law and to German
procedural law), 8 BerDGVR (1968), pp. 304, 305.
Paussmeyer, ibid p. 429. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that public international law puts some
limits on the scope of international jurisdiction of
States because:
laws extend so far as, but no further than,the
sovereignty of the State which puts them into
force nor does any legislator normally intend to
enact laws which apply to or cover persons,
facts, events or conduct outside the limits of
his State's sovereignty. This is a principle or,
perhaps one should say, an observation of
universal application.
Mann F.A., "The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction
Revisited After Twenty years", Recueil Des Cours 1984 III,
Tome 184, p.8, at p.20); Sucharikul, 3rd Rep. YB. ILC,
1981, vol.11, I, at p.131. As was held in the case of The
Queen v. Jameson, (1896, 2 Q.B. 425, 430, quoted by Mann,
loc. cit. at p.21) by Lord Russell of Killowen in 1896 and
since then frequently reaffirmed under international law
a State is not allowed to apply its legislation:
to foreigners in respect of acts done by them
outside the dominions of the sovereign power
enacting.
8personality of the defendant State might act as an
exception^^ to the jurisdiction of the otherwise competent
courts, the question of international competence of the
forum State has often been confused with the
jurisdictional immunity of the defendant State.
Jurisdiction must be based on some sound criteria.
The clearest dimension of State jurisdiction is
territorial. Indeed the territorial principle is the most
fundamental principle governing jurisdiction,^^ especially
In S.S. Lotus case (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10(1927) the
Permanent Court of Int'l Justice affirmed the proposition
that Turkey's enforcement jurisdiction which depended on
its prescriptive jurisdiction was consistent with
international law. See: also Bowett, op cit, fn. 1, at
pp.1 et seq.; Brownlie, op cit, fn. 7, at pp. 298 et seq.
However, some publicists think that the function of public
international law in regulating the civil jurisdiction is
either minimal because the action will be between private
parties and the court will apply "the proper law" and not
the lex fori (Jennings, "the limits of State
Jurisdiction", Nordisk Tidsskrift For International Ret,
32(1962) pp.210-211) or it is nil because, civil
jurisdiction leads to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments which is regulated by private
international law (Morris, the Conflict of Laws, (2nd Ed.
1980), pp.404-405, quoted by Bowett, loc cit. at p.3.
Rigaux, op. cit, fn.l6, at p. 121.
Bowett, op cit, fn. 1, 1982, at p.4;
Sucharitkul, op cit,fn. 20, at p.131; The European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in articles 6
and 7 provides for territorial jurisdiction and creates
"territorial fiction" for purposes of asserting
jurisdiction. See Bowett, loc. cit. at. p. 3. Mann is of
the view that the international jurisdiction to
adjudicate, which is an emanation of the State's right to
regulate, namely the international jurisdiction to
legislate, has remained loyal to the principle of
territoriality, especially in the filed of civil
jurisdiction. The developments in the United States, since
1945, which has replaced the power theory of jurisdiction
with the fairness theory, leading to the relaxation of the
territorial principle by notions of fairness,
reasonableness, and convenience have not restructured the
international scene and has not diminished the weight of
the territorial principle in this regard. Mann, op cit,
fn. 20, at pp. 67-68.
in matters of civil jurisdiction. However, there are other
principles for jurisdiction such as the nationality, the
protective and the universality principles of jurisdiction
which are founded on other links or connections such as
public policies, ordre public, public interests, fiscal
considerations, and the artificial concept of
nationality.^^
Since each State is eminently sovereign^^ in
regulating its rules of competence, including its rules of
international competence, which are designed to respond
adequately to its diverse social, political and economical
interests and concerns, conflicts regarding the material
or physical scope of jurisdiction and competence can and
do arise.Such conflicts often lead to the expansion of
one or more national jurisdictions resulting in concurrent
jurisdictions of different States.
It is not the purpose of this study to examine in
detail the rules of private international law of each
State governing such conflict or concurrence of
jurisdiction. However, from the above analysis, it can be
comfortably concluded that before the question of
jurisdictional immunity of a State arises there must be a
legal foundation for the exercise of competence or
jurisdiction of the forum State over another foreign State
Bowett, op cit, fn. 1, at pp.7-13; Sucharitkul,
op cit, fn. 20, at p.130.
YB. ILC., 1983, II, II, p.26, para.5.
25 Sucharitkul,3rd. Rep. op cit, fn. 20, at p.131.
26 To reduce chances of concurrent jurisdiction and
potential areas of conflicts of jurisdiction. States have
endeavoured individually or in cooperation with other
States, to harmonize or regularize issues of concurrent
jurisdictions through their own rules of competence or
unification efforts such as the Hague Conference on
Questions of Private International Law. Sucharitkul,
ibid,, at p.131.
10
and or against its property. Consequently there is a
relativity between the established competence of the forum
State and the obligation on the part of that State to
suspend or withhold the exercise of such competence; in
other words to grant jurisdictional immunity to the
respondent State.
Though the notions of immunity and competence are
closely related because the absence of competence produces
the same result as the application of the rule of
sovereign immunity does, they are however distinguishable.
In other words, competence is a sin qua non condition of
immunity. Immunity presupposes the existence of
competence. If there is no competence, in accordance with
the private international law rules of the forum State,
the question of immunity will be eliminated.
"The ILC Second Draft on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and their Property", (YB. ILC. 1991,
vol.11. Pt. II, p.13) has clearly recognized the
distinction between the competence of a foreign court and
the jurisdictional immunities of another foreign State,
the former to be determined in accordance with private
international rules of the forum State and the latter to
be governed by the Draft Articles. For instance para. 1 of
Article 10 of the said Draft under the title "commercial
transactions" provides:
If a State engages in a commercial transaction
with a foreign natural or juridical person and,
by virtue of the applicable rules of private
international law, differences relating to the
commercial transaction fall within the
jurisdiction of a court of another State, the
State cannot invoke immunity from that
jurisdiction in a proceeding arising out of that
commercial transaction (Id at p.33).
For comments on the ILC Second Draft see: Schreuer C. and
Kessedjian C., "Le Projet D'Articles De La Commission Du
Droit International Des Nations-Unies Sur Les Immunities
Des Etats", R.G.D.I.P., Vol.96 (1992), p.297. The ILC's
distinction is also recognized by the Resolution of the
International Law Institute, at its Session of Basel in
1991 (AIDI, vol.64, T.II, at p.266), because although in
the Resolution the immunity from jurisdiction is based on
the notion of incompetence rations materia of the forum
11
Nevertheless, the empirical study of immunity cases in
some countries such as United States, will show that in
many instances, the distinction between the obligation to
grant immunity and lack of competence or jurisdiction on
the part of the forum State is hard to draw and is often
blurred. The reason is that, in many countries courts
usually do not follow an established order of priority in
their determinations of different jurisdictional problems.
They might deal with the issue of competence over a
foreign State in the context of an immunity determination,
rather than in the pursuit of a technical and sheer
analysis of the issue of competence. For example, as will
be explained later^® the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
has intertwined the notions of competence and immunity so
that the courts will take care of the issues of competence
and immunity in the same stage.
A. Competence or Jurisdiction
The term jurisdiction is often synonymous with the
word competence, though in legal literature jurisdiction
is ordinarily wider than competence. Competence sometimes
refers to the attribution or distribution of judicial
State this immunity ratione materiae is not equated with
the prior issue of subject matter jurisdiction which is
related to the existence of connecting factors and which
must exist before the issue of immunity arises. (Brownlie
Ian, Preliminary Report, "Contemporary Problems Concerning
the Jurisdictional Immunity of States", AIDI, vol.62. T.l,
at p.97). It is in pursuance of this distinction that the
Resolution provides in Article 7, para.3 that:
A foreign State which asserts its jurisdictional
immunity in respect of a claim before a relevant
organ of the forum State is not thereby
precluded from arguing that the organ lacks
competence to determine the subject-matter of
the claim for reasons other than jurisdictional
immunity
See infra, Chapter 6, fns. 822-83 0 and the
related text.
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power within a particular legal system, among different
courts and organs of the State.For the purpose of this
study however, the two terms will be used
interchangeably^" since in international plane the
internal distribution of jurisdiction is not the focus of
interest, rather the crucial question is whether the legal
system of a country as a whole has jurisdiction. When a
court is incompetent, or lacks the requisite competence to
be seized of a case, it goes without saying that it has no
jurisdiction or is without jurisdiction. Conversely when
a court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a case, it
clearly has no competence.
B. Territorial Connection
Private international law rules pertaining to the
determination of international competence, in most
countries, require that there be territorial connections
between the action and the forum State. Grounds such as
the nationality or the place of business of one or more of
the contracting parties, the place of the conclusion of
the contract, the place of the performance of the
obligations under the contract and the location of the
disputed properties might provide the required territorial
In common law countries jurisdiction is more
prevalent than competence, though the latter is not
unknown. In civil law countries, both expressions are used
often synonymously but sometimes with a thin distinction
between them. (See Sucharitkul, 3rd Rep. op clt, fn. 20, at
p. 132). Some writers have attempted to make a clear
distinction between the two terms. See: for instance,
Cosnard Michel, La Soumission Des Etats Aux Trlbunaux
Internes Face A La Tndorie Des Immunit6s Des Etats, Paris,
Pedone 1996, pp.32 et seg, where he distinguishes between
competence in its narrow sense, i.e. the power of a
certain court to decide a given case between two
identified persons, and jurisdiction, in its wide sense
which is the abstract power given to an organ to decide
one or more categories of disputes. Id. at p.33.
As has been done by the ILC. See for instance:
Sucharitkul, 3rd Rep. op cit, fn. 20, at p.132.
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connection.
Moreover, in so far as public international law is
concerned, since the territorial principle is the main
principle^^ in matters of jurisdiction, there is support
for the view that, under international law in cases
against a foreign State jurisdiction can be exercised only
in respect of cases, the subject matter of which do have
some reasonably close connection to the forum.
Also, most immunity codifications have incorporated
the requirement of the territorial connection,^^ which is
really a question of competence and not of immunity.
Immunity will be removed where, among other things, there
is sufficient contacts between the claim and the forum
State. Mention has to be made, first, of the European
Convention on State Immunity of 1972 which requires
specific and concrete contacts with the State of the
forum.Almost all national legislation on immunity have
more or less followed the European Convention by requiring
Rigaux, op cit, fn. 16, at pp. 12 0-121; the ILC
Second Draft, comments on Article 10, op cit, fn. 27, at
p.34.
Mann, op cit, fn. 20, at p. 20; Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law, op cit, fn. 7, at
p.299; Bowett, op cit, fn. 1, at p.4.
Crawford J., "A Foreign State Immunities Act for
Australia", Australian YBIL. vol.8 (1983), p.71, at pp.90-
92, Brownlie, Principles, op cit, fn. 7, at p.315.
34 Kessedjian & Schreuer, op cit, fn. 27, at p.315.
Higgins Rosalyn, "Recent Developments in the Law
of Sovereign Immunity in the United kingdom", AJIL Vol.71
(1977), p.423, at p.436.
See for instance. Article 7 and 10 of that
Convention. On the European Convention see generally:
Sinclair Ian, "The European Convention on State Immunity",
ICIQ, Vol.22 (1973), p.254; Verhoeven Joe, "L'Entree En
Vigueur Du Protocole Additionnel A La Convention Europeene
Sur L'Immunite Des lltats". Revue Beige De Droit
International, Vol.XIX, 1986, p.647.
14
some territorial connections between the action or the
defendant State with the forum State.^^
Thus, while in cases against foreign non-government
defendants the issue of territorial connection is a matter
of international competence to be determined in accordance
with private international law rules of the forum State,
in cases against foreign State, many courts and
legislation have dealt with the issue in an immunity
context. The reason, in so far as the case law is
concerned, as was explained before, is that the courts
normally do not follow an established order of priority in
their determinations of different jurisdictional problems
The ILC Second Draft (op clt, fn. 27) , while
recognizing the distinction between the competence of a
foreign court and the jurisdictional immunities of another
foreign State, in some articles provides for territorial
connection with the forum State, (for instance in article
11 dealing with employment contracts and in article 12
relating to "personal injuries and damage to property").
This incorporation of the territorial connection has been
criticized by some ( Schreuer and Kessedyian, op clt, fn.
27, at 316) and appreciated by some (See Greig, D.W.
"Forum State jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity Under the
ILC's Draft Articles". ICLQ, 1989, vol.98. p.243&p.560, at
pp.269 et seq. The former writers, while criticizing many
aspects of the ILC Draft specially its requirement of the
territorial connection, suggest that the adequate solution
is to separate strictly the question of immunity from
issues pertaining to jurisdictional competence, such as
the territorial connection and nationality of the parties,
leaving the latter group of issues to private
international law of each forum State, to determine the
domain of jurisdiction. This proposal seems difficult to
accommodate, at least as regards the territorial
connection, because firstly almost all national
legislation on immunity have incorporated the requirement
of territorial connection and the aim of the ILC Draft is,
presumably, to unify those legeslation together with the
principles deriving from the huge case law, in a single
convention, and secondly the incorporation of the
territorial connection in some of the articles of the ILC
Draft is the result of the insistence of some third world
countries in order to assure them that there are
sufficient safeguards against the tendency of expansive
jurisdiction which might exist in some developed
countries' courts. (Greig, loc cit, at p.270).
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and they might deal with the issue of territorial
connection in a case against a foreign State in the
context of immunity from jurisdiction rather than in the
context of the international competence of the forum
State.
The national and international legislation's
incorporation of the requirement can be explained in
different ways. For instance, the United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act has incorporated the due process
requirement of minimum jurisdictional contacts in its
immunity provisions^® presumably because FSIA is meant to
be the sole jurisdictional basis for claims against
foreign States.^' International instruments such as the
ILC Draft and the European Convention's incorporation of
the requirement too, though technically mingles the issues
of immunity and competence, would seem justifiable on the
ground that it will enhance uniformity, reduce uncertainty
and will preclude instances of expansion of jurisdiction
at the cost of defendant States, which in many cases are
likely to be among developing countries and very much in
need of jurisdictional safeguards so that, at least, a
portion of their essential activities remain outside the
judicial scrutiny of the municipal courts of the developed
States.
III. ORIGINS AND SOURCES OF THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
To discern the origins of sovereign immunity is not
an easy task. It is widely believed, among jurists, to
emanate from the maxim par in parem non habet imperium
See infra, Chapter 6, the discussion pertaining
to the territorial connection.
See infraf Chapter 5, fns. 673-674 and the
related text.
40 See Greig, op cit, fn. 37, at pp.268 et seq.
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which in turn derives from the principles of sovereign
equality, independence and dignity of States. However, if
one endeavors to go behind the maxim, one finds that it is
based on earlier theories concerning personal immunity of
sovereigns or heads of states^^.
Classical writers on international law such as
Grotius, Genteli, Bynkershoek and Vattel, though
extensively discussed, in their huge treatises, the
problems of the immunities of personal sovereigns and
diplomatic immunities, have made no reference to the
topic^^. Such was the case with pre-Nineteenth Century
legislative provisions and international conventions in
Europe and elsewhere. There were some references to the
immunities of ambassadors and personal sovereigns in some
european legislation of that period and in the post-
Eighteenth Century case law of some nations^^. It was
mainly in the Nineteenth Century that the question of
State immunity was dealt with by national courts and they
began to formulate the doctrine. Since then, the role
played by jurisprudence or the case law of principal legal
systems has been of prime importance^^.
Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, p. 121,' Von Mehren
Robert. B., "The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 17
(1978), p. 33, at pp. 36 et seq.
42
214.
Sucharitkul, Second Report, op cit, fn. 4, at
Ibid.
Sucharitkul, Preliminary Rep. op cit, fn. 3, at
pp. 231-232. Some writes, like Brownlie, seem to be
critical of the existing tendency in the literature which
ignores or underestimates State practice, because though
the judicial decisions are an increasingly rich source,
they frequently are outcome oriented either in favor of
the restrictive doctrine or on the basis of an
unsubstantiated determination of issues involved, which
leads to contradictory adjudicative results. Secondly, the
views of judiciary may be in variance with the views of
the executive or legislature. Thirdly, the guidance given
by the executive to its domestic courts may not be
compatible with the positions taken by the executive
17
Evidence of rules of international law on State
immunities can be found primarily in the judicial
decisions of municipal courts, national legislation,
government practice, international conventions,
international adjudication and opinions of writers^®.
Although the above mentioned sources have contributed to
the progressive evolution of the law of State immunities,
the customary international law on this subject has grown
chiefly and primarily out of the jurisprudence of
municipal courts. The reason for this major role is that
it is the trial judge who is called, primarily to decide
the jurisdiction of the court and the limits of its
competence in any action involving a foreign State. The
court may determine the question of its jurisdiction by
referring to the relevant rules on the competence of
national courts including that of itself
IV. HISTORY OP THE DOCTRINE OP STATE IMMUNITY
A. In European And Non-European Countries^^
1. Immunity Prom jurisdiction
In the period preceding to the First World War the
clearly predominant practice of the States was to grant
absolute immunity to foreign States, that is to extend the
before the courts of other States. For instance, the
United States continued to rely on absolute immunity in
the courts of other States, until 1973, two decades after
the "tate letter" which is reputed as having changed the
United States practice. See Brownlie Ian, "Contemporary
Problems Concerning the Jurisdictional Immunity of States"
AIDI, vol.62, T.I, 1987, p.13, at p.16.
45 Sucharitkul, ibid, at p. 231.
^ Sucharitkul,iJbid, at pp. 231-232;,op cit, fn 4,
at p. 214; idem, 6th Report, YB. ILC. (1984), vol. II, pt.
I. p. 15.
Historical development of immunity law in
France, Germany and the United States will be addressed,
in more detail, at the beginning of the Chapters
discussing French, German and the United States cases.
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immunity of a foreign State to all suits brought against
it and its property^®. This practice, however, was
subject to criticism by writers. To give an example, as
early as 1891 at its Hamburg Session the Institut de Droit
International, on the proposal of de Bar, a leading
exponent of the restrictive theory, adopted a resolution
which denied foreign States immunity, inter alia, with
respect to "actions relating to a commercial or industrial
establishment or a railway operated by the foreign State
in the territory" of the State of the forum/' The reason
was that the international relations of States were
growing rapidly resulting in the increase of extra
territorial State activities^® and States were,
increasingly, getting involved in commercial activities,
monopolizing some trades, operating shipping, railway and
postal services. First World War and the appearance of
communist States enlarged the domain of States'
international commercial activities further. Particularly
in cases arising out of private law commercial activities,
affording the immunity to the defendant State would seem
a great injustice to the individual claimant, because
Dunbar N.C.H.,"Controversial Aspects of
Sovereign Immunity in the Case Law of Some States",
Recueil des cours, vol. 132, 1971, pp. 203-204; Von
Mehren, op cit, fn.41, at p. 34.
["l]es actions qui se rapportent a un
etablissement de commerce ou industriel ou a un chemin de
fer exploites par I'Etat etranger dans le territoire".
See: "Projet de reglement international sur la competence
des tribunaux dans les proces contre les Etats, souverains
ou chefs d'Etat etrangers". Annuaire de L'Institut de
droit international, 1891-1892, vol. 11 (1892), pp. 436-
437.
Brownlie, Principles, op cit, fn. 7, p. 327;
"Harvard Research on Competence of Courts in Regard to
Foreign States", AJIL, vol. 26(1932), Supplement, pp. 473-
474; de Visscher P. et Verhoeven J. "L' Immunite de
juridiction de h' Etat Etranger dans la jurisprudence
Beige et le Project de Convention du Conseil de L'
Europe", in: L' immunite de Juridiction et d' execution
des Etats, Actes du Collogue conjoint des 30 et 31 Janvier
1969, Bruxelles, 1971, p. 37.
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while the doctrine of State iininunity would not exonerate
the defendant State from liability, practically, the
claimants were left at the merci of the foreign State to
collect their claims and in some cases, the application of
immunity would indeed lead to denial of justice. Perhaps,
in reaction to the abovementioned developments, the case
law of at least two European countries, namely Belgium and
Italy had already begun to restrict the absolute immunity
of foreign States.
a) In Belgium:
The Belgian courts had a pioneering role in
restricting the domain of jurisdictional immunities of
States to sovereign acts®^. In a celebrated trilogy of
cases concerning the Government of Peru and its monopoly
over guano, different Belgian courts rejected the
jurisdictional pleas of the Peruvian Government,
de Visscher et Verhoeven, ibid, p. 37; Rigaux
F. and Fallon M., Droit International Priv4, Tome II,
Droit Positif beige, Maison Larcier S.A. Bruxelles, 1993,
no. 822; Verhoeven Joe, "Immunity From Execution of
Foreign States in Belgian Law", UYIL. 10 (1979), p. 73;
However, unlike in the domain of immunity from
jurisdiction, the Belgian court practice on immunity from
execution is not free from uncertainty and ambiguity. The
Pre-Word War II judgments seem to endorse the absolute
immunity of foreign States properties though a trend can
be traced among the rare judgments issued since after the
Second World War, trying to "restrict immunity to property
intended for sovereign purposes" (Verhoeven, loc. cit. p.
77) . Since The Cour de Cassation has not had an
opportunity to tackle the problem of immunity from
Execution it is hard to draw concrete conclusions from
those few jud^ents {idem. pp. 83-84) . In a rather recent
judgment (Soci4t4 de droit irakien Rafidain Bank et arts
c. Consarc Corporation, soci6t6 de droit am6ricain et
arts, Brussels, court of appeal, 10 march 1993, case note
by Verhoeven Joe, Journal des Tribunaux, 3.12.1994, p.787)
the court clearly indorsed the restrictive domain of
immunity from execution because it stated that the object
of immunity from execution was to protect certain
properties of foreign States from measures of enforcement.
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respectively in 1857, 1876 and 1881®^. The Court of
Cassation for the first time in its decision of 11 July
1903 in the famous case of S.A. (des Chemins de Fer
liegeois-Luxembourgeois) c. I'Etat n6erlandais^, embraced
the doctrine of restrictive immunity and denied the
Netherlands immunity from jurisdiction with regard to a
claim brought against it by a railway company. The court
held that immunity from jurisdiction will be granted only
with regard to acts of political life (acts de la vie
politique) of the State, that is when the sovereignty of
the State is at stake. On the other hand if the State,
does not confine itself to its political role but owns and
acquires property, enters into contracts, becomes a debtor
or creditor or even engages in trade, it is not acting in
the domain of public authority, but as a private person.
In this capacity, if a case is brought against it in
Belgian courts, then the foreign State is subject to the
Belgian jurisdiction just like any other alien^^.
b) In Italy
Italian jurisprudence too, is often mentioned as
having taken the lead in distinguishing between the public
and private acts of State as the basis of restrictive
immunity.^®. In 1876 the Court of Cassation in Florence
made a distinction between the State as a bearer of
political authority (ente politico) and the State as a
Sucharitkul, Rec. de Cours, op cit, fn. 5, at p.
132.
" S.A. (des Chemins de Fer liegeois-
Luxembourgeois) c. I'Etat n6erlandais, Clunet, 31 (1904),
p. 417.
Ibid, p. 417. For recent cases see; Rigaux and
Fallon, op cit, fn. 51, no. 822; Born H. and Fallon M.
J.T. (1983), 218, (1987),481.
Allen, Eleanor Wyllys: The Position of Foreign
States Before National Courts, Chiefly in Continental
Europe, New York, 1933, p. 221.
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subject of private law (ente civil) . It upheld the
immunity of the foreign State only with respect to its
exercise of political authority®^. Subsequent cases, have
employed the distinction between sovereign and non
sovereign activities as the criterion for granting or
rejecting immunity.®^
c) Elsewhere
The trend to shift from absolute immunity which
prevailed in the Nineteenth Century period, to the
distinction made between public and private acts of State,
was followed in the Twentieth Century by the
Netherlands,^® Austrian,®' Swiss, Greek and Jordanian'®
56
seq.
Harvard Draft, op cit, fn. 50, at pp. 622 et
See Russian Trade Delegation in Italy, Annual
Digest, 15 (1948), p.141, kingdom of Greece v. Garnet,
Court of Cassation, ILR 24 (1957) p.209. See also cases
cited by Lautherpacht, op cit, fn. 11; Harvard Draft, op
cit, fn. 50, at pp.622 et seq.; ILR. 22 (1955), p.235;
lYIL. vol. 2, 1976, pp. 322 & 326.
The Dutch courts finally adopted the doctrine of
restrictive immunity, in both areas of jurisdiction and
execution in the case of N.V. Cabolent v. National Iranian
Oil Company, Court of Appeals of the Hague, 28 Nov.1968,
ILR 47 (1947), p.138. For comments on this case see:
Voskuil, C.C.A., "The International Law of State Immunity
As Reflected in the Dutch Civil Law of Execution" NYIL,
10(1979), p.245, at pp.277-278.
Allen, op. cit, fn.55, p.265. The Supreme Court
of Austria in the case concerning Aliter, Dralle g.
Republic of Czechoslovakia (ILR 17 (1950); Clunet, 77
(1950), p.747) and in the case concerning Collision with
Foreign Government-Owned Motor Car (ILR 40 (1970), p.73)
recognized the distinction between actes jure gestionis
and acts jure imperil and denied the respondent State
immunity from suit.
ILR 17 (1950), pp. 163. The pre-1951 court
practice of different countries on immunity has been
reviewed by Lauterpacht, op cit, fn. 50, pp. 220 et seq.
The German Constitutional Court, too, in its famous
judgement in the Claim Against Empire of Iran Case, ILR 45
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courts as well as International Mixed Courts of Egypt.
By the downfall of communist regimes in Eastern
Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in
recent years, the doctrine of absolute immunity must have
lost most of its exponents^^. The reason for this
presumption is that keeping to adhere to absolute theory
would be incompatible with the policy of attracting
foreign investment and the requirements of market economy.
Although some States, such as Brazil, China, Ecuador,
Japan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Venezuela
might still accept the absolute doctrine^^, the
overwhelming trend, especially in major industrialized
countries is towards more and more restricting the domain
of jurisdictional immunities of States and their
properties^. This trend remains unabated especially on
(1972), has reviewed relevant judicial decisions
throughout the world, and available in 1963, in order to
support its decision on the applicability of the
restrictive doctrine.
For information on Egyptian International Mixed
Courts, see Badr, Gamal Moursi, State Immunity, An
Analytical and Prognostic View, The Hague, 1984, p. 21 et
seq.
The Socialist States, though in theory staunchly
defended the principle of absolute immunity, in practice
had agreed, through waiver provisions in their treaties
with non-Communist countries or otherwise, to be subjected
to the jurisdiction of other States in their commercial
relationships. On ex Communist States practice see:
Enderlein F., "The Immunity of State Property from Foreign
Jurisdiction and Execution: Doctrine and Practice of the
German Democratic Republic", NYIL. 10 (1979), p. Ill;
Boguslavsky M. M., "Foreign State Immunity: Soviet
Doctrine and Practice", Idem, p.167.
Brownlie, Principles, op cit, fn. 7, p. 328.
^ Some authorities have expressed doubts about the
universality of the restrictive theory. For instance,
Brownlie is of the view that it is easy to decide that the
principle of absolute immunity of States has, since long
time ago, ceased to be a rule of customary (or general)
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the face of total "absence of judicial practice upholding
absolute immunity as a major weakness militating
against the viability of the absolute theory»
2. Immunity from Execution
Unlike the immunity from jurisdiction, the immunity
from execution of foreign States in many countries, did
not, for a long time, attract too much attention by the
commentators and was not subject of too many decisions by
the courts^. The main reason was that the States, having
the benefit of relying on the doctrine of absolute
immunity from jurisdiction, would not reach the stage
where they needed to rely on the doctrine of immunity from
execution. Even when the domain of immunity from
jurisdiction had been limited and the depart from the
absolute doctrine to the restrictive doctrine seemed to
have been an irreversible trend, the States used to enjoy,
in a wider domain than that of the immunity from
jurisdiction, the immunity from execution^^.
Nevertheless, the extent to which foreign States are
immune, by international law, from measures of execution
international law, but it is difficult to asses what
principle has replaced it. Brownlie I., "Contemporary
Problems Concerning the Jurisdictional Immunities of
States" AIDI, vol. 62, pt. I, Session of Cairo, 1987, pp.
25-26. See also, ILA Report of the 58th Session of Manila,
pp. 444-445, observations made by, M.K. Nawaz (India),
D.H.N. Johnson (Australia), and Horacio Grigera Naon
(Argentina).
Sucharitkul, 6th Report, op cit fn. 46 , p.
15.
^ Oppetit Bruno: "La pratique Frangaise en
Matiere d'Immunite d' Execution", L'Immunit4 d' Execution
de l^Etat Etranger, Cahiers du Cedin, 1988, p. 49.
See for example the Belgian court practice which
shows a significant gap between the immunity from
jurisdiction and the immunity from execution, as discussed
by Verhoeven, op cit, fn* 51, p. 73.
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such as seizure of property and enforcement of judgments
and prejudgment attachments, has attracted, though to a
lesser degree in comparison to immunity from jurisdiction,
a vast literature especially in recent decades when the
absolute doctrine of immunity from jurisdiction has been
abandoned in many countries. Upon an examination of the
jurisprudence, treaty and statutory provisions and the
opinions of writers, it can comfortably be suggested that
in recent decades there has been a clear trend in the
direction of qualifying or restricting the rule of
absolute immunity from execution, specially in those
jurisdictions which apply the restrictive theory of
jurisdictional immunity. However, the predominant trend
is that the immunity from execution is distinct from
immunity from jurisdiction and the domain of the former is
broader than that of the latter. In other words apart from
general restrictions on suit, there are certain extra
restrictions on execution, because execution is a harsh
measure and the damage caused by it to the dignity of the
foreign State is more than what a mere issuance of a
judgment would cause'^®. Thus lack of immunity from
jurisdiction does not necessarily mean lack of immunity
from execution and if a State can be impleaded before a
foreign court for its non-sovereign acts it does not
follow from this fact that the properties of that State
^ Crawford James, "Execution of Judgments and
Foreign Sovereign Immunity", AJIL, vol. 75(1981), p. 820
et seq; Rousseau, op cit, fn.ll, p. 16= However, in some
jurisdictions such as in Switzerland the denial of
immunity from jurisdiction would lead to the denial of
immunity from execution, where there is no territorial
connection (binnenbeziehung) between the claim and
Switzerland. Also in Belgium, in the classic case of
Socobelge et Etat beige c.Etat hell^nique, Banque de GrSce
et Banque de Bruxelles, Tribunal Civil de Bruxelle, 1951
(Clunet, vol.79, 1952, pp.244-266 note M.R. Hennebieq;
Rev. crit. d.i.p. 1952 p.11-130, note Claude-Albert
Colliard), the court held that once immunity from
jurisdiction was exercised on the merits immunity from
execution too had to be rejected. See also, Sucharitkul
7th. Rep. YB. ILC. 1985, II,I, p.21, at p.27.
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can be subject to execution measures. The properties
shall remain immune if they are of public nature i.e
devoted to sovereign purposes of the State^'.
V. THE FOUNDATIONS OP THE DOCTRINE OP STATE IMMUNITY AND
THE RELEVANCE OP INTERNATIONTO. LAW
Survey of modern case-law in major industrialized
countries of Europe and elsewhere and of the efforts of
the various Governmental and non-governmental bodies
clearly demonstrates the existence of a conspicuous trend
in favor of the restrictive doctrine of immunity.
However, there appears to be no unanimity of view on the
true rationale of the doctrine because the grounds
advanced in support of the theory are different and
numerous. It may be useful, before embarking on an
analysis of those grounds, to see^° what is the most
relevant legal discipline in which immunity matters are
dealt with.
It may be true, as some commentators have pointed
out, that immunity is a question which falls, often, among
the boundaries of different legal disciplines, between law
and politics, between international law and domestic law,
between private law and public law^^. However, a short
look at the literature and the jurisprudence, pertinent to
immunity law, reveals that in most countries immunity is
a requirement of public international law and is granted
to sovereign States on the basis of the principles of that
Lauterpacht. op cit, fn. 50, pp. 22 0 et seq;
Philippine Case, infra, fn.407, at p. 166.
Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, p. 197.
Bourel. infra, fn. 177, no. 3; Synvet, infra,
fn. 211, p. 874.
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discipline^^. The view that State immunity is a
requirement of public international law is supported by
the fact that there are some international conventions,
such as the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic
immunities which accord immunity from execution for
certain properties of the foreign State. These
conventional rules often reaffirm the preexisting
customary rules. For instance, article 22 of the said
Convention which makes immune from "search, requisition,
attachment of execution", the "premises of the mission,
their furnishings and other property thereon", is regarded
as an endorsement of a time honored State practices.^
Indeed, apart from the question of recognition of a State
or a government and its effects, it is mainly the channel
of State immunity, through which, the national courts get
in touch with public international law and have to examine
its foundations and principles^^.
A. The Legal Basis of Immunity in the United States,
Germany and France
1. In The United States
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 refers explicitly at its "Findings and declaration of
purpose" to the fact that international law is quite
pertinent to the question of immunity problems^. As to
^ Sucharitkul, Rec. des Cours, op cit, fn. 5, pp.
93&95; Steinberger, op cit. fn. 19, p.428.
^ Synvet, infra, fn. 211, p.866.
Lalive J.F., "L' Immunite de juridiction des
fitats et des Organisations Internationales", Recueil des
Cours, 1953, Tome 84, p. 14.
75
Under international Law, states are not immune
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts in so
far as their commercial activities are
concerned, and their commercial property may be
levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments
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the legal basis of immunity U.S. case law in numerous
judgments refers explicitly to comity. For instance the
Supreme Court in Verlinden held:
As the Schooner Exchange made clear, however,
foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace
and comity on the part of the United States, and
not a restriction imposed by the Constitution^^
comity in its legal sense is held by the supreme court as
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other'^
In affording the international comity of immunity the
courts will balance the United States interest:
[i]n providing a forum to injured parties
rendered against them in connection with their
activities.
Section 1602 of FSIA.
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, (U.S.
Supreme Court, 23 May 1983) ILR 79 (1989) p. 548, at p.
552. See also Ex parte Peru, 318 US, 578, 586-590, 87 L Ed
1014, 63 S Ct. 793 (1943); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 US 30,
33-36, 89 L Ed 729, 65 S Ct 530 (1945).
In a decision which determined the fate of pre-
judgment attachments in 96 cases against the Islamic
Republic of Iran (New England Merchants National Bank et
al. V. Iran, (S.D.N.Y. 1980, ILR 63 (1982), p. 497), The
court explicitly held that the fact that the doctrine of
immunity had been codified in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act did not alter the fundamental premise that:
[s]overeign immunity is a privilege enjoyed by
a foreign nation than an inalienable right to
which it can lay claim
Ibid, at p.596.
^ Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino et al.,
(U.S. Supreme Court, 23 March 1964), ILR 35 (1967), p.2,
at p.26.
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against our interest in maintaining amicable
relations with other nations by respecting their
sovereign acts^®
This language suggests that when there is no "amicable
relations" to be maintained between the U.S. and a foreign
State, as was the case with Iran, it will be pointless to
grant immunity and the only interest might be to provide
judicial remedy to the U.S. claimants.
2. In Germany
The German Constitutional Court, in accordance with
article 25 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany is entrusted with the task of establishing whether
there exist a rule of customary international law, inter
alia, as to the immunities of foreign States and their
properties. This mechanism clearly indicates that in
Germany, it is the international customary law, adopted
into the domestic law of that country, which governs the
issue of immunities^'. In Germany as well as in most
countries of the world the topic of immunity forms a part
of public International law text books.
3. In France
In France, however, the picture is slightly different
and as will be shown in Chapter 2 of this work, immunity
in some cases is a matter of private international law and
in some others a requirement of public international law.
Callejo V. Bancomer, SA, Court of Appeals, 5th
Cir. 1985, ILR 84 (1991), p.107, at p.130.
Seidl - Hohenveldern,"State Immunity: Federal
Republic of Germany", NYIL. (1979), p. 54; Kohler,
observations on some German cases, Clunet, 1984, p. 174.
See for instance Shaumann & Habscheid, op cit,
fn. 19; Rousseau, op cit, fn. 11
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VI. WHETHER IMMUNITY IS A PRINCIPLE OR AN EXCEPTION?
A point of interest in immunity law literature is
whether State immunity is a principle or an exception to
a more basic principle? The response to this question has
divided the international community ever since the
restrictive doctrine has begun to gain ground against the
absolute doctrine. For example this difference of view is
very well illustrated in the opinions of the members of
the International Law Commission while dealing with the
subject of State immunity.®^ The members coming from the
western countries argued that the starting point should be
the basic principle of the territorial jurisdiction of the
forum State and immunity should operate only as an
exception to that basic principle. The reason for this
suggestion is that a foreign State's activity in the
territory of another State, can take place only with the
latter's consent.®^
On the other hand members of the Commission,
principally, from ex-communist countries, were of the view
that the starting point is the sovereignty and equality of
States from which absolute immunity of States is inferred
Report of the ILC to the General Assembly, YB.
ILC. 1991, II, II, p.12, at pp.22-23
The best known example for this proposition is
reputed to be the case of Schooner Exchange v. Mc Faddon
(infra, fn.95) where Marchal CJ said:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
by itself... All exception, therefore, to the
full and complete power of a nation within its
own territories must be traced up to the consent
of the nation itself.
(ibid, at 116).
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as a basic principle.®'
Having these opposite views in mind, some writers are
of the view that the answer to the question varies when
one proceeds from different starting points. If one starts
from the topic of state immunity, in the light of general
practice of States as evidence of customary international
law, jurisdictional immunity of States could be viewed
either as a rule, a general rule or a general principle
which itself admits of some exceptions.®'^ In the
International Law Commission this controversy led the
members to find a compromise formula as reflected in
article 5 of the second Draft. The article, states a
basic principle of immunity qualified by other provisions
of the Draft which carve out different exceptions to the
principle of immunity.®^
®' On Socialist countries' position on State
immunity see: supra, fn.62; Osakwe C., "A Soviet
Perspective on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Law and
Practice", Virginia JIL 23(1982) p.13; the Memorandum of
Professor Ushakov N. of 11 May 1983 prepared for the ILC,
A\CN.4\371, YB. ILC. 1983, II, I, p.53.
®^ Sucharitkul, 4th. Rep. YB. ILC. 1982, II.I, at
pp.203-204. See also: Lissitzyn Oliver, "Sovereign
Immunity as a Norm of International Law" in Transnational
Law in a Changing Society, Essays in Honour of Phillip c.
Jessup, Edited by Friedman, Henkin and Lissitzyn, N.Y.,
1970, p.188 at p.194.
85 Article 5:
A State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself
and its property, from the jurisdiction of the
courts of another State subject to the
provisions of the present articles.
ILC. Rep. to the GA, YB. ILC., 1991, II, II, at p.23.
®^ Some national court practice and national
legislation start from the basic principle of immunity and
then provide for various exceptions. See for example, the
French jurisprudence (as discussed infra, in Chapter 2);
The FSIA, sees.1604 and 1605; the United Kingdom Immunity
Act, sees. 1(1) and 2-11; the ILA Montreal Draft
Convention On State Immunity arts. II and III. The ILA
Report of the 60th Conference, Montreal, 1982 (London,
1983, pp.5 et seq. Resolution No.6. "State Immunity"; ILC
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In Contrast the International Law Institute's
Resolution®^ does not start from the point of view as if
immunity from jurisdiction of foreign courts were a
principle or exception, rather it proposes "formulations
pertinent to the application of rules relating to
the jurisdictional immunity of States with a view to
limiting that immunity, while maintaining the protection
of essential State interests",®® In arto 2, it sets forth,
first the criteria indicating the competence and then
criteria relating to the incompetence of courts or other
relevant organs of the forum State in relation to
jurisdictional immunity of States, with the provision that
each case has to be dealt with in light of its own facts
and the "relevant criteria both of competence and
incompetence; no priority to be applied concerning either
group of criteria".®'
However, article 6 of the Resolution'® calls for
appropriate weight to be given to the principle of good
faith which in cases of doubt will operate in fovour of
competence of the local court and against the immunity of
foreign state. So does art.2.2(d) which suggests for the
competence of the court even though the dispute does not
arise from relationships of private law and is
nevertheless based on elements of good faith and reliance
(legal security) within the context of the local law.
Consequently, at least in so far as immunity from
jurisdiction is concerned, by and large, the pendulum
Second Draft, op cit, fn.27, art.5.
®^ AIDI, Vol.64, II, Session of Basel, 1991,
p. 215, at pp.2 67 et sag.
®® Preamble ,3rd para, AIDI, 64,11,2 67.
®' Art, 2, para. 2, id. at 261.
Id, at p. 271.
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swings in favour of competence and against immunity.'^
VII. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
The review of historical and legal development of the
doctrine of immunity furnishes ample evidence of the
foundations of the doctrine as a general rule of
international law.'^ Different bases have been suggested
as the legal justification of the doctrine as follows:
A. Principle of Equality, Sovereignty, Independence
and Dignity of States
These notions which seem to coalesce, together form
a firm international legal basis for sovereign immunity.
According to this principle all States are equals and none
of them can be subject to the jurisdiction of another
without surrendering a fundamental right. Indeed it would
be undignified if a foreign State were to descend to
defending itself in a case filed against it by a private
party. When a State is claiming immunity, it is asserting
its own sovereignty and dignity.
Therefore the application of the State immunity
represents a resolution of sovereignties between States.'^
The maxim par in parem imperium non habet seems to be a
valid point of departure and a sound legal basis that
The Resolution's approach, in regard to the
immunity from execution, follows the more orthodox
approach, by providing for a general rule of immunity from
measures of constraint (article 6) with additional
emphasis on the immunity of certain categories of
properties (such as properties of central banks, etc.) and
then setting forth instances where enforcement measures
are allowed.
Rosseau, op cit, fn. 11, at pp.8 et seq;
Lissitzyn, op cit, fn.84; Sucharitkul, 2nd Rep. op'cit,
fn. 4, at p.238.
Sucharitkul, 4th Rep. op cit, fn. 84, at p.204.
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between two co-equals one can not exercise authority over
the other.Many judgments especially classical ones have
based their immunity rulings on the above mentioned
principle relying on one or more of its underlying
notions.'^
See O'Connell D.P., International Law, 2nd. Ed.
Vol.2. London, 1970, p.842, where he traces the above
mentioned notions to the doctrine which developed from
Bodin to Austin and Hegel, according to which the law is
the creature of sovereignty and that between States as co-
equals there could be no subjection, there could only be
consensus.
For instance. Schooner Exchange v. Mc Faddon and
others, 116 (1812)... (W. Cranch, Reports of Cases argued
and adjudicated in the supreme court of the United States
(New York, Banks Law Publishing, 1911), vol.VII, 3rd. ed.
at 145; Parlement beige, (United Kingdom, The Law Reports,
Probate Division, vol.V, London, 1880, p.197; Gouvernement
espagnol v. Casaux (1849), (S. 1849.1, 81; D. 1849, 1, 5)
where the French Court of Cassation relied on the
universally recognized rule of the mutual independence and
said:
independance reciproque des Etats est I'un des
principes les plus universellement reconnus du
droit des gens. De ce principe il resulte qu'un
gouvernement ne peut etre soumis, pour les
engagements qu'il contracte, a la juridiction
d'un Etate etranger; qu'en effet le droit de
juridiction qui appartient d chaque gouvernement
pour juger les differends nes a 1'occasion des
actes emanes de lui est un droit inherent a son
autorite souveraine, qu'un autre gouvernement ne
sauriat s'attribuer sans s'exposer a alterer
leurs rapports respectifs' (S. (1849), 1, at
93) .
The reciprocal independence of States is one of
the most universally recognized principles of
the Law of Nations;- it results from this
principle that a government may not be
subjected, in respect of its commitments, to the
jurisdiction of a foreign State;- the right of
jurisdiction possessed by each government to
judge disputes arising out of acts emanating
from it is a right inherent in its sovereign
authority, to which another government may not
lay claim without risking a worsening of their
respective relations.
For more judgments see Rousseau, op cit, fn. 11, at
pp.9-10.
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The legal justification of immunity from jurisdiction
which is in the main based on the principle of
sovereignty, equality, independence and dignity of States,
can equally justify the grant of immunity from execution,
though the two immunities are in some respects distinct.
Immunity from execution is derived from the same source of
authority as the immunity from jurisdiction does.'^ Indeed
the practice of States reveals that immunity from
execution has maintained a broader domain that the
immunity from jurisdiction and is more vividly explained
by the principle of sovereignty and dignity of States
because, attachment and seizure of property is a harsh
measure and is considered as a blow to the sovereignty and
independence of the foreign State concerned.'^
B. Analogy with the Immunities of the Local Sovereign
This approach, based on the historical development of
the immunities of the local sovereign, treats the foreign
State or the foreign Sovereign in the same way as it
treats the local sovereign.'® Like the local sovereign,
which is the original source of right and can not be
impleaded in its own courts, the foreign State too, can
not be sued in the courts of another foreign State."
96
30.
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Sucharitkul, 7th. Rep., YB. ILC. 1985, II, I, at
Rousseau, op cit, fn. 11, at p.16.
Sucharitkul, 2nd Rep. op cit, fn. 4, at p.
O'Connell, op cit, fn. 94, at p.843
" O'Connell, ibid, discusses this approach not as
a separate principle, but in the context of principle of
comity. Local sovereigns would extend to other sovereigns
the same immunities as they enjoyed themselves in their
own courts, not as a matter of obligation but as a matter
of comity in order to attain reciprocity for themselves.
See also principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, (1934),
(Annual Digest... 1933-34, Vol.7 (1940) case No.61, p.l66;
Kawananakoa v. v. Polyblank (1970), U.S. United States
Reports, Vol.205 N.Y. Banks Law publishing, 1921, p. 34;
229;
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C. The Theory of Comity, Courtoisie
International, and Reciprocity
UKU'ER^'ITE C£TM. DE LOUVaIK
K.CULTE DS DROIT
BrBLIOTHEQUE
PLACE I.IONTESQUIEU, 2
B -1348 LOUVAIN - LA - NEUVE
According to this approach the grant of immunity to
a foreign State is not an obligation on the part of the
forum State but it is conferred upon the foreign sovereign
as a matter of comity or good will. In contrast to the
first principle which can exclude jurisdiction altogether
over the foreign State, the comity theory would allow for
the jurisdiction but requires that it be waived in the
interests of friendly inter-State relations Though
originally the wavier might have been ex gratia, probably
its wide and universal practice has produced a rule of
positive lawJ°^ Historically immunities would be extended
to the foreign sovereign in good faith, combined with
and Haber v. Queen of Portugal, (1851), (Law Reports,
Queen's Bench Division; p.207, (Quoted by Sucharitkul,
ibid) where Chief Justice Campbell basing sovereign
immunity on international law said:
To cite a foreign potentate in a municipal
court, for any complaint against him in his
public capacity is contrary to the law of
nations, and an insult which he is entitled to
resent.
Some writers are of the view that comity, is an
added reason and a subsidiary basis for immunities. (See
for instance, Sucharitkul, op cit, fn. 5, p.119). Rousseau
seems to prefer the explanation of the immunity from
jurisdiction on the basis of independence and equality of
States to those based on the territoriality of the
judicial competence and the simple usage of courtoisie.
However, he adds, whatever may be the foundation of
immunity from jurisdiction it is:
un principle elementaire du droit des gens
and an established rule of International
Rousseau, op cit, fn. 11, at p.10.
law. See
101 O'Connell, op cit, fn. 94, at p.843.
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self-interest^°^ in order to attain reciprocity. The
principle of reciprocity, alone, has hardly been
considered to be relevant to the determination of a plea
of immunity perhaps because it introduces relativity into
the law and requires complex investigations of foreign
States positions and of their laws which indeed is
tantamount to negativing any meaningful standard of
international lawJ°^ However, some polish cases provide
evidence of reciprocity as a basis for immunity
dispositions, because article 5 of the Polish Code of
In Schooner Exchange, (op cit, fn. 95, at
pp.135-136) Chief Justice Marchall, inter alia, said that:
The world being composed of distinct
sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal
independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted
by intercourse with each other, and by an
interchange of those good offices which humanity
dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns
have consented to a relaxation, in practice, in
cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of
that absolute and complete jurisdiction within
their respective territories which sovereignty
confer.
The notion of international comity was explicitly
relied on by Lord Justice Bret in Parlement beige (op cit,
fn. 95, at pp. 214-215), where he said:
The principle... is that, as a consequence of
the absolute independence of every sovereign
authority, and of the international comity which
induces every sovereign State to respect the
independence and dignity of every other
sovereign State, each and everyone declines to
exercise by means of its courts any of its
territorial jurisdiction over the person of any
sovereign or ambassador of any other State, or
over the public property of any State which is
destined to public use, or over the property of
any ambassador, though such sovereign,
ambassador, or property be within its territory,
and, therefore, but for the common agreement,
subject to its jurisdiction.
103 O'Connell, op cit, fn. 94, at p.847
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Civil Procedure provides for the condition of
reciprocity
D. Relevance of Diplomatic Immunities
According to this approach the diplomatic immunities,
though established long before the immunities of States,
are not unrelated to the latter. Indeed immunities of
ambassadors and diplomats are accorded to them for
functional necessities and for the benefit of the State
which they represent. The reason is that the diplomatic
agent shall lose his immunity when he ceases to represent
the State and while at the service of the sending State,
he can not alone renounce his immunity.Therefor, since
diplomatic agents are accorded immunity under
international law in their capacity as representatives,
and for the benefit of the foreign States, a fortiori
their respective States should be entitled to the same
immunities.
E. Difficulty or Impossibility of Execution
According to this approach the absolute immunity from
execution would provide and necessitate absolute immunity
from jurisdiction. In many countries the immunity from
execution of foreign States' properties is absolute, and
the judgment rendered can not be practically enforced
For Polish cases see German Immunities in
Poland, Supreme Court, Annual Digest, Vol.8, 1935-193 7,
case No.95, p.239; S.V. British Treasury, Supreme Court,
ILR, Vol.24, 1957, p.223; French Consulate in Cracow
case. Supreme Court, ILR, Vol.26, 1958, II, p.178, quoted
by Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, at pp. 206-207 See also
observations of Skubiszewski (reflected in AIDI, 62, T.
II, p. 259 and AIDI 63, T.I, at p. 20) where he proposes the
inclusion of the principle of reciprocity in the
Resolution of the International Law Institute.
Dessus V. Ricoy (1907) , Clunet, Paris, 34th year
(1907), pp.1086 and 1087, quoted by Sucharitkul, 2nd Rep.
op cit, fn. 4, at p.229.
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without the consent of the foreign State. This
uneforceability demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the
doctrine which seeks to find a distinction between various
acts of a State. In a number of early Belgian cases,
the courts accepted the doctrine of absolute immunity on
the ground that assets of a foreign State could not be
attached.
Nowadays, however, this approach has lost much, if
not all, of its weight. Firstly, in may countries the
immunity from execution is no longer absolute; Secondly a
judgment confronted with difficulties of enforcement
because of the reluctance of the judgment debtor, a
foreign State, does posses not only moral effect, but also
possess legal effect in that it can be the subject of
diplomatic action or even international judicial
proceedings between the national State of the plaintiff
and the foreign State. Therefor, impossibility of
enforcement or its related difficulties can not be a sound
legal justification for State immunities.
VIII. CRITERIA FOR THE RESTRICTION OF IMMUNITY
The survey, at previous pages, of the case-law in
different countries^"' demonstrates that while State
immunity is considered as a general rule of international
law, the controversy over its extent is ongoing and there
See: Fitzmaurice Gerald G., "State Immunity from
Proceedings in Foreign Courts", BYIL, 1933, P.101, at
p. 121, where he is of the view that the judgment is
without even a moral effect.
Affaire Braive, P.B. 1902-11-204, 241; Etat
n6erlandias c. Soci6t6 du Chemin de Per, P.B. 1902-11-162,
163, both qouted by: Sucharitkul, Recueil des cours, op
cit, fn. 5, at p.121.
Lauterpacht, op cit, fn. 11, at 222.
And the more detailed study of the historical
development of immunity in France, Germany and the United
States in subsequent Chapters of this work.
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is a clear trend in favour of restricting the scope of
immunities of foreign States. The survey discloses that
different grounds are used to rationalize the restriction
of the immunities. Indeed one of the most important
challenges of immunity law is the ongoing effort to
identify the boundary between immunity and non-
immunity.''^'' Before embarking on the criteria for the
restriction of immunity we should see if the rule of
immunity jurisdictionally imposes a duty upon the
territorial State to refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction over a foreign State and if immunity must be
distinguished from the competence of the territorial
State, established by the application of private
international law rule of the forum, does it apply rations
personae or rations jnateriae?"'' Immunity applies rations
p&rsonas to identify, at least on a prima fads basis, its
beneficiaries, among which the principal one is the
foreign State as such or its agents, agencies, and
instrumentalities, with or without separate legal
personality. The greater bulk of immunity law, however, is
concerned with and involves the efforts regarding the
determination of immunity rations matsriae, to identify
whether substantively it can properly be claimed by those
contending to be its beneficiaries. If one could provide
an underlying rationals for the restrictive immunity as
determining the substantive limits of immunity, within
which immunity can be asserted rations matsrias, then
difficulties relating to the identification of categories
of beneficiaries of immunity rations psrsonas will be
minimized."^ Therefore, it would be in order to focus on
different criteria, suggested by case law or otherwise, to
Comments of Higgins R., AIDI, 64, II, 1991, at
p.236.
See: Sinclair, Rscusil dss. Cours, op clt,fn.
10, at p.199; Rousseau, op cit, fn. 11, at pp.11-16.
Sinclair, ibid, at p.200.
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justify the restrictive doctrine. Those criteria can be
mentioned as follows.
A. Dual Personality of State
This criterion is based on the proposition that
State acting in the sphere of public law will be in a
different capacity than where acting in the sphere of
private law. In the latter case immunity must be denied,
because as soon as the State descends to the domain of
private law it will assume the position to which a private
law person is entitled with respect to rights and
obligations and with respect to amenability to suit.
Different Italian and French judgments are based on this
dichotomy of State as a body politic {ente politico) and
a civil entity (ente civile) In early French
jurisprudence some judgments were based on the distinction
between "Etat puissance publique" and "etat personne
privee" from which emanates the notions of commercial
versus non-coinmercial and sovereign versus non-sovereign
activity.
The difficulty with this criterion is that it is a
subjective distinction. Indeed "... a sovereign State does
not cease to be a sovereign State because it performs acts
See for instance, the case of Guttier v.
Elmilik, II Foro Italiano, (Rome) Vol.XI, part 1 (1886),
pp.913 & 919-921 a decision confirming that of the court
of Appeal of Luca, (1886), ibid, p.490; but see Gamen-
Huiaber c.Etat russe. Court of Appeal of Paris 1912,
Dalloz, 1913, 2, 201; which rejected the distinction
between dual personalities of State by holding that all
activities of State pursued a political goal. In Germany
see: Heizer g. Kaizer-Franz-Jaseph. Bahn A.G, Bavarian
Court of Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 1885, quoted by the
Harvard Draft, op cit, fn. 50, comment to article 7, at
p.534. Also commented at length by Allen, op cit, fn. 55
See: infra. Chapter II, the text following fns.
181-188
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which a private citizen might perform".''^® Moreover, the
State, even in countries of an advance capitalist system,
might well be required to enter into industrial and
economic activities in the interest of the general welfare
of the community as a holeJ^^
B. Implied Waiver
Implied waiver or voluntary submission by the
defendant State to the territorial jurisdiction of the
forum State, which has been relied often as a subsidiary
ground for immunity, is based on a broad interpretation of
the notion of waiver by some courts, especially at the
early days of the shift from the absolute to the
restrictive doctrine. Examples of the application of this
criterion might be found where a State enters into a
contract or a legal relationship which entails an implied
recognition of the jurisdiction of local courts In the
Fitzmaurice, op cit, fn. 106, at p.121. In that
article, Fitzmaurice argues that any attempt for
delimiting the scope of immunity would be futile because
it either leads to conflicting results or to the
elimination of immunity. He therefore suggest that "the
only sound course is to adhere to the strict doctrine of
complete immunity, any departures from it, in specific
cases, being regulated by international conventions".
ibid, at p.124. Fitzmaurice's suggestion is in sharp
contrast with Hirsch Lautespacht's proposal in his
article, op cit, fn. 11, where he advocated the abolition
of the doctrine of immunity of foreign States before
municipal courts except to the extent that the territorial
State enjoys it. To make international law free "of the
shackles of an archaic and cumbersome doctrine of
controversial validity and usefulness", (ibid, at p.247)
he emphasised the desirability of international
codification by a multilateral treaty which provides for
a general rule of non-immunity subject to a few specified
exceptions and safeguards.
116 Lauterpacht, ibid, at p.224.
Heizer v. Keizer Franz-Josef Bahn A.G., op cit,
fn.ll3; the case of Russian Trade Delegation v. Tesini and
Malvezzi (1925, Italian Court of Cassation, Annual Digest,
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Russian Trade Delegation— the Court of Cassation of
Italy relied, inter alia, on the proposition that where a
State embarks upon industrial or commercial activities in
Italy, that State's renunciation of its immunity would be
implied.
These broad interpretations of the notion of implied
waiver were, at the time of the application of the full
rigour of the absolute immunity, in sharp contrast with
the practice of English courts where they required that
the foreign State should waive its immunity in the face of
the court in the actual proceedings."' However, later
developments of immunity law do not seem to have indorsed
a broad interpretation of the notion of waiver. For
instance in the ILC's Second Draft^^° while waiver of
immunity from jurisdiction can be express (article 7), or
implied (articles 8 and 9), waiver of immunity from
execution can only be express. Moreover, article 18.2 of
the said Draft explicitly requires that the express
consent given for immunity from jurisdiction "shall not
imply" waiver of immunity from execution, "for which a
separate consent shall be necessary". The 1991 Resolution
of the International Law Institute^^^ in its article 5
adopts a similar approach. Mention has to be made also of
the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. While an
Vol.3, 1925-26, case No.127, p.176, quoted and commented
by Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, at p.203.
"8 Ibid.
Duff Development Co. Ltd. v. Government of
Klantan (1924), A.C., p.797; Kahan v. Pakistan Federation
(1951), K.B., p.1003, quoted by Fitzmaurice op cit, fn.
106 at p.105, and by Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, at pp.204-
205; the rule that waiver must be made in the face of the
court was subsequently abolished by the U.K. State
Immunity Act of 1978 (section 2) where, among other
things, a State may submit to the jurisdiction of a
foreign curt by a "prior written agreement".
^20 Qp cit, fn. 27
AIDI, Vol.64, II, p.267.
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explicit or implied waiver might be sufficient for matters
of immunity from jurisdiction^^^ and immunity from post-
judgment attachment^^^ for matters of immunity from pre-
judgment attachment only an explicit waiver can workJ^^
C. Acta Jure Imperii and Acta Jure Gestionls
The case law of a number of countries has developed
a distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure
gestionis, granting immunity only for the former category
of activities. The distinction which has become a
catchword and is considered by many writers to be the
central core of the restrictive doctrine is based on the
assumption that certain activities are properly sovereign
or State functions and others essentially do not involve
puissance publique.^^^ Expressions such as "acts de
gestion priv6e" and "acts d' autorit4", and "acts de
Section 1605(a)(1).
Section 1610(a)(1).
Section 1610(d)(1).
125 For Belgian cases see, for example, Feldman v.
Etat de Bahia (1979) (Pasicrisie beige, 1908 (Brussels),
part 2. p.55). cited by the Harvard Draft, op cit, fn.
50,at p.484; Monnoyer et Bernard v. Etat frangais (1927)
(Pasicrisie beige, 1927 (Brussels) part 3, pp.129-132,
cited by the Harvard Draft, loc cit, at p.615; For U.K.
See the notorious case of I'Congreso del Partido, U.K.
House of Lords (1981) 3. W.L. R. 328, and the more recent
case of Littrell v. U.S.A, High Court, Queen's Bench
Division, 8 June 1992, Court of Appeal, 12 Nov. 1993, ILR,
Vol.100, p.438; for Germany the landmark decision of Claim
Against the Empire of Iran Case, Federal Constitutional
Court, ILR 45 (1972), p.57; Youssef M.Nada v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 1975, Provincial Court of Frankfurt, ILM, XVI
(May 1997), p.501; for Italy the case of Typaldos, Console
di Grecia v. Manicomio di Anersa (1886), (Giurisprudenze
Italiana (Turin), Vol.1 (1886) p.229, cited and translated
in the Harvard Draft, loc cit, pp.624-625.
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souveralnetd" are used as french language equivalents
Though this criterion is widely used and is more objective
than the previous ones, in that it focuses on the nature
of the activity rather than its purpose, it has been
criticized in the doctrineIndeed courts of different
countries, and occasionally courts of the same country,
have characterized the same activity sometimes as Jure
imperil and sometimes as Jure gestionis.—
In order to reduce difficulties of distinguishing
between acts Jure imperii and acts Jure gestionis, in
Europe there has been a tendency to do this by reference
to the distinction between private law^^' and public law
activities. Thus, as was stated by the Empire of Iran
case,^^° if the State has acted in a private law capacity
The Terms "acte de gouvernement" and "acte
d'autorit6" are used in French legal system for division
of competence between civil and administrative tribunals
and for designating government acts that are outside
jurisdiction of courts, see: Hamson, "Immunity of Foreign
States: the Practice of the French Courts", BYIL, 1950,
p.293.
See: for example, Brownlie, AIDI, 62, T.I, pp.26
et seq., where he is of the view that the distinction is
unsuitable for the development of the law, and
Lauterpacht, op cit, fn. 11, at pp.222 et seq.
Lauterpacht, Ibid, at p. 222. Lalive is of the
view that the distinction, as a juridical technic, has
produced considerable difficulties and that the question
of characterization, so far, has been an obstacle to the
development of a general and precise rule.
II est generalement admis que cette distinction
se heurte a des difficultes considerables du
point de vue de la technique juidique. Le
probleme de qualification a jusqu'a present fait
obstacle a 1'elaboration d'une regie generale et
precise.
Lalive, op cit, fn. 74, at p.282.
Higgins, R. "Certain Unresolved Aspects of the
Law of State Immunity", NILR., vol. XXIX (1982), p.265, at
p.268.
Empire of Iran case. Op cit, fn. 125
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the act would be an act Jure gestionis. Therefore, the
criterion of private law and public law activity seems to
be a different expression of the jure imperii, jure
gestionis distinction, with emphasis on the public or
private nature of the activities
D. Principle of Non-intervention
This principle seems to be the underlying principle
of the International Law Institute Resolution of 1991
Professor Brownlie^^^ in his preliminary Reportafter
citing different methods for restricting immunity and
admitting their relative usefulness, considers them to be
inadequate. He puts forward his own solution which,
despite reservations by some members of the Institute,
constitutes the main pillar of the aforementioned
Resolution. He suggests to regulate the problem of
immunities by resorting to rational principles relating to
the competence of the courts. The main proposition is that
"certain subject matter which is sometimes said to involve
immunity ratione materiae" is not immunity ratione
materiae because it is not immunity at all.""^® The
question is one of essential competence and is grounded in
See: Sucharitkul, 4th Rep. op cit, fn. 84, at.
p.209, where he suggests that the distinction between acta
Jure imperii and acta Jure gestionis could be said to be
more comprehensive while other variations can be
considered as a "nuance or a shade of difference in
emphasis".
IDI. Resolution, Basle Session, 1991, AIDI.
64,11, p. 267
As the Rapporteur of the topic "Contemporary
Problems Concerning the Jurisdictional Immunities of
States".
AIDI, op cit, fn. 64, p. 13. See also
Brownlie,Principles, op cit, fn. 7, at p.324, where he
mentions the principle of non-intervention as a legal
basis for immunity.
135 AIDI, ibid, at p.19.
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another principle of international law, the principle of
non- intervention. The crucial point is to see what are
the critical elements in determining whether the municipal
courts are competent. Those critical eleioaents are based
upon two main distinctions:a) "the identification of
those areas of municipal court's incompetence which is
often described as immunity rations materiae, b) "the
distinction between the essence of national policies and
the normal risks of implementation by means of private law
transactions". In this analysis what is outside the
competence of domestic courts is not acts jure imperil as
such but it is the policies both domestic and foreign that
are to be protected from the examination by the domestic
courts. Thus some subject mater are protected as a
consequence of principle of non-intervention^^® and some
are protected on general grounds of international public
policy (and other principles in certain cases).This
method is believed to avoid difficulties of a)
identification of acts jure questions, b) reference to
commercial activity and c) the criterion of an activity in
which private persons or entities may engage. Based
mainly on the aforementioned analysis, the International
Law Institute's Resolution gives two sets of
counterveiling indicia which are based on the competence
and incompetence ratione materiae of the courts. In
matters which, according to the fundamental principle of
non-intervention, a domestic court lacks competence
Ibid, at p.34.
Ibid, at p.35,
138 sgg Bowett, op cit, fn. 1, at pp. 14-18, where he
mentions, among other principles such as equality of
States, principle of non-intervention as a basic principle
governing the relations of States and as a good criterion
for assessing the propriety of exercising jurisdiction by
one State against another one.
AIDI, op cit, fn. 64, at p. 35.
Ibid, at p.34.
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ratione jnaterlae""^^ the immunity of the foreign State will
be upheld, otherwise, and in harmony with the other sets
of indicia the matter would fall under the juridiction of
the domestic court, meaning the rejection of immunity. The
problem with the principle of non-intervention is that it
can not justifiably explain all aspects of immunity
law.i«
E. Commercial Activity
Since early times the notion of commercial activity
which is usually accompanied, or at least motivated, by
the notion of profit making has been used in the doctrine
and the case law to attack the absolute immunity of the
foreign sovereign or foreign State where they are, in
fact, acting like an ordinary person of private lawJ'^^
Which is different from the prior issue of
subject matter jurisdiction, ihid, at p.97.
Later in his Definitive Rep. id. pp.44 et seg,
Brownlie seems to admit that these two areas of non-
justiciability (immunity ratione materiae) and
justiciability leave a number of situations outside the
classification. Those situations are the questions of
prejudgment attachment and post judgment attachment (where
eventually the Resolution has mainly adopted the ILC's
approach) and secondly the question of operation of
principle of consent and finally the immunity of heads of
State and foreign ministers. Ibid, at p.48.
For the doctrine see for instance,, Weiss Andre
"competence ou incompetence des Tribunaux a 1' egard des
Etats etranger", Recueil des cours, 1923 vol.1, pp.525 et
seq; For the case law see for example: the Charkieh case
where judge Philimore stated that:
No principle of international law, and no
decided case, and no dictum of jurists of which
I am aware, has gone so far as to authorize a
sovereign prince to assume the character of a
trader, when it is for his benefit; and when he
incurs an obligation to a private subject to
throw of, if I may so speak, his disguise, and
appear as a sovereign, claiming for his own
benefit, and to the injury of a private person,
for the first time, all the attributes of his
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The criterion distinguishes between those activities of a
State with a commercial or non-governmental nature and
those with non-commercial or governmental nature.All
recent codification^^® on State immunity contain some kind
of commercial transaction or commercial activity
provision.Indeed, the major part of the old concept of
jure Imperil/jure gestionis is covered by the commercial
transaction clause. Like the old concept the commercial
activity notion focuses on the nature rather than the
purpose of the activity.
character.
The "Charkieh", (1873) (United Kingdom), The Law Reports,
High Court of Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts, vol.IV
(1875), p.59 at pp.99-100.
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210.
Sucharikul, 4th Rep. op cit, fn. 84, at pp.209-
Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent
Developments, Grotius Publications, 1988, p.10.
See; for instance, the European Convention on
State Immunity of 1972, article 7; The British Act,
section 3; The U.S. Act, section 1605; the Australian Act,
section 11; the ILC Second Draft, op clt, fn. 27, article
10 and the International Law Institute Resolution of 1991
(op clt, fn. 132) which speaks of "commercial transaction"
as the first criterion of indicating the competence of the
local courts in article 2.2(a) and again speaks of the
term "commercial contract" in article 2.2(b).
Definitions of commercial activity or commercial
transaction in many immunity codification and national
legislation are fairly similar. For instance, the European
Convention on State Immunity of 1972, refers to the
notions of "industrial, commercial, or financial activity"
carried out "in the same manner as a private person" would
carry out [Article 7]. The Australian Act defines a
commercial transaction as "a commercial, trading,
business, professional industrial or like transaction"
including contracts for the supply of services or goods
and other financial agreements and financial guarantees
(section 11 of the Australian Act). These broad and rather
circular definitions of the term "commercial activity",
combined with the approach of focusing, in most cases, on
the nature, rather than the propose, of the transaction
gives the courts ample room to curtail the scope of
immunity by characterizing the activity as commercial and
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The wide use of "commercial/governmental activity",
criterion in the case law^^® and in the codification
projects indicates that nowadays the notion is the most
common place or common ground for limiting immunity
because^^' it is easily identifiable, understood and
meaningful. Nevertheless, there are some criticism on the
usefulness of the criterion as solid basis for the
development of immunity law because, like the jure
imperii/jure gestionis test, it produces conflicting
results and brings uncertainty
F. Functional Necessities
This approach is based on the assumption that none of
the criteria suggested by the case-law or doctrine can
fully justify the grant or the rejection of immunity^®^
and therefore the better course would be to grant immunity
where functional necessities^®^ require it, even on the
basis of most restrictive approach.^"
to reject the plea of immunity.
See for example cases cited by Sucharitkul, 4th.
Rep. op clt, fn. 84, at pp.213 et seq.
Ibid, at pp. 210-211.
For critiques on the usefulness of this
criterion see, for example, Crawford J., "International
Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune
Transactions", BYIL, 1983, p.71; at pp.76 et seq and pp.
89 et seq; Brownlie, AIDI, op cit, fn. 64, at p.34.
Actually, many writers have expressed doubts as
to whether any of the abovementioned criteria could
sufficiently be a basis for the restrictive theory of
immunity. Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, pp. 200-205;
Lautherpacht, op cit, fn. 11, p. 220 et seq; Crawford,
ibid.
152 Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, at pp.214-217.
As Lord Dening put it in the case of Rahimtoola
V. Nizam of Hyderabad (House of Lords, 7 Nov. 1957), ILR
vol.24, p.175, it would be incorrect and a gross
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The functionalist approach begins from the point
where the territorial jurisdiction is the principle and
immunity is an exception to that exclusive and broad
jurisdiction Immunity will be granted because of
functional necessities, and in the final analysis on the
basis of equality and sovereignty of States, so that the
validity of acts which a foreign State performs in its own
territory may not be subject of judicial review by the
courts of another sovereign. In this sense, the
functionalist test is indeed based on the principle of
sovereignty and equality of States which has served, in
the heydays of the absolute doctrine to justify a wide
immunity for a foreign State. The difference is that the
functionalist approach subordinates the equality and
sovereignty principle to the principle of territorial
sovereignty of States. If the functionalist approach can
be adopted in a convention of universal character in which
the exceptions of immune activities to the basic principle
of territorial jurisdiction are carefully and clearly
enumerated, it will be a positive and welcome development
to the immunity law.''^^ On the other hand, if the
application of this approach flourishes in the court
practice of States, based on their own determinations of
territorial jurisdiction, instances of arbitrary
characterization of activities of foreign States as immune
or non-immune will occur frequently which will create
uncertainty and inconsistency and will be harmful to the
establishment of a sound and an internationally acceptable
foundation for immunity law.
simplification to found immunity on the purely formal
impleading of a foreign State, rather it should be based
on the nature of the conflict and whether the matter is
cognizable by the local court. Nevertheless, Lord Dening
Justifies the grant of immunity where it affronts the
dignity of the foreign State.
Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, at pp. 214-215.
As has been done by the Vienna Conventi<
1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.
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IV. CODIFICATION EFFORTS
A. At National Level
Different efforts at national or international level
have been made to codify the rules of immunity law. Seven
countries namely Australia, Canada, Pakistan, Singapore,
South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States have
adopted special legislation embodying the restrictive
doctrine^". These seven instruments in Chronological
order are as follows; the United States Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, the United Kingdom State Immunity
Act of 1978, the Singapore State Immunity Act of 1979, the
Pakistani State Immunity Ordinance of 1981, the South
African Foreign States Immunities Act of 1981, the
Canadian State Immunity Act of 1982 and The Australian
State Immunities Act of 1985^^^. All these instruments
have common features while containing distinctive
provisions and contrary elements^®®.
B. At International Level
Apart from national legislation, in international
plane the attention of learned bodies has since long time
ago been focused on the immunity problem. Most of all
Institute de Droit International,^^' International Bar
Badr, op cit, fn. 61, pp. 113 et. Seq.
The Australian Act is reprinted in Common-Wealth
of Australia Gazette, No. S 128, 2 6 March 198 6, cited by
Australian Y. B. Int'l. L. vol. 10, p. 299; other six
Statutes are all reprinted in Badr, ibid, pp. 188-230,
158 Brownlie, op cit, fn. 7, p. 328, Badr, op cit,
fn. 61, pp. 115 et seq.
See supra, fn.49 and the accompanying text.
Apart from the Hamburg Resolution in late 19th Century,
the Institute has adopted two more Resolutions in this
Century, at the Aix-en-Province Session in 1954 (AIDI,
1954, II, pp.293-301) and at the Bal Session in 1991 (Id.
vol.64, II, pp.388-401. For the preparatory work leading
to the 1991 Resolution, see Id. vol.62, I, pp. 13-158;
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Association, International Law Association, and Harvard
Law Faculty have endeavored to codify the immunity law and
facilitate the trend towards the theory of restrictive
immunity''^. At inter-governmental level too, various
efforts have been made in order to codify, in part or in
whole, the law of sovereign immunity or to regulate
special aspects of the problem.Among these efforts
mention has to be made of the Brussels Conference on
Maritime Law of 1926, which adopted the Brussels
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning
the Immunity of State-Owned Ships in the same year. The
main purpose and object of the Convention was to
assimilate the status of State-owned or operated merchant
ships to that of privately owned or operated merchant
ships and to subject the claims involving the former to
the jurisdiction of local courts. The same applies to two
important conventions, namely the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the Convention on
the High Seas, both signed in 1958 at Geneva and now in
force^^^. Other attempts were made at the League of
Nations Committee for the Progressive Codification of
International Law (1925-1928), Asian/African Legal
Consultative Committee, Council of Europe Committee of
Experts on State Immunity whose works led to the adoption
in 1972 of the European Convention on State Immunity and
vol.63-1, pp. 13-30; vol.64-1, pp.80-89; vol.64-11 pp.214-
278.
Sucharitkul, Preliminary Rep. op cit, fn. 3, pp.
229-231, Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, pp. 134-137.
For a list of some important conventions such as
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and
also of some regional international agreements regulating
rules of immunity in respect to certain categories of
State representatives see Sucharitkul, s. "Immunity of
State" in: International Law: Achievements and
Prospects, (Mohammed Bejaoui General Editor) , 1991, Unesco,
Paris, p.327, at p. 331 et seq.
162 Brownlie, Principles, op cit, fn. 7, p. 329.
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Additional Protocol^^^, and most significantly the
project, started actively since 1978 by the International
Law Commission of the U.nJ^. The draft articles on
"jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Properties"
was adopted by that commission on the first reading on 20
June 1986 and on the second reading on 7 June 1991
Furthermore the Commission decided on 4 July 1991 to
recommend to the General Assembly of the United Nations to
convene an international conference of plenipotentiaries
to review the text of the draft and to draw up a
convention on the topic
The European Convention follows course different
from seven national statutes. All seven national statutes
impose various restrictions on immunity of foreign States
Properties from execution, whereas Article 23 of the
Convention, while imposing on signatories the duty to give
effect to judgments rendered against them, endorses the
absolute immunity from execution. See Verhoeven J., op
cit, fn. 51, p. 75.
On recent codification efforts see generally;
Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, pp. 137-145; ILA, Report of the
Sixtieth Conference (Montreal, 1982), 5-10, 325-48;
Annuaire de I'Inst. 62 (1987), i. 13-158; ibid, 62(1987),
ii. 241-73; ibid., 63(1989), i, 64-i, 80-89, G4 ii, 214-
287; Yrbk. ILC(1979), ii (Pt. I), 227-44; (1980), ii (Pt.
I), 199-230; (1981), ii (Pt. I), 125-50; (1982), ii (Pt.
I), 199-229; (1983), ii (Pt. I), 25-56; (1984), ii (Pt.
I), 5-58; (1985), ii (Pt. I), 21-47; (1986), ii (Pt. I),
21-37; ibid. (Pt. 2), 7-22, (1991), Vol I.
YB. ILC, (1991) vol I, p. 88. This draft contains
a set of 22 Articles.
Ibid, p. 185. Since 1991 the General Assembly has
followed up the matter by adopting different resolutions
and by establishing an open-ended working group of the
Sixth Committee in order to receive the comments of the
member States and to attenuate the differences so that a
general agreement can be achieved and the conference of
plenipotentiaries be convened. The General Assembly's
Resolution No. 52/151, 15 Dec. 1997 shows that an
international conference is still far away since the
Resolution anticipates the establishment of a new working
group and urges the States, if they have not done so, to
submit their comments in accordance with Resolution
No. 49/61, 9 Dec. 1994 of the General Assembly. See: The
Work of The International Law Commission, 5th. Ed. United
Nations, New York, 1996, pp.104-111, and Analytical Guide
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V. CONDITIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT
Under General international law enforcement measures
will be admissible if certain conditions are met. First
of all there must exist a binding and enforceable court
decision against the foreign State or an automatically
enforceable document from which the veracity of the claim
can be ascertained. The claim must not have been
rejectable by the forum State on the basis of the rules
regarding jurisdictional immunities of foreign States.
Otherwise the forum State would be prohibited under
international law to recognize such a judgment^^^.
Generally one would agree with these conditions, subject
to some precautions.
Moreover, with respect to the attachment of State
owned properties, in some countries such as France
and the United States^^', there is a requirement that the
properties sought to be attached be related to the
transaction giving rise to the claim. In other words only
those properties of a foreign State which are used for the
commercial or industrial activity upon which the claim is
based can be attached^^°. In some other jurisdictions such
to the Work of the International Law Commission, (1949-
1997), United Nations, New York, 1998, pp.83-95.
WJOC Legal Status case, infra, fn. 381,
at p. 202.
See Chapter 2, the discussion pertaining to
Eurodif attachment.
See Section 1610 (a) (2) of the FSIA and Chapter
7,the discussion pertaining to the Iranian attachments in
the U.S.
Martin, infra, fn. 610, at 488; Delaume G.
"Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity" AJIL 79
(1985) No. 2. p. 319, at p. 335.
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as Germany this factual connection is not necessary'^^.
Other jurisdictional requirements such as the payment
of costs if the plaintiff is successful and the
availability of judicial machinery to verify bona fides
claims must be fulfilled as well^^^.
With respect to interim measures to secure
satisfaction of a judgment where different mechanisms such
as pre-Judgment attachment or injunctions are used, the
matter is not settled^^. While in France, saisie
conservatoire is allowed and practiced, the Immunity Acts
of the United States and the United Kingdom allow pre-
judgment attachments, only when the foreign State has
given an appropriate waiver. Some commentators construe
the lack of such restriction in the Immunity Acts of
Pakistan, South Africa, Singapore and Canada as an
indication that those laws permit pre-judgment attachment
174
NIOC Revenues From Oil Sales case, Federal
Republic of Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, 12
April 1983, ILR 65 (1984) p. 215, at p. 242.
1^2 Crawford, op cit, fn. 68, at p. 868.
Ibid, p. 869.
Steinberger, op cit, fn. 19, at p. 443;
however,the requirements of "waiver" and "factual
connection" were embodied in the ILC Second Draft. Article
18 of that Draft provides;
No measures of constraint, such as attachment,
arrest and execution, against property of a
State may be taken in connection with a
proceeding before a court of another State
unless and except to the extent that:
(a) The State has expressly consented to the taking
of such measures as indicated;
(ii) by an arbitration agreement
or in a written contract;
or
(iii) by a declaration before the
court or by a written
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Properties held for central banking or monetary
purposes are considered by some jurisdictions and writers
to be immune from enforcement measures^^. Furthermore
the forum State ought not, under the guise of the
enforcement measures, intervene in the internal affairs of
the foreign State or impede the smooth functioning of its
diplomatic and consular missions^^^.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The above survey clearly demonstrates that by 1979,
there was an unmistakable trend towards the application of
the restrictive immunity theory in the jurisprudence of
many countries. The works of learned bodies of
international law and opinions of writers too, were
overwhelmingly favoring that trend. Furthermore, as will
be seen the United States, by adoption in 1976 of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and France and Germany,
through the decisions of their highest courts, had
communication after a
dispute between the parties
has arisen;
(b) the State has allocated or earmarked
property for the satisfaction of the claim which
is the object of that proceeding; or
(c) the property is specifically in use or
intended for use by the State for other than
government non-commercial purposes and is in the
territory of the State of the forum and has a
connection with the claim which is the object of
the proceeding or with the agency or
instrumentality against which the proceeding was
directed.
ILC Second Draft, op cit, fn. 27, at p. 56.
Re: infra,. Chapter 7, the discussion pertaining
to the immunity of central bank funds in the United
States; Steinberger, ibid, at p. 443.
Philippine Case, infra, fn. 407, at p. 189.;
NIOC Revenues Case op. cit, fn. 171, at p. 244.
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definitely opted to grant only restrictive iininunity to
foreign States and their properties.
On the other hand, in late Seventies, there were many
unanswered questions, raised by the application of the
restrictive theory in both immunity from jurisdiction and
immunity from execution areas. This point is of
particular significance because following the 1979
Revolution in Iran many large cases in Germany and France
and hundreds of cases in the United States were filed
against the new Iranian Government which involved
immunity determinations by the courts. The main objective
of this thesis is to see how the restrictive theory was
applied to the Iranian cases and in what way those cases
contributed to the development of the restrictive theory,
bearing in mind that the relations of Germany and France
with Iran were less than friendly and those of the United
States were even hostile.
PART TWO
CLAIMS INVOLVING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
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CHAPTER TWO
CLAIMS INVOLVING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN BEFORE THE FRENCH COURTS
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OP IMMUNITY LAW IN FRANCE
A. Pre-1945 Case-law on Immunity From Jurisdiction
In France, the role of legislation in regulating the
immunity law has been, so far, very insignificant and
provisions of the internal law in that respect are very
scarce^^. However, and despite the fact that the
authoritativeness of an "arret" which may be cited by the
courts and followed is much less than that of a
"precedent" in common law countries'"^®, the most important
role in this field has been played by the jurisprudence.
During the entire period of 19th century, the French
jurisprudence adhered to the principle of absolute
immunity of states, irrespective of the nature of the act
constituting the basis of the claim. This solution was
first affirmed on 22 January 1849 by the Court of
Cassation in the case of Gouvernement espagnol C. Casau^^^
. Although in most cases, the incompetence of the courts
derived from the fact that the contracts underlying the
claims were related to the domain of "Public Service" of
the State, which was necessarily of a sovereign nature,
the generality of the terms used by the courts left no
doubt that nothing of the nature of the act had been taken
into consideration^®".
Bourel Pierre, Dalloz, Repertoire De Droit
International, Immunites, tome II, 1969, p.118, Nos. 6-9.
Sucharitkul, op cit, fn. 5, at p. 140.
Op cit, fn. 95; Dunbar, op cit, fn. 48, pp. 205-
209; Bourel, op cit, fn. 177, at no. 49; Sucharitkul,
ibid.
Bourel, ibid, at no. 48
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The attempt by the lower courts to establish a
distinction between the State as a public power {Etat
puissance public) and the State as a private person (Etat
personne privet), was rejected, in 1912, in a case against
the Russian governments®^ The court held that all
activities of the State pursued a political goal and its
unity resisted any attempt for division^®^. However,
after the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the
application of the principle of absolute immunity of
States, which had already been criticized by the doctrine,
met with considerable difficulties. These difficulties
emanated, partly, from the sharp increase in the number of
the persons which were beneficiaries of the immunities and
partly from the increased involvement of the State outside
its borders, in the fields of economy, industry and
commerce.
In 1915 for the first time, the restrictive doctrine
of immunity was formulated and applied by French courts.
The Tribunal de commerce de Nantes made a distinction
between acts of private law and public law nature and
denied immunity. On appeal, the Cour d' Appel de Rennes
though declared jurisdiction, because in its view, the
vessel Hungerford had been employed by British Admiralty
in public law activities, confirmed the doctrine of
Gamen-Humber c. Etat russe, op cit, fn. 113
182
II n'y a pas lieu de distinguer entre eux... la
personnalite publique qui echapperait a la
competence etrangere de la personnalite morale
qui s'y trouverait, au contraire, assujettie:
tous les actes d'un Etat ne pouvant avoir qu'un
but et qu'un fin toujours politiques et son
unite resistant a ce dedoublement.
Ibid, at Dalloz, 1913, 2. 202.
In the case of Soci4t4 Maritime Auxiliaire de
Transports c. Capitaine du Vapeur Hungerford, Darras, 15
(1919), 510.
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restrictive immunity, as formulated by the Tribunal de
Commerce"^^. In subsequent cases involving State-owned
ships, if their uses were of commercial nature, the
immunity would be denied.
This trend towards the application of the restrictive
doctrine was not limited to shipping cases. In 1919, The
Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine, held that, a contract
entered into by Office Suisse de Transports Ext6rieurs,
for the purchase of goods to be imported into Switzerland
was a commercial transaction, or an acte de Commerce,
subject to the jurisdiction of local courts. Although,
immunity was upheld on appeal, because Cour d^Appel de
Paris was of the view that the contract being an "acte
politique" was a non-commercial one in nature, the Court
of Appeal did so in reliance on the restrictive
doctrine^®®.
The notion of "Acte de commerce** as contrasted with
the notion of "acte politique" and "acte de souverainet4"
or "acte de puissance publique" has been widely applied by
French courts and has had a great impact on the evolution
of the restrictive doctrine. After the First Word War,
the theory of "acte de commerce" was adopted in a series
of cases involving the activities of the Trade Delegation
of the former Soviet Union. The Court of Cassation in
1926 held for the first time that the said delegations
could not benefit from immunity of jurisdiction for their
commercial activities^®^. This holding was later affirmed
by other judgments of French courts and was extended to
the cases involving commercial activities of other foreign
Ibid, 18 (1922-23), p. 743, at p. 745, quoted by
Sucharitkul, op cit, fn. 5, p. 144.
Ibid.
186 Soci6t4 le Gostorg U.R.S.S. c. Association
France Export, 19 Nov. 1926, D. H. 1927, 56; S. 1930-1-49,
(quoted by Sucharitkul, ibid. p. 145).
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States too^®^.
The precedent made by the Soviet Union cases was not
sufficient for the courts to set aside the doctrine of
absolute immunity because some commentators were of the
view that those cases had to be limited to instances were
the foreign State had the monopoly of foreign trade^®®.
Therefore, the depart from the absolute theory to the
restrictive theory was far from unanimity and continuity,
as demonstrated by often inconsistent judgments.
B. Post-1945 Case-law on Immunity from jurisdiction
The inconsistency which existed in the jurisprudence
before the Second World War, did continue to exist for
sometime after the war. Although the general trend was
towards the application of the restrictive theory of
immunity, many judgments were issued affirming the
absolute nature of the immunity from jurisdiction of
States. For example in the case of Aricastre'^^'^, the
Court of Appeal of Poitier upheld the immunity from
jurisdiction in proceedings relating to succession to
property and in the case of Rossignol which involved
the possession of real estate situated in France, the
Tribunal Civil de la SGlne upheld the immunity from
jurisdiction of the defendants.
For sometime the courts attempted to employ the
187 Trib. Com. Marseille, 11 Mai 1939, J?ev. Crlt.
d.l.p. 1939. 133, Cours de Cassation; Bourel, op clt, fn.
177, at no. 67.
1®® Bourel, Ibid.
^®' State of Romania v. Arlcastre, Clunet,73-76
(1946-1949), p. 6.
Rossignol v. State of Czechoslovakia, Annual
Digest, vol 16, 1949, case No. 40, p. 140 (quoted by
Sinclair, op clt, fn. 10)
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distinction of "actes d' autorit^" and "actes de gestion".
The rationale was that while immunity could be granted for
those activities of the State accomplished jure imperil,
it could not be afforded for acts accomplished jure
gestionis'^^^. However, since this distinction was too
vague and too uncertain for delimiting the domain of
immunity from jurisdiction, it was criticized by some
courts and was eventually abandoned by the jurisprudence.
For instance, in the case of Robine^^^ the Court of Appeal
of Bordeaux declined to recognize any distinction between
sovereign acts of the State and its acts as a private
individual and upheld the plea of immunity made by the
British Government, thereby adhering once again to the
already shattered theory of absolute immunity.
1. The First Ruling of the Court of Cassation
These sporadic reliance on the absolute theory of
immunity was ended by the Court of Cassation's judgment of
1952 in Martin v. Bank of where the court for the
first time relying on the restrictive immunity held that
Bank of Spain enjoyed immunity when it acted as an agent
and on behalf of the Spanish State in the matter of
stamping or exchanging the bank notes.
Bourel, op cit, fn. 177, at no. 52.
Robine v. Consul of Great Britain, Annual
Digest, Vol. 17, 1950, case No. 38. p. 140.
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En effet, si cette Banque, dotee d'une
personnalite propre est justiciable des
tribunaux frangais pour ces actes de commerce,
il en est autrement lorsque le litige est
relatif a des operations accomplies dans des
conditions imposees par I'Etat espagnol par
representation de ce dernier. Ces actes
constituent des actes d' autorite echappant a
tout controle juridictionnel fran^ais,
Martin v. Bank of Spain, Clunet, 80 (1953) p. 654.
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2. Subsequent Rulings of the Court of Cassation
Thereafter, the Court of Cassation applied the
restrictive theory in different cases such as Perignon'^^'^,
Societe Transshipping v. Pakistan"^^^, L'HStel George
and the landmark case brought against the Iranian
Railways Organization/'^ Where the Court attempted to
rationalize the application of the restrictive theory.
The aforementioned cases, which are chosen by way of
example, show that despite some lower courts' loyalty to
the doctrine of absolute immunity of States, the leading
role of the Court of Cassation has at last and since long
time ago replaced the rigid theory of absolute immunity by
the more up-to-date and flexible restrictive doctrine,
which makes subject to French courts' jurisdiction, those
claims which arise from commercial or trading activities
of foreign States.
C. Fre-1945 Case-law on Immunity from Execution
Immunity from execution of foreign States in France,
unlike the immunity from jurisdiction, did not for a long
time, attract too much attention by the commentators, and
was not subject of too many decisions by the French
France, Court of Cassation. 8 December 1964.
ILR 45 (1972), p. 82 & ILR 65 (1984), p. 39.
France, Court of Cassation. 2 March 1966, ILR
47 (1974), p. 150.
The celebrated case of Spanish State v. Societe
Anonyme De L' Hotel George V, France, Court of Cassation
(First Civil Chamber), 17 January 1973), ILR. 65 (1984),
p. 61.
Administration des Chemins des Fer du
Gouvernement Iranien v. Soci6t6 Levant Express Transport,
Court of Cassation, ILR 52 (1978), pp. 315-316;
R.G.D.I.P., 1969, p. 883.
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courts^'®. The main reason was that the States, having
the benefit of relying on the doctrine of absolute
immunity from jurisdiction, would not reach the stage
where they needed to rely on the doctrine of immunity from
execution. Even when the domain of immunity from
jurisdiction had been limited and the depart from the
absolute doctrine to the restrictive doctrine seemed to
have been an irreversible trend, the States used to enjoy,
in a wider domain than that of the immunity from
jurisdiction, the immunity from execution.
The Court of Cassation, did affirm the absolute
nature of the immunity from execution in 1885^". Other
French courts did follow the same line for a very long
time. If we set aside the controversial and notable case
of Soci6t6 le Gostorg et U.R.S.S.C. Association France
Export,in which the Court of Cassation affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeal and authorized a Saisie-
arrSt against the assets of the Trade Delegation of the
former Soviet Union, it can be said that the French case
law, before 1945, did clearly support the absolute
immunity of States from measures of execution of whatever
nature2°i.
D. Post~1945 case-law on Immunity from Execution
The sweeping character of immunity from execution, in
frustrating the attempts of the private claimants and
wasting the time and energy of the judiciary, provoked
much concern and criticism, by both judiciary and the
doctrine, resulting in a huge bulk of literature on the
1'® Oppetit, op cit, fn. 66 at p. 49.
Cass. Civ. 5 Mai 1885, Veuve Caratier Terrasson,
S. 1886, 1, 253, Quoted by Oppettit, ibid, p. 53.
200 Crawford, op cit. fn.68, p. 839.
201 Ibid, p. 849.
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necessity of restricting the domain of immunity from
execution, and it can be said that since 1952, when the
immunity from execution of the Norwegian Government was
denied by the Court of Cassation, a trend, though
sometimes lethargic and gradual, has emerged in order to
limit the domain of the immunity from execution^°^.
Nonetheless, due to the fact that the domain of the
immunity from execution was broader than that of the
immunity from jurisdiction, there was an idea, even in
early Nineteen Eighties, to characterize the former of
having an absolute nature^"'. This notion of absoluteness
was confirmed by some precedents, such as the case of
Ipitrade decided in 19782°^^ which alluded to that
absoluteness^"®. However, the more recent jurisprudence,
particularly that of the Court of Cassation, has
endeavored to limit the scope of this immunity^°^.
1. Three Major Rulings of the Court of Cassation
If we set aside the old cases, there remain only
three cases decided by the Court of Cassation, namely
Crawford, ibid, p. 839; Paulsson Jan-Anders,
"Sovereign Immunity from jurisdiction, French Case Law
Revisited", The International Lawyer, vol. 19. 1985, p.
277.
Synvet H., Comments on Eurodif Judgment (France,
Court of Cassation 14 Mar. 1984) J.C.P. 1984, 20205.
204 Trib. grande inst. Paris, 12 Sept. 1978,
Ipitrade, Clunet, 1979, p. 857, note Oppetit.
205 Bischoff Jean-Marc: "Immunite d'Execution des
Etats Strangers", Rev. crit. d. i. p. 73( 1984) 4: p.649;
Oppetit, B: case note on Eurodif, (Cour de Cassation,
Premiere Chambre Civile, 14 March 1984), Clunet 111. 1984.
3: p. 601.
206 Synvet, op cit, fn. 203 at 20205.
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Englander, Clerget and C.A.V .N .0 , which
chronologically enunciate the restrictive nature of the
immunity from execution.
a) Englander
In this case the issue at the stage of the
execution of a money judgement was that whether the funds
in an account held by the Banque Commercial Pour 1'Europe
du Nord, in the name of the Czechoslovakian State Bank
could be attached. The Court of Appeal had ruled that the
funds could not be attached because the accounts of the
State Bank, served various purposes including sovereign
ones, from paying the commercial debts of the Czech State
to the payment of the costs of the State's membership in
different international institutions. The main reasoning
of the court followed the line that, by denying the
immunity there would be a risk, affecting the assets used
for sovereign activities of the State, thereby
jeopardizing those activities which were distinct from the
activities of the State Bank. The Court of Cassation
reversed the decision, holding that the mere risk and
detriment to the State assets could not justify the
granting of the immunity. Indeed, the Court of Cassation
seemed to have the view that, it was possible to
distinguish between private funds and public funds.
Therefore, it ruled against immunity^"'. Englander,
however, did not answer to the question of possibility of
Bischoff, op cit, fn. 205, p. 647; Paulsson, op
cit, fn. 202 p. 278; Crawford, op cit, fn. 68, pp. 840 et
seq.; observations of Advocate General Gulphe on Eurodif,
J.C.P. 20205, International Legal Materials (I. L. M.),
vol. 23 (1984), p. 1064.
Englander c. Banque de 1' Etat tch6coslovaque.
Court of Cassation, 11 Feb. 1969, Clunet, 1969, p. 923,
note Kahn; Rev. crit. d. i. p. 1970, p. 98, note Bourel;
ILR 52(1979),P.335
209 Gulphe, op cit, fn.207
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execution measures against the assets of the State itself,
because, at any rate the funds were in the name of the
State Bank rather than the Czech State itself.
b) Clerget:
In the second important case which was brought
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam^^°, the
plaintiff sought to execute a default money judgement in
his favor, for damages and salary due to him under an
employment contract against the funds held for the account
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, before the Banque
Commercial pour les Pays de 1'Europe du Nord. The Court of
Cassation, though criticized the lower court for not
investigating whether the assets were of commercial
origin, upheld the lower court's decision on the ground
that immunity from execution, as a matter of "comity", was
not of an absolute character and would be granted if the
assets sought to be attached were of a commercial, rather
than of a public nature. Since the "origin and the
destination" of the funds could not be determined without
hampering the "diplomatic activities" of the defendant
State, they could not be attached, even to enforce the
payment of a private law obligation. In Clerget which at
its face seems to be contradictory to Englander, one gets
the impression that for the purpose of determining the
nature of the funds, the court had combined the notions of
the "origin" and , "destination" thus basing that
determination on an abstract criterion^".
210 Clerget. c. Representation Commercial de la
R4publique d6mocratique du Vietnam, Court of Cassation, 2
Nov.1971, Rev. crit. d.i.p., 1972, p.310
Synvet H., "Quelque reflexions, sur I'immunite
d' execution de I'Etat etranger", Clunet, 112, 1985, p.
875.
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C) C.A.V.N.O.S
The Court of Cassation had another occasion to
pronounce itself on the question of restrictive nature of
immunity from execution. This was in a case involving an
Algerian State entity^^^. The national fund of the French
Bar Association, as the subrogate to the rights of french
contributors to a private pension fund, established in
Algeria, prior to independence, whose assets had been
taken over by C.A.V.N.O.S. the pre~independence fund of
Algeria, sued the latter in France and attached its assets
there. C.A.V.N.O.S. claimed that it was a public service
entity and, as such, its properties were immune from
execution. The French courts held that since the
properties of C.A.V.N.O.S. were distinct form those of the
Government of Algeria, no immunity could be granted.
In C.A.V.N.O.S and Englander, the Court of Cassation
seems to have based its decision on the presumption that
the assets of State entities with a distinct legal
personality independent from the State engaged, not
exclusively, in public activities are not immune from
measures of execution. However, none of these three cases
were devoid of ambiguity and uncertainty. Particularly it
was not clear that how and under what circumstances the
assets of a State itself could be determined as having a
public or private nature, thereby immune or subject to
execution measures^^'.
2. Other Cases
Mention has also to be made of two post C.A.V.N.O.S.
212 caisse alg6rienne d' assurance vieillesse des
non-salar±6s c. Caisse des barreaux frangaise. Decision of
7. Dec. 19977, Court of Cassation, Rev. crit. d. i. p.,
1978, p. 532.
213 Paulsson, op cit, fn. 202, p. 280; Crawford, op
cit, fn. 68, p. 842.
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cases, which though eventually were settled out of court,
had some implications on immunity law.
a) Ipitrade
The first is the Ipitrade^'^'* in which, the bank
accounts belonging to the Federal Republic of Nigeria were
attached, by the Tribunal de grande Instance de Paris for
the enforcement of an I.C.C. arbitral award, decided in
Geneva. Although immunity was denied, because a post-
arbitral settlement agreement between the parties
contained a clear waiver of immunity from execution by the
parties, ironically, the court, disregarding the rulings
of the Court of Cassation in previous cases, alluded once
again to the absolute character of the immunity from
execution^^®.
b) Liamco
The second case^^^ involved the attachment by Liamco,
in whose favor an arbitral award in the sum of 80 million
U.S.D had been issued, subsequent to the termination by
Libya, of Liamco's oil concession. The attachment which
covered the monies owed to the Libyan Government, its
Central Bank and a number of State entities was objected
to by Libya and its entities. The Libyan Government and
the Central Bank relied on the doctrine of absolute
immunity from execution of foreign States, whereas, other
State entities pleaded that their assets could not be
attached for the payment of an arbitral award which was
rendered not against them, but against the Libyan State
21'^ Procureur de la R6publique v. S.A. Ipitrade
International, Clunet, 1979, p. 857.
215 Crawford, op. cit, fn. 68, p. 842.
procurer de la R6publique c. Soci6t4 Liamco,
Clunet, 1979, p. 842.
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itself. Pursuant to the intervention, in the case, by the
Procurer de la R6publique, the Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris, vacated all the attachments, on the ground that
the mere invocation of the privilege of immunity, based
upon internal and international public order was enough to
justify the annulment of the attachments, because in the
Tribunal's view, at that stage, it was impossible to make
a distinction between the funds emanating from commercial
or economical activities of private law, and the funds
which related to the domain of sovereignty or public
service of Libya. The court did not deal with the
argument of piercing the corporate veil. In the meantime
it ordered that a panel of three experts examine the
origin and the destination of the assets in order to
determine the public or private nature of those funds.
This investigation was sought, perhaps, out of the concern
resulting from the Court of Cassation's criticism of lower
court's failure in not investigating the nature of the
assets of the State of Vietnam in the case of Clerget. In
Liamco too, the question of whether the assets, eventually
proved to be belonging to the foreign State, could be
attached remained open.
To sum up, in early 1980s the French court practice,
particularly in the field of immunity from execution was
not free of uncertainties. There were many unanswered
questions. The jurisprudence had not reached a definitive
solution to the question of whether the assets belonging
to a foreign State could be attached. The attachment would
be possible if the assets were allocated for a non-immune
purpose. The assets of State entities could be attached
unless it was shown that the assets themselves were
allocated to immune purposes, or mixed with the assets, so
set aside, in a manner that their separation would be
impossible^^^.
217 Crawford, op cit, fn. 68, p. 843.
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II. IRAN'S IMMUNITY FROM EXECUTION
It is against the above background that the Iranian
cases should be looked at. Before analyzing the legal
points of those cases, it is useful to have a factual
summary of them.
A. Background and Summary of Eurodif Cases
In 1973, the French Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique
(C.E.A), through one of its %100 subsidiaries, Societe
d'Etudes et de Recherches d'uranium (S.E.R.U), with the
cooperation of a number of european companies, established
a special company Eurodif. Eurodif was to be engaged in
the process of production of enriched uranium in Tricastin
(DrSme). In 1974, the Imperial Government of Iran, which
intended to acquire the technology of the Production of
nuclear combustibles, entered into negotiations with the
French Government. A framework was established within
which different agreements were concluded^^®. On the basis
of these agreements Iran, through its Atomic Energy
Organization, and C.E.A, created a French
company, (SOFIDIF) .2^'
The first agreement was signed on 27 June 1974
under the title "Large cooperation sclentifigue, technique
et industrielle dans tous les domaines de 1'utilisation
pacifigue de I'dnergie nucldaire" between the two
Governments. A second agreement of cooperation was
signed, on 23 dec. 1974, between the French and the
Iranian Governments about the uranium enrichment and its
related financial matters. These two agreements resulted
in other contracts of industrial cooperation between
C.E.A. or its subsidiaries on the one part, and the
Iranian Government, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization
(0.E.A.I.), later replaced by the Iranian organization for
Investment and Economic and technical Aid (O.I.A.E.T.I.),
on the other part. Report of M.le Conseiller Fabre to the
French Court of Cassation, Dalloz Sirey, 1984, p. 630.
La Soci6t6 Franco-iranienne d'enrichissement de
1'uranium par diffusion gazeuse (S.O.F.I.D.I.F), to whom
a part of the shares of S.E.R.U. was transferred. In April
1978, %60 of the capital of S.O.F.I.D.I.F. was held by
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The Iranian Government, undertook on 23 Sept. 1974,
and later by the agreement of 23 February 1975, to lend a
loan of one billion U.S.D. to C.E.A. in three annual
installments, which were advanced in full, between 1975
and 1977. The French Government had explicitly guarantied
the repayment of this loan which was to be spread over
seven years from Nov. 1982^^°. This loan agreement
contained a clause providing for the arbitration by
International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C). A second
agreement was concluded on the same day i.e. 23 Feb. 1975,
according to which O.E.A.I, acquired %10 of the capital of
Eurodif as well as the right to a share of the enriched
uranium. This second agreement too, contained the same
arbitration clause.
In addition, on 7 July 1977 The Government of Iran
granted to Eurodif a loan of 943,000,000.00 francs to be
expended for the factory in Tricastin repayable over
eleven years from 31 dec. 1982, the Third 400,000,000.00
Francs instalment of which, due to be paid in June 1979,
was never advanced. All these agreements were to lead to
the construction, in Iran, of two nuclear reactors of 900
MW, fuelled by enriched uranium which Eurodif was to
supply to, its shareholder, Sofidif. Sofidif, too, was to
divide the said fuel between its shareholders, the C.E.A.
and OEAI (later lOIETA). Therefore it was further agreed
that the shareholders, including Iran would extend to
Eurodif shareholder's advances in order to provide
sufficient working capital for it. Iran advanced 130
million francs and was supposed to advance an additional
amount of 80 million francs on the date of the attachment
C.E.A and %40 by Iran through its I.O.I.E.T.A. Fabre
Report, ibid.
Republic of Iran and others v. Societe Eurodif
and Sofidif and Commissariat a 1^Energy Atomiqe,France,
Court of Appeal of Paris ( first chamber ) 21 Apr. 1982,
ILR 65(1984), p.93; Clunet, 1983, p. 145; Rev. crit. d. i.
p. 1983, p. 101.
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in the dispute. These defaults, due to social and
political changes in Iran, were later followed by the
decision in June 1979, of the newly established
revolutionary Government of Iran that it would not
continue with the project of development of nuclear energy
which the Imperial Government had decided upon.
1. The Attachment
Amidst this uncertainty, Eurodif, Sofidif and C.E.A,
initiated the arbitration proceedings and sought to attach
the debt owed by C.E.A, and the French Government, as the
guarantor, to the Iranian Government as a result of the
loan made by Iran to the C.E.A. The Tribunal de Commerce
de Paris issued a conservatory attachment of sums
provisionally fixed at nine billion francs. Iran and its
agencies appealed against the said "Saisie arret"
contending that they were entitled to jurisdictional
immunity and immunity from execution. Eurodif and Sofidif
argued that the loan had been allocated under commercial
arrangements governed by private law and that Iran by
agreeing to have the matter settled through the I.C.C.
arbitration rules, had in fact waived its immunity.
2. The Judgment of the Court of Appeal on 21 Apr. 1982
The Court of Appeal of Paris in its judgement of 21
Apr. 1982^^^ ordered the vacation of the attachment by
holding that, firstly the point at issue was the use of a
measure of execution which would come under the ambit of
immunity from execution. Thus, immunity from jurisdiction
had no bearing on the case and that the alleged waiver of
immunity from jurisdiction would not imply the waiver of
immunity from execution^^^. Secondly, immunity from
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid, ILR, at p. 97.
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execution was not absolute and it could be ruled out where
the properties sought to be attached, were allocated by
the foreign State, to the accomplishment of a purely
commercial activity, either by the State or by one of its
entities created for that purpose. Thirdly, the loan had
been allocated to finance to build a factory for the
manufacture of enriched uranium. However, the repayment of
this loan to the Iranian State, was free from any
allocation and it was within the sovereign prerogatives of
that State to decide in what manner and for what purpose
to use those funds, which funds enjoyed in principle, as
public funds, immunity from execution. Since the public
nature of the funds would be determined by the allocation
to be made by the Iranian Government, the court deemed it
unnecessary to determine that whether the production of
uranium was a commercial activity^^^. On the Issue of the
adoption of I.C.C. rules on the enforceability of the
subsequent award and the lack of right to appeal, the
court held that recourse to arbitration did not imply
waiver of immunity from execution. Because, in the
court's view, waiver, had to be certain and unequivocal
and could not result from recourse to arbitration^^^.
3. Iran's "Demande De Provision"
Despite the judgment of 21 Apr. 1982, the French
Government and the C.E.A, continued the suspension of
their repayment to Iran of the interest of the loan^^®.
Therefore, Iran sought to secure a provisional measure of
"demande de provision" in a r6f4r6 proceedings before the
"Tribunal de grande instance de Paris" against the C.E.A
and the French Government. The Iranian demand was denied
on 10 June 1982 by that Tribunal, declaring itself
Ibid, at p. 98.
Ibid.
Fabre Report, op cit, fn. 218, p. 630
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incompetent. Iran appealed against the decision and the
aforementioned Court of Appeal of Paris, affirmed, in its
judgment of 12 July 1982, the said declaration of
incompetence^^^. The court held that the series of
international agreements concluded among the parties
constituted a single body emanating from the reciprocal
engagements of the two sovereigns and therefore could not
be put to the jurisdiction of the French judges^^^. In
fact, the Court of Appeal, resorted to, without using the
expression, the theory of "acte de gouvernement^'^^^. Both
parties appealed to the Court of Cassation. Iran appealed
against the judgment of 12 July 1982 while Eurodif and
Sofidif appealed against the judgment of 21 Apr. 1982.
4. The First Judgment of the Court of Cassation
The Court of Cassation issued, on 14 March 1984, two
judgments with respect to those appeals^^', one of which,
hereinafter refereed to as the first judgment of 1984, has
gained a great deal of importance due to the impact it has
had on the development of immunity law in France^^°. The
226 Ibid.
22^ Ibid, pp. 633 & 637. Fabre agrees with the court
of appeal's second judgment in considering the series of
the agreements as an indivisible body of reciprocal
engagements between sovereigns, falling into the domain of
public international law and outside the jurisdiction of
the French judge, due to the nature of the activities
involved.
228 Synvet, op cit, fn. 203, 20205.
229 Soci6te Eurodif et autre C. Republique islamique
d^Iran et autre, Cass. civ. 1 re, 14 mars 1984, La Semaine
Juridique (J.C.P.), 1984, 20205; Rev. crit. d. i. p. 1984.
p. 644; 77 ILR (1988), p. 513.
2^° Almost every commentator has admitted that the
judgment is a land-mark decision, for example one writer
calls the judgment as "d' arrSt de principe" or at least
as "d'arrSt i. principes", see Oppetit op cit, fn. 205, p.
601.
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Court of Cassation by referring to the principles of
private international law held that,^^^ as a matter of
principle foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution.
Nonetheless, this immunity could be set aside where the
properties attached had been allocated for a commercial
activity of a private law nature upon which the claim was
based. The court after mentioning a short history of the
relationships of the parties, and the international
agreements concluded between them, focused on the nature
of the debt owed by C.E.A. and the French Government to
Iran, i.e. the attached funds. In the court's view both
contracts signed on 23 Feb. 1975, contained arbitration
clauses incorporating the rules of the I.C.C Court of
Arbitration. The debt had originated in the very funds
which had been allocated, through the aforementioned
contracts, for the production of nuclear energy. The
court criticized the court of appeal for not having
examined the nature of the activity, before giving a
ruling on the case^^^. Therefore, the judgment of 21 Apr.
1982 was quashed and it was remitted to the Court of
Appeal of Versailles^^^.
231
Vu les principes de droit international prive
regissant les immunites des Etats etrangers;
Attendu que I'immunite d'execution dont jouit
I'etat etranger est de principe; que, toutefois,
elle peut etre exceptionnellement ecartee; qu il
en est ainsi lorsque le bien saisi a ete affecte
a I'activite economique ou commerciale relevant
du droit prive qui donne lieu ^ la demande en
justice;...
J.C.P., supra, fn. 229, 20205.
Though the Court of Cassation was not in a
position to, itself, determine the nature of the activity
leading to the manufacture of uranium, the message between
the lines of the court's arguments are easy to discern and
one could expect that the Court of Appeal of Versailles
would consider that activity as a commercial one, as it
became the case later.
233 ILR, op cit, fn. 229, at p. 515.
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5. The Second Judgment of the Court of Cassation
On the same date the same chamber of the Court of
Cassation rendered its second judgment on Iran's appeal
against the judgement of 12 July 1982 of the Court of
Appeal. Unlike the Court of Appeal's judgment of 12 July
1982, the Court of Cassation, here, did not rely on the
theory of acte de gouvernement or the incompetence of the
French courts in the context of diplomatic agreements.
Neither it elaborated on the agreements of the parties in
that regard. Instead it approached the matter, from the
view point of the domain of powers of the French courts in
relation to a pending arbitration. The court held that,
the demande de provision, brought before the Juge des
r6f6r6s, could not be entertained, where the arbitration
process was already underway and that it could not be
compared with a simple provisional or conservatory measure
provided for under paragraph 5, article 8 of the I.C.C.
Rules of Arbitration, to which the parties had adhered to.
The court therefore, substituted this basis^^^. The result
was that the court could escape the sharp contrast of
detaching the 23 Feb. 1975 agreements from the single body
of diplomatic agreements for immunity law purposes and not
detaching them in reliance on the theory of act de
gouvernement.
6. The 1986 Judgment of the Court of Appeal of Versaille:
a) Production of Uranium a Commercial Activity
The Court of Appeal of Versailles in its judgment^^^
234 For the second judgment of 14 March 1984 of the
Court of Cassation see: J.C.P., op cit, fn.229, 20205,
accompanied by Fabre Report, Gulphe observations and
Synvet comments.
R6publique islamique d' Iran c. Eurodif et
Autres, Cqur D' Appel de Versailles, ArrSt du 9 Juillet
1986, ICSID Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal, 1987,
p. 161.
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dealt with the issues called upon by the Court of
Cassation. It first tackled the problem by referring to
the elaborate and complex history of the relationships of
the parties involved and numerous international agreements
concluded thereunder, then held that the loan granted by
the Iranian Government to the CEA had been allocated for
the production of uranium. The court simply held that in
its view production of nuclear energy was an economical
activity.On the private law character of the involved
economic activity, the main argument of the court was that
according to the loan agreement of 23 Feb. 1975, as well
as the stipulations of the other agreement of the same
date between C.E.A and 0.E.A.I. governing the
establishment of Sofidif, the disputes were to be
adjudicated through the ICC Arbitration. This showed, the
court held, that the parties had intended to submit
themselves to the rules of international commerce and that
the allocation had been made to a private law commercial
activity. The court pointed to the fact that these two
agreements had provided for the applicability of the
Iranian laws. However, since the agreements did not
contain any provisions alien to private law (disposition
exorbitante de droit commun) of Iran, the private law
nature of the contract would prevail. The court went on
to hold that contrary to the Iranian parties' arguments
the President of the "Tribunal du commerce du Paris" was
competent rantione materiae, because in different
contracts it had been provided for the jurisdiction of the
ICC, which meant that the parties had admitted the
commercial nature of their transactions. Moreover,
according to article 8.5 of the rules of ICC each party
could resort to judicial authorities prior to, or in
exceptional circumstances after, the submission of the
case to the arbitration, in order to acquire provisional
or conservatory measures. This mechanism, in the court's
236 Ibid, p.164.
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view, gave more colour to the commercial nature of the
parties' arrangements.
The court's identification and selection of an
economic and industrial activity aspect among several
features of the complex Irano-French relationships in the
matter and its classification as commercial activity is in
line with the nature of the activity test irrespective of
the purpose of the activity and its surrounding
circumstances. There are at least two judgments issued by
German and Belgium courts which deal with the
characterization of activities involving nuclear energy
production. In Garden Contamination^^ a claim against the
former Soviet Union for damages arising out of the
Chernobyl nuclear accident, though the claim against the
USSR was rejected by the district court of Bonn, the court
held in dicta that the characterization of an activity as
sovereign or non sovereign was to be made according to lex
fori. In the Federal Republic of Germany energy production
was conducted on a purely private basis so that the State
responsibility in respect of unclear energy production was
a non sovereign matter. The Belgium decision^^® involved
the proceedings instituted for the enforcement in Belgium
of a judgment issued by an American court in favour of two
companies, one American and one British. The court of
appeal, clearly held that in accordance with lex
the nature test would establish the jure gestionis
character of the activity and discarded the purpose of
Garden Contamination Case, Federal Republic of
Germany, Provincial Court (Landgericht) of Bonn, 11 Feb.
1987, Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgericht) of
Cologne, 23 March 1987, District Court (Amtsgericht) of
Bonn. 29 Sep. 1987, Provincial Court (Landgericht) of Bonn
14 dec. 1987, ILR 80 (1989), p.367.
Soci4t6 de droit irakien Rafidain Bank et arts
c. Consarc Corporation, soci6t6 de droit americain et arts
, op cit, fn. 51, at p.797.
23' Id, at 798.
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activity test, i.e., the use of the materials required by
the contract in the production of nuclear weapons program
of Iraq, in favour of the nature test.
b) irreparable Harm:
Iranian Parties argued that since one of the
conditions for the grant of provisional measures was the
risk of irreparable harm, which, due to the solvency of
Iran, it was lacking in this case, the pre-judgment
attachments could not be granted. The court held that the
peril, from which resulted the urgency, related to the
possibility of the recovery of the sums and not to the
solvency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was surely
solvent. In the court's view the circumstances of the
case brought about by the abrupt rupture of the
relationships of the parties made the possibility of that
recovery illusive. Therefore, the element of peril was
present in the case together with other elements
justifying the grant of provisional measures i.e the
prejudgment attachment^^". Thus, the attachment granted by
the "Tribunal de commerce de Paris" was maintained.
7. The Framatome Case
Apart from Eurodif cases before the I.C.C court and
the French courts; mention has to be made also of the case
of arbitration between some other French companies and
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran^^\ because it may shed
some light on Eurodif Cases. In Framatome the French
companies resorted, on 30 mai 1980, to the arbitration
240 Op cit, fn. 235, at p. 167.
Framatome et autres c. Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, Sentence Arbitral du 30 Avril 1982
Sur La Competence, Clunet, 111 (1984), p. 58; The case
note by Oppetit B., under the title "Arbitrage et contrats
d'Etats", loc. cit. p. 38; Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration, Vol VIII (1983), p. 94.
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clause of their contract of 18 Sep. 1977 with the
respondent, and asked for monies due under that contract
which had allegedly been repudiated by AEOI. AEOI made
several exceptions to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral
Tribunal, inter alia, one of which was tantamount to
reliance on immunity from jurisdiction before an arbitral
body^^^. AEOI contended that it had not repudiated the
contract but it was the Government of Iran, who in pursuit
of its sovereign rights over a strategic and
internationally sensitive project, the pacific
exploitation of nuclear energy, had ordered A.E.O.I not to
pursue the policy adopted by the pre-revolutionary Regime.
Since the decision to renounce the exploitation of nuclear
energy was a sovereign one, it could not be reviewed by
the arbitral tribunal, because the arbitration would
necessarily lead to the questioning of national
sovereignty of Iran, something which was outside the
competence of the tribunal.
The tribunal held that it could decide the case
because the tribunal's adjudication of the case would not
entail the review of the national sovereignty of Iran but
it would only entail the review of the financial
consequences of the decision to renounce the exploitation
of nuclear energy. This too would not be arbitrable if
the tribunal were to order the specific performance of the
contract since the tribunal had to review the national
sovereignty of Iran^^^. Because the tribunal was not doing
2^2 Practice shows that immunity from jurisdiction
happens to be resorted to even before an arbitral
Tribunal. See Bourel P., "Arbitrage International et
Immunites des Etats Etrangers, A propos d' une
jurisprudence Recente", Revue de Arbitrage, 1982, No. 2,
p. 121.
This question, i.e. the intervention of a State
or a State agency in the execution of an agreement, has
been almost similarly at issue in some other cases leading
to conflicting results. For example, in the complex and
protracted litigation concerning I congresso del Partido,
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that, the respondent's arguments were unacceptable^^^.
8. The Third Judgment of the Court of Cassation
The Eurodif case was not closed by the 1986 judgement
of the Court of Appeal of Versailles. The Government of
Iran, together with OAIETA, which had at stake billions of
French francs, again appealed to the Court of Cassation,
against the 1986 judgment.Iran's argument was that the
determination, even on a prima facie basis, of the debt
owed to Iran, by C.E.A and the French Government, required
improper intervention of a domestic court in the dispute
which was already pending before arbitration. The court
rejected this argument by holding that, that determination
would not involve an examination of the merits, something
that was within the sole province of the arbitrators and
therefore, granting a conservatory attachment was not
misconstruction of the arbitration clause.
64 ILR (1983), pp. 154, 227, 307, case note in Law
Quarterly Review 98 (1982), p. 94; De Sanchez v. Banco
Central de Nicaragua, 770 Federal Reporter, Second series
(F. 2d) 1385 (5th cir. 1985) ; Banque Central de la
R4publique de Turquie, v. Weston Companies de Finance et
de 1'investissement, ILR 65(1984), p. 417.
The tribunal dealt with the respondent's
arguments regarding the legal validity of the resolutions
of the United Nations General Assembly and held that such
resolutions, provided that they met certain conditions,
were only of declaratory and not creative character. The
tribunal heavily relied on TOPCO Award.
Some other interested companies, tried to
intervene and defend the Versailles 1986 judgement. The
court joined two appeals against the judgment, and
dismissed the intervention sought by Framatome and others
due to lack of their personal interest in defending the
1986 judgment. R4publique islamique d' Iran et autres c.
Soci6t6 Framatome et autres; Organisation de I' 4nergie
atomique de 1' Iran et autres c. Eurodif et autres. Court
of Cassation (civil chamber), 20 March 1989, Rev. crit.
d.i.p. 1990, p. 346, case note, Bischoff; 89 ILR (1992),
p. 31.
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Iran's other main objection was that immunity from
execution would be set aside only when the funds subjected
to attachment were expressly allocated for the economic or
commercial activity governed by private law, upon which
the claim was based. In the absence of an express
allocation, Iran held, immunity from execution as a
principle would stand, particularly in the case of a loan
of fungible, pursuant to which, the ownership of those
fungible is transferred to the borrower. The court
rejected this argument by holding that, allocation of
funds need not be expressly mentioned in the contract(s),
and the court dealing with the attachment could resort to
all means including to examine other contracts to
establish the allocation^^^.
To sum up, in the series of complex Eurodif cases,
primarily the Court of Cassation, in its first judgement
of 14 March 1984, and then the Court of Appeal of
Versailles, in its judgement of 9 July 1986, and once
again the Court of Cassation in its judgement of 2 0 March
1989, first identified the industrial and economical side
of Franco-Iranian international agreements, which were
concluded at the highest level as far as the quality of
the parties involved were concerned, between the two
States^^^, as the main feature of that complex contractual
body. Having focused on the economical side of the
relationship the courts then classified Iran's peaceful
exploitation of nuclear energy as a commercial activity.
This commercial activity, in turn, determined the nature
of the funds owned by France to Iran pursuant to loan
agreements concluded in relation to the uranium production
ILR, ibid, pp. 35-3 6.
2^^ Gulphe observations, op cit, fn. 207
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project. 2^®.
C. The Impact of Eurodif on the Development of Immunity
Law in France
As was pointed out before^'^' the legal regime of the
Immunity from execution of foreign States, in France, in
late Seventies and early Eighties, was of an uncertain and
sometimes controversial status^®". Even the celebrated
cases of Englander, Clerget and C.A.V.N.O.S. did not give
a clear answer to the main question that what properties
of foreign States, and under what circumstances, could be
subject to forcible measures of execution, because those
three cases had often been interpreted in different ways
leading to divergent results^®^. However, this uncertain
situation was drastically changed, following the first
judgment of the Court of Cassation, on 14 March 1984, in
Eurodif. Almost all commentators writing on Eurodif have
mentioned that judgment as a land-mark case in French
j uri sprudence^^^.
The complex and protracted history of Eurodif
was not limited to the aforementioned proceedings. There
were other proceedings, before the I.C.C. as well as
before different French courts, including Court of
Cassation, resulting in different.awards and judgments.
The reference to these proceedings was not made, because
they did not involve issues pertaining to sovereign
immunity. A short history of those proceedings can be
found at: Fouchard Phillipe, "note on Court of Cassation's
judgments of 20 March 1989 and 28 June 1989", Revue De
L'Arbitrage, 1989, No. 4. p. 653.
Supra, fns. 202-217 and the accompanying text.
Bischoff, op cit, fn. 205, p. 648.
251 Ibid, p. 649.
Ancel B. & Lequette Y. Grand arrSts de la
jurisprudence frangaise de droit international priv6,
Sirey, Second ed. 1992, at p. 514; Oppetit, op cit, fn.
205, at p. 601.
86
Interestingly enough, Eurodif differs with almost all
conventional immunity cases in that unlike the latter in
which the claimant is normally a private person, be it
natural or legal, the claimants in Eurodif were not simple
subjects of private law. Sofidif and Eurodif, though
incorporated as legal personalities, were established
through active involvement of C.E.A. and were ultimately
controlled through C.E.A., the majority shareholder, by
the French Government. The C.E.A. itself, was close to and
under watchful eyes of the French Government due to
security reasons, while remaining autonomous for
efficiency purposes^". The involvement of C.E.A. and of
the French Government, as the guarantor of the one billion
dollars loan, coupled with the huge sums of money due to
be paid to the Iranian State, makes the whole Eurodif
affair an almost unique case as far as the involved
parties and their capacities are conserved. Nevertheless,
perhaps, the very exceptional context of Eurodif which
required, as far as the safeguarding of national interests
of France were concerned, a drastic step forward in
limiting the domain of immunity from execution, provided
the best opportunity for the Court of Cassation to
pronounce itself on the immunity from execution of the
properties of a foreign State^^^. The Court clarified some
uncertain points and brought an element of innovation to
the body of immunity law in France, as will be explained
in the coming pages.
1. The Legal Basis of immunities:
The question of the source from which emanates the
existence of the immunities and its legitimacy has often
been dealt with by the doctrine and the French
jurisprudence. The answer given by the doctrine and
253
254
Fabre, op cit, fn. 218, p. 63 0.
Synvet, op cit, fn. 203, 20205.
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specially by the jurisprudence is by no means clear and
coherent. While some writers maintain the view that there
exist a veritable international custom as to the existence
of the immunities^^^, others hold the view that,
immunities of foreign States are no requirement of public
international law because there is not a sufficient degree
of certainty and precision as to its domain^®^.
The jurisprudence is not coherent either. The Court
of Cassation in an old judgment in 1932^®^ held that, in
order for a State to be entitled to jurisdictional
immunity, it must have a sufficient existence and
personality, in its relations with other States, in
accordance with the principles of public international
law. There are many other judgements in which the
reciprocal independence of the States have been relied
upon as the ground on which immunities are based,and
many judgments in which the incompetence of the courts is
the result of a traditional custom of public international
law^^' or the result of an international usage, and
judgments in which the denying a foreign State of its
immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution
Scelle, Cours dr. int. public, 1948, p. 792;
Rousseau, op cit, fn. 11, p.10.
Thierry, Sur, Combaco, Vallee, Droit
international public, 3° ed. p. 305; Lalive, op cit, fn.
74, p. 251.
Civ. 24 Oct. 1932, D. p. 1933, 1. 196, note
Gros, quoted by Bourel, op cit, fn. 177, no. 30.
As an example Trib. Civ. Seine, 31 July 1878,
Journal dr. int. 78, p. 500.
As an example, Trib. Civ. Seine, 11 Feb. 1892,
Journ. dr. int. 92, p. 492.
260 Trib. civ. Casablanca, 10 March 1955, Rev. Crit.
d.i.p. 1955.
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would be contrary to the law of nations^'^.
Mention has also to be made of some judgments, that
resort to the notion of "Courtoisie internationals", in a
sense that does not entail a public international law
obligation for the forum State^^^. For instance in the
aforementioned case of Clerget, the Court of Cassation,
refereed to, as the legal basis of the immunities, not to
the principles of the law of the nations, but to the
notion of (courtoisie internationale)^^^. In Englander,
another celebrated judgement of the Court of Cassation
dealing with immunity from execution of foreign States,
the Court based its decision on article 1315 of the Code
Civil, a provision of internal law.
In Eurodif, the judgement of 21 Apr. 1982, the Court
of Appeal, held that the manner in which the debt, owed by
the French Government and C.E.A. to Iran, would be used by
Iran, would be decided "sovereignly" by Iran. Therefore
the funds were purely public funds benefitting, in
principle from immunity from execution. The court, indeed,
attempted to resolve the issue of allocation of the funds,
by looking to the future, in reliance on sovereignty, a
fundamental principle of public international law.
See for example Clerget case where the court
held:
Finally in principle immunity from
jurisdiction and from execution derive from the
independence and the sovereignty of a State and
not from its recognition. It is contrary to the
Law of Nations that a government should be
subject, to the jurisdiction of a foreign State,
and that its property should be seized and made
subject to execution.
Clerget, Court of Appeal of Paris, 7 June, 1969, 52 ILR
(1979), p. 310, at pp. 311&312.
262 Bischoff. op citf fn. 205, p. 648.
2"^^ Rev. crit. d.i.p. 1972, p. 310, at p. 311.
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The 1984 judgment of the Court of Cassation on the
other hand, took up the line pursued by that Court in
Clerget. Here, the Court considered the immunity from
execution as a matter regulated by private international
law because the judgment begins by "Vue les principes de
droit international prive regissant les immunites des
etats etranger". This explicit, though short, reference to
the principles of private international law have made some
commentators to believe that, the Court is indicating that
the grant of immunity by the State of the forum to the
foreign State is not a matter to be regulated by public
international law^^. Because whenever the Court of
Cassation has considered an issue to fall within the
province of public international law, it has not hesitated
to rely on the principles of that discipline^^®. For
example those cases in which the court has relied on the
principle of territoriality of nationalizations. The
point, however, is that, as mentioned before, in many
immunity cases, the jurisprudence, including that of the
Court of Cassation has tacitly or explicitly made
reference to the principles of public international law,
leading inevitably to the belief that public international
law is relevant to the question of immunities.
Some commentators^^, maintain that the reference by
the Court of Cassation to the principles of private
international law does not exclude the relevance of the
public international law, and is merely a reminder of the
traditional French notion of conflict of jurisdictions.
In other words, the formulation employed by the court
draws a partition between public international law from
Bischoff, op cit, fn. 205, p. 848.
265 Bischoff, ibid, quoting: civ. l""® , 20 Fev. 1979,
Rev. crit. d.i.p. 803, note Batifol.
Synvet, op cit, fn. 211, p. 867 and Oppetit, op
cit, fn. 205, p. 59.
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which emanates the existence of the immunities and the
domestic law, according to which the national judge
determines the domain of immunities^^^. This view, though
persuasive, overlooks the possibility that the Court of
Cassation might have, deliberately, chosen not to make any
reference to the public international law in order to make
the impression as if no inter-State questions were
involved. That possibility is supported by the fact that,
as was mentioned before, unlike other immunity cases,
Eurodif was not a conventional pattern, a claim between a
private law person and a foreign State, but a case
involving France and Iran, and putting at issue a bulk of
international agreements, constituting as held by the
Court of Appeal of Paris^^ an undetachable body of
diplomatic agreements. Public international law factors
were already frequenting the judges' minds, and one may
think that any allusion by the Court of Cassation to
public international law, would drag the whole problem
further into the domain of already present discipline of
public international law, and would make it difficult for
the Court to sever the industrial and economical aspect of
the case from the diplomatic aspects. Reference by the
Court, to public international law principles, would have
tilted the balance in favor of public international law
character of the whole matter and might have resulted in
the incompetence of the French judicial system. Because as
was held, by the Court of Cassation, in Scripts Lombardes
case, the courts can interpret the provisions of
diplomatic conventions, if no question of public
This view seems to follow the proposition made
by some French writers where they hold that immunity from
jurisdiction of foreign States is traditionally, at least
in French private international law, related to the issue
of conflict of jurisdictions, which is normally regulated
by resort to Lex fori. Batifol et Lagarde, Droit
international priv6, T.II,(7th. ed. 1983),no. 690 et seq;
Mayer, Droit international priv6, p. 241.
268 Judgement of 12 July 1982.
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international law is involved. Otherwise the
interpretation must be given by the French Government^^'.
At least there is one post-Eurodif case, namely
Marseille Fret, decided in 1986 and involving a Libyan
State Agency, where the Court of Cassation has reverted
once again to principles of public international law by
holding that, when the conditions for enjoying by a State
of its jurisdictional immunity are present, the court must
uphold immunity d' office and if it failed to do so, it
would be violating principles of public international law
governing inter State relations^^". This clear reference
to the principles of public international law in a case
Faure and Association des porteurs Frangais des
Script Lombards v. Italian State and Comit6 Des
Obligataires De la Compagnie Des Chemins De Fer Danube-
Save- Adriatique, Court of Cassation, 5 October, 1965,
ILR 45(1972), p. 83, at p. 85; Rev. crit. d.i.p. (1967),
p. 159.
270
Des lors que les conditions necessaires pour le
jou de I'immunite de juridiction existant au
profit d'un Etat etranger ou d'un organisme sur
son ordre ou pour son compte se trouvent
remplies, le juge fran9ais perd, sauf
renonciation a ce privilege, son pouvoir de
juger et le moyen tire de cette immunite doit
tire releve d'office, m§me devant la Cour de
cassation. En I'espece, la cour d'appel qui,
pour statuer sur la demande de mainlevee de
saisie conservatoire d'un navire s/est prononcee
sur 1'existence d'un principe de creance a
I'econtre d'un Etat etranger, qui resulterait du
prejudice occasionne par un acte de puissance
publique emanant de cet Etat, a viole les regies
du droit international public gouvernant les
relations entre Etats.
Soci4t6 G4n6ral National Maritime Transport Company v.
Soci6t4 Marseille Fret,(Cass. civ., 4 F4vrier 1986,
R.G.D.I.P. 1987, p. 668; Clunet, 1987, p. 112, note
Jacquet Jean-Michel; ILR 77 (1988), p.530. Rev. crit.
d.i.p. 1986, p.718, case note by Mayer P., see also Mann
F.A. "State Corporations in International Relations", in
Bos M. & Brownlie I. (eds.). Liber Amicorum for Lord
Wilberforce, Clarendon Press, (1987) , p.131, at pp. 136-137.
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involving issues of both immunity from jurisdiction and
immunity from execution, indicates that the Court of
Cassation in Eurodif was not engaged in the business of
dispensing with the relevance to the immunities of public
international law principles, for ever.
2. Criteria for Limiting the Scope of Immunity From
Execution:
How to Classify the Assets
At least since 1969, when the judgment of
Englander^ was rendered, by the Court of Cassation, the
French case law has attempted to find some criteria in
order to delimit the domain of immunity from execution. In
that judgment the Court of Cassation acknowledged the
possibility of distinguishing between private assets and
public assets, holding that if the origin and the
destination of the assets, sought to be attached, were
such as to make it possible to determine the nature of
those assets as commercial, immunity would be ruled out.
Three years later, in the case of Clerget, The Court of
Cassation criticized the Court of Appeal of Paris for not
investigating whether the funds were of commercial
nature^^^. Nevertheless, the highest court affirmed the
court of appeal, since the origin and the destination of
the funds had not been determined. In Liamco, the Tribunal
de grande Instance of Paris, aware of the Clerget
criticism, while vacating the attachments^^ levied on
Libyan assets, because, the court could not at that time
distinguish between public and private funds, ordered an
investigation into the nature, destination and use of the
assets of Libyan State entities funds.
Rev. crit. d. i. p., op cit, fn. 208, p. 923.
Ibid, p. 924.
273 ggg supra, fn. 214 and the accompanying text.
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a) Origin Versus Destination of the Assets
In Eurodif, the Court of Appeal of Paris, in its
judgment of 21 April 1982 (hereinafter April 1982
judgment) followed the same line of reasoning and after
admitting that immunity from execution was of a
restrictive nature held that, that immunity did not depend
on the criteria whether the activity was commercial or
non-commercial, rather it depended on the public or
private nature of the assets to be attached^^'^. The court,
adopting the nature of the funds test, unlike the
England&r and Clerget judgments which had, for the sake of
determining the nature of the funds refereed to both the
origin and the destination of the properties, tacitly
discarded the notion of the origin of the properties and
put the emphasis on the future use or the destination of
the properties. The court held that the funds used for
the repayment by France and C.E.A. of the loan to Iran
were not subject to any specific allocation and Iran was
entitled to decide sovereignly as to the use of such
funds. Therefore, the funds were of public nature and
immune from measures of execution. This judgment while
conventional in many respects^^, has been criticized, by
some writers, because by putting the emphasis on the
future use of the funds, it has left the fate of public or
private nature of the funds entirely at the discretion of
the foreign State, thereby leading to the revival of
absolute or semi-absolute character of immunity, something
that the judgment itself has explicitly ruled out^^^.
Mayer P., case note on 21 April 1982 judgment,
J?ev. crit. d.i.p. 72 (1983), p. 106.
275 Gulphe Observations, op cit, fn. 207 20205;
Mayer, ibid.
276 For criticism of the judgment see: Mayer, ibid;
Gulphe, ibid.
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b) Court of Cassation's Formula:
Allocation of the Assets to Commercial Activity
The 1984 judgment of the Court of Cassation reversed
the judgment of the Court of Appeal by adopting a quite
different formula. The court, began with once again
reiterating the restrictive nature of the immunity from
execution by holding that:
foreign States enjoy immunity from execution as
a matter of principle. Nevertheless this
immunity can be set aside in exceptional cases
such as where the assets attached have been
allocated for an economic or commercial activity
of a private law nature, which has given rise to
the claim at issue^^.
Indeed, in order for the immunity to be ruled out,
there must be cumulatively two conditions. Firstly, the
assets sought to be attached must have been allocated for
an economic or commercial activity under private law.
Secondly, the origin of the claim giving rise to the
attachment, must be the same commercial or economical
activity, under private law. The court, after examining
the background of the Franco-Iranian relationships in the
case, criticized the Court of Appeal of Paris for not
examining the nature of the activity involving nuclear
energy production program, since in the Court of
Cassation's view, the debt owed by France and C.E.A. to
Iran had originated in the very funds which had been
allocated for the production of nuclear energy^^®. By
adoption of this formula, already adopted in U.S. Foreign
77 ILR (1988), p. 513, at p. 515, for the French
text of the passage see supra, fn. 231.
Bischoff, op cit, fn. 205, p. 650; Oppetit, op
cit, fn. 205, p. 187.
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Sovereign irtununities Act of 1976^^', the Court of
Cassation aligned the French system with that of the
United States, since as the Eurodif judgment shows, the
court of Cassation was under the impression that the said
formula, had already been applied by Untied States Courts
in many Iranian cases^®°.
As can be seen there is an element of innovation in
the Court's analysis. The innovation is not in the
adoption of the formula, but lies in the judgment's look
at the question of allocation and the way by which it is
determined^®^ and more particularly the way in which the
allocation serves as a means for the determination of the
public or private nature of the assets leading to the
grant or the denial of immunity from execution.
c) "Allocation and its Difficulties"
As mentioned before, the celebrated judgments of
Section 1610 which deals with the "Exceptions to
the immunity from attachment or execution provides that:
(a) The property in the United States of a
foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) of
this chapter, used for a commercial activity in
the United States, shall not be immune from
attachment in aid of execution, or from
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of
the United States or of a State after the
effective date of this Act,
if. .
(2) the property is or was used for
the commercial activity upon which the claim is
based, or
280 pqj. impact of the FSIA on Eurodif see:
Gulphe Observations, op cit, fn. 207; Fabre Report, op
cit, fn. 218. However, as will be shown in Chapters
dealing with the U.S. cases, most of the attachments
levied an Iranian properties paid little regard to the
requirement that the property sought to be attached must
be related to the commercial activity giving rise to the
claim.
281 Bischoff, op cit, fn. 205, p. 650.
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Englander, Clerget, Liamco and 21 April 1982 (Eurodif)
employed the criterion of public or private nature of the
assets, regardless of the nature of the activity giving
rise to the claim, for the purpose of delimiting the
domain of immunity from execution. Since most measures of
execution are directed against bank accounts or debts owed
to foreign States, devoid of any express future
allocation, the criteria of future use of the assets puts
a heavy, if not impossible, burden on the shoulder of
private claimants, and might lead to the revival of
absolute character of immunity from execution. Therefore,
some writers, support the jurisprudence's looking to the
past for allocation purposes^®^.
(i) Nature of the Funds Plus Nature of the Activity
Test
With a view to resolving these longstanding
difficulties, the Eurodif 1984 judgment combined the
nature of the funds test with that of the nature of the
activity test. The criterion for upholding the immunity
remains to be the nature of the funds test. However, the
nature of the funds can be determined, not by looking to
the future and leaving the judgment creditors at the mercy
of the foreign State, but by looking to the past. In
looking to the past too, the court will have access to
certain factual data and background. The judge is indeed
entrusted with two duties: 1) Looking to the past in order
to see if the funds have been allocated for a certain
activity from which the claim has originated. 2) To
examine and determine whether that activity is a private
law activity of commercial or economical nature^®'.
Looking to the past can be analyzed in two ways. Either to
Ibid; Oppetit, case note on Eurodif, op cit, fn.
205, p. 602
Oppetit, ibid, p. 603.
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take into consideration, the overall activity upon which
the claim is based, from its origin to its final stages,
or to focus solely on the cause of the debt or the
contract which gave rise to it^^.
(ii) Whether Production of Uranium a Commercial
Activity
The 1984 judgment did not deal with the issue of
whether the production of uranium was commercial activity
but harshly criticized the Paris Court of Appeal for not
determining the nature of that activity thereby giving a
clear signal that by that determination the court would
have solved the allocation problem. This question was
later decided by the Court of Appeal of Versailles, who,
after referring to the elaborate and complex history of
the contractual relationships of the parties involved,
held that the loan granted by Iran to the French side had
been allocated for the production of uranium, which was in
the court's view, an economical activity^®^.
The Versailles court had to further determine the
nature of that economical activity. In doing so, it held
that according to the loan agreement of 23 Feb. 1975, as
well as the stipulations of some other contracts between
the parties, the disputes were to be adjudicated through
arbitration by the ICC Arbitration. This showed that the
parties had intended to submit themselves to the rules of
international commerce and that the allocation had been
made to a private law commercial activity. The court also
noted that the loan agreement did not contain any
Gulphe, in his observations, prefers the
analysis of the overall activity. Gulphe observations, op
cit, fn. 207, p. 1067.
285 Op cit, fn.235, p.164.
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provisions alien to private laws of Iran^®^. The court
went on to say that the Iranian Government had, through
its intermediary agencies, participated in a private law
activity and that contracts concluded in the field of
commerce and finance are of commercial nature^®^. The
court here was preforming a task partly, similar to that
of a determination of immunity from jurisdiction. In
examining the activity of production of uranium, in line
with the now predominant criterion of the nature of the
act test, applicable in many countries, especially in the
United States, the Court did not consider the purpose of
the Iranian program of peaceful proliferation of nuclear
energy to see if it was carried out in the interest of
public service^®® or it was devoid of any such goals.
d) Burden of Proof
The question of burden of proof of public or private
nature of the assets as well as who should prove the
commercial nature of the activity giving rise to the claim
and the nexus between that activity and the assets sought
to be attached is of great procedural importance. The
French case law before Eurodif was not at all clear on
this question. In Englander^^'^ the Court of Cassation
reversed the judgment of the lower court for not
separating the public use funds from private use funds.
The Clerget judgment, seems to have put the burden on the
shoulder of private claimant, because, as long as the
origin and destination of the funds are not determined
Fabre suggests that Iran seems to have accepted,
in its pleadings, that the loan agreement was of the
nature of an "international commerce act". Fabre Report,
op cit, fn. 218, p. 633
Bourel, op cit, fn. 242, p. 128.
Re: the discussion, in this Chapter, on NIOC and
NIGC cases, infra, fns. 338-345 and the accompanying text.
See supra, fn. 208 and the accompanying text.
99
they could not be attached. However it should be mentioned
that the Court of Appeal was criticized by the Supreme
Court for not investigating the nature of the assets.
This concern led to the court's designation of a panel of
experts in Liamco case.
The Eurodif answer to the question of burden of proof
while, to a large extent, helpful, is not clear cut and
could be interpreted in two ways. Some are of the view
that, since the 21 April 1982 judgment of the Court of
Appeal and 1984 judgment of the Court of Cassation, have
held that the immunity from execution is the principle and
it would be ruled out only in exceptional circumstances,
the question of burden of proof is resolved definitively
and it is upon the one who claims the existence of the
exception, that the burden of proof falls^'°.
The other view which suggests that at least a part of
investigation has to be carried out by the court ex
officio, seems more acceptable^'^. The reason is that the
Court of Cassation criticized the 21 April 1982 judgment
for not looking at the origin of the Iranian assets and
for not determining the nature of the activity from which
the claim had arisen. The case was remanded to the Covrt
of Appeal of Versailles, mainly, to determine the nature
of the activity, i.e, the production of nuclear energy,
and the court did so. The holding of the Court of
Cassation in its judgment of 1989 gives more support to
the idea that the courts have a role to play, ex judice,
especially in determination of the commercial or non
commercial nature of the transaction from which the claim
Huet Andre, "L'Immunity D' Execution De L'lltat
Et Des Autres Collectivites", L'Immun±t6 D'Ex6cution De
L'J^tat Et Des Autres Collectivitds Publiques, 1990,
Bruylant, Bruxelles, p.85, at pp. 104 et seq.
Delaume George: "Recent French Cases on
Sovereign Immunity and Economic Development Activities",
ICSID Review, Vol. 2, 1987, p. 152, at p. 154.
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has originated. The Court of Cassation held that the
allocation of the loan need not be expressly mentioned in
the contract and that the Court of Appeal could resort to
all means to establish the allocation, including to look
to other contracts^'^. The highest court further held that
the Court of Appeal, in doing so, did not reverse the
burden of proof, something that, in the Iranian parties'
view, was on the shoulder of the French claimants.
Against this background it would be fair to suggest
that Eurodif has supplied a dual solution to the problem
of burden of proof. The determination of commercial or
non-commercial nature of the activity upon which the claim
is based should be made by the court ex officio. The nexus
between the commercial activity and the assets sought to
be attached must be proven by the party seeking the
attachment^'^. Since, proving that nexus might be too
heavy a burden for the attachment seekers, the Court of
Cassation has recognized a broad power for the judges, to
enable them to resort to all means to establish the
allocation. This broad power which will be used in a
process of appreciation of facts^'^ will alleviate the
burden of private claimants and will reduce the chances of
success of reliance by foreign States, on immunity from
execution resulting ultimately in further restriction of
the said immunity. In fact despite the requirement of the
existence of a link between the economic activity upon
which the claim is based and the property sought to be
attached, the Eurodif judgment leads to softening and
liberalization of the criteria of allocation of assets.
Eurodif 1989 judgment, op cit, fn. 245, 89 ILR
(1992), p. 35.
Delaume, op cit, fn. 2 91, p. 154.
Fouchard, op cit, fn. 248, p. 660.
See: Mayer, Droit int^l. priv6, op cit, fn. 15,
at no.327.
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D. Questions Left Open By Eurodif:
Not all problems relating to immunity from execution
of foreign States were resolved by Eurodif 1984 judgment.
Some questions were left open. The first question is that
whether the formulation of Eurodif applies to the
properties of State entities as well. This question was
concretely raised, and answered by the Court of Cassation,
in the Sonatrach case.^'^ Migeon, a French engineer, had
entered into an employment contract, for the duration of
two years, with Sonatrach, an Algerian State entity.
Migeon claimed damages for termination before the expiry
date, by Sonatrach, of his contract, and in enforcement of
the judgement rendered in his favor, obtained the
attachment of debts payable by Gas de France to Sonatrach,
pursuant to a contract for supply of liquified gas. The
attachment was upheld by the Court of Appeal of Paris.
Sonatrach appealed to the Court of Cassation, relying on
the Eurodif formulation that the debt attached had no
connection whatsoever with the employment contract. The
Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal by holding that
unlike the assets belonging to foreign States every assets
of a State-owned entity, which was legally distinct from
the foreign State, could be attached, by all creditors of
that entity provided that the assets constituted a part of
a body of funds allocated for an activity governed by
private law. The Court further held that the principal
activity of Sonatrach was transport and commercialization
of hydrocarbures, which is governed by private law. The
debt owed by Gas de France to Sonatrach emanated from that
activity and therefore would be subject to attachment
unless the contrary was proven.
Soci6t6 National Alg6rienre de Transport et de
commercialization des Hydrocarbures ("Sonatrach") c.
Migeon, Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 1 Oct.
1985, 77 ILR (1988), p. 525; J.C.P. 1986, 20566 with case
note by Synvet.
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In light of the Sonatrach, plaintiff is in a much
better position than it is in cases against a foreign
State, in that the private nature of the activity of the
State entity concerned can easily be established by
examining the constituent instrument of the entity in
question.This protection afforded to plaintiffs is in
line with the trend of further restricting the immunities
accorded to foreign States and their emanations.
Sonatrach, indeed supplemented the 1984 judgment of
Eurodif. With regard to properties of State entities the
principle is non-immunity of those properties, unless the
contrary is proven, unlike the properties of foreign
States which are in principle immune from measures of
execution unless the conditions of the exception to
immunity are fulfilled.
Another important question not clearly answered by
Eurodif 1984 judgment is that whether claimants seeking
the attachment of properties belonging to a foreign State
can attach those properties, even when their claim has no
relationship with the property sought to be attached. In
other words, whether the conditions for the application of
the exception to the immunity rule, as formulated by
Eurodif, are exhaustive or illustrative? On this point the
commentators are divided. Some are of the view that the
wording of the judgment shows that there are other
restrictions to the immunity rule, because the Court after
declaring that the immunity from execution is a principle
from which there are some exceptions^'®, goes on to state
297
298
Mayer, Droit Int'l PrivS, op cit, fn. 15, at
no.327.
attendu que I'immunite d' execution don't jouit
I'lltat etranger est de principe; que, toutefois,
elle peut etre exceptionnellement ecartee, qu'il
en est ainsi lorsque...
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that "qu' il en est ainsi" which indicates that the
situation analyzed by the court is but one of the many
exceptions^". Others express doubt or are inclined to the
view that the limitations are exhaustive and the
properties of the State are in principle immune from
measures of execution and the only conceivable way for a
private claimant to establish the private nature of the
assets is to proceed with the Eurodif formulation^®®.
It is partly for unanswered questions in immunity law
of France that a commentator proposes the idea that the
immunity law has to be, like in the case of the U.S. and
the U.K, regulated by legislation^®^.
Following Eurodif, there are, at least, two judgments
wherein the French courts, including the Court of
Cassation, have dealt with immunity from attachment in a
way different than that of Eurodif. The first one is by a
lower court in the case of SEEE.^^^ In this case pursuant
to an arbitral award rendered in favour of SEEE, a French
company, in a claim based on a contract for the
construction of a railway in the former Yugoslavia, SEEE
obtained attachments on the debits owed by Air France to
the State of Yugoslavia for charges levied for overflight
over Yugoslav territory by the aircraft of Air France.
Apparently there was no connection between the commercial
Eurodif, op cit, fn. 229.
Synvet, op cit, fn. 2 03 and op cit, fn. 211, p.
875 et seq.
Paulsson, op cit, fn. 202, p. 284; Bischoff, op
cit, fn. 205, p. 652 et seq.
Synvet, op cit, fn. 211, p. 874.
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v.
Soci6t6 Europ6enne Etudes Et D'Entreprises, Credit
Lyonnais, Air France and others. Tribunal de grande
instance de paris, 3 July 1985, ILR 82 (1990), p.58, at
p.71 et seq.; Clunet 1985, p.911.
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activity upon which the original claim was based i.e. the
contract for construction of a railway, and the funds
attached, i.e. the debt owed by Air France to yugoslavia.
Therefore, the attachment could easily be rejected on the
basis of the Eurodif formula. Nevertheless, the Tribunal
de grande instance, did not employ that formula. Rather it
followed another line of argument for rejection of the
attachments by holding that:
The debt owed to the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia for the amount of those overflight
charges relates directly and necessarily to the
exercise by that State of its prerogative powers
linked to its national and international
sovereignty as that sovereignty applies to its
territory and airspace.
The effect of the "blocking" of that debt, which
is the result of the attachment at issue, is of
such a nature as to infringe and interfere with
the independence of the Yugoslav State, in the
regular and continuous performance of its duties
and obligations and its freedom of action and
decision, as may be deduced from the fundamental
rules of international law and treaties.
Furthermore the attachment constitutes an
infringement of the rules of international
courtesy which are related to the exercise of
sovereignty.
The court, in order to determine the nature of the
assets, referred expressly to the origin of the assets,
irrespective of their connection with the cause of action.
It also had a view to the future use of assets because it
expressed concern that blocking those assets would
infringe and harm the defendant State in performing its
sovereign duties. So again the purpose test, somehow akin
to the notion of public service in immunity from
jurisdiction determinations, came into play in classifying
the assets sought to be attached.
303 Ibid, ILR, at p.73
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The second judgment was issued by the Court of
Cassation in Marseille Fret.^^'* In this case Marseille
Fret, a French company, obtained a conservatory attachment
of the vessel (Ghat) belonging to a Libyan company in
order to secure the debt arising from allegedly wrongful
detention of one of its vessels by the Libyan Government,
in the context of a shipping transaction between Marseille
Fret and Ras and Hilal, another Libyan company. The Court
of Cassation in vacating the attachment, could easily
apply the Eurodif formula by saying that since the
attached vessel which belonged to a Libyan company,
apparently extraneous to the original transaction, had no
relationship with the private law activity giving rise to
the action, the attachment was invalid. But the Court of
Cassation addressed the problem from a different
perspective and held that since the debt that Marseille
Fret wanted to secure was caused by an act of public power
of Libya (the seizure of Marseille Fret's vessel in
Libya), any attachment pronounced would be on the
existence of that debt and would be contrary to principles
of public international law, regarding jurisdictional
immunity of States.
Marseille Fret signifies the double domain of
immunity from execution. Normally, immunity from execution
protects certain assets of a foreign State, because of
their nature, but exceptionally it also prohibits the
attachment of properties for securing debts which are of
public nature and can not be recognized, even indirectly,
in France.The court's main focus was on the nature of
the debt which was to be secured. In order to be attached,
the debt should arise, like in Eurodif, from a private law
30A Op cit, fn. 270.
For the French version of the relevant part of
the judgment see: supra, fn.270, and the accompanying
text.
Mayer Pierre: case note on Marseille Fret,
ibid, at p.723.
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activity. Up to this point the Marseille Fret is indeed in
line with Eurodif. But the Court of Cassation's silence on
the point that the property sought to be attached must be
connected to the private law activity which gave rise to
the claim as well as its method of dealing with the
immunity from execution problem leaves little doubt that
the Eurodif methodology is too narrow to tackle all
problems relating to immunity from attachment at a time
when the well known distinctions^®^ between immunity from
jurisdiction and immunity from execution are frequently
blurred.
E. Observations
The prime object of the first Eurodif 1984 judgment
was to destroy the automatic grant of immunity from
execution to foreign States^"®. Eurodif is the only
judgment in which, for the first time, the Court of
Cassation has clearly ruled that immunity from execution
is not of an absolute nature^"' and has tried to give a
formula in order to precisely delimit that extent. By
that formula, which has been adopted by the court after a
comparative study^^°, the court has removed a great deal
of uncertainty and controversy in the French case-law. In
this connection it should be noted that presently, in
France, the status of the properties belonging to foreign
States is clear as far as their immunity from execution is
concerned. Those properties are immune, from any measures
of execution, unless the court dealing with the attachment
determines, in fulfilling its judicial task, that the
property sought to be attached, is not only linked, but is
Batifol et Lagarde, op cit, fn. 267, no 693-3.
308 synvet, op cit, fn. 211, p. 883.
Ancel et Lequette, op cit, fn. 252, p. 519.
See Fabre Report, op cit, fn. 218, p. 632.
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allocated to the commercial activity of private law giving
rise to the dispute between the parties. In case the
conditions of the application of the exception to the
immunity rule are present, then those properties can be
attached even before a judgment is rendered. At this
point the Court of Cassation has taken even a step further
than that of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of the
United States where according to Sec. 1610(c) and (d) of
the said Act pre-judgment attachments are permissible only
if there is an express waiver by the foreign State of its
immunity from execution.
The Court of Cassation judgment in Sonatrach has
supplemented the achievements of Eurodif, in defining the
status of State entities and enterprises as far as their
immunity from execution is concerned. According to
Sonatrach, in contrast with Eurodif, the properties of
foreign State-entities are, in principle, attachable for
the debts of that entity even if they are unrelated to the
dispute between the parties.
Another major achievement of Eurodif is the step
taken by it in the direction of unification of the legal
regime, regulating immunity from jurisdiction and immunity
from execution. In this context, as was pointed before,
the crux of the problem, in each case involving immunity
from execution, will turn to be the identification of the
activity and its classification as commercial or non
commercial. The idea of unification of the regime of both
immunities has some proponents in the doctrine^".
See for example, Bourel, op cit, fn. 242, p.
143, where he suggests that the application, in immunity
from execution determination, of the notions of "public
service** and "commercial activity", which are well known
bases ^for restricting the domain of immunity from
jurisdiction, would be a major step towards that
unification and would serve the objective of restricting
the domain of what is often called the absolute immunity
of States.
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However, the 1984 judgment, the later ones, and Sonatrach
have only applied the notion of "commercial activity" and
have not gone further to take into consideration the
notion of "public service" in their determination of the
nature of the activity of the production of nuclear
energy.
This partial application of the criteria used for
delimitation of immunity from jurisdiction in delimitation
of immunity from execution while might be considered as an
encouraging sign of progress, would have its disadvantages
as well. It is almost a matter of judicial notice among
the jurists that the enforcement measures against the
properties of a State is more apt to cause harm to the
dignity and sovereignty of that State than subjecting that
State to the jurisdiction of a foreign court would^^^.
The point is that while, as will be explained in coming
pages, an important Iranian State-entity like NIOC, may
remain immune from the jurisdiction of the French courts,
the properties of the Government of Iran, involved, in a
sense in an intergovernmental relationship, can be subject
to prejudgment attachment. The reason is that, the French
jurisprudence in cases involving NIOC, has applied, inter
alia, the notion of public service in the characterization
of the activity of provision of cathodic protection for
the oil pipelines and commercialization of hydrocarbures.
On the contrary, in the case of Sonatrach,
commercialization of hydro carbures was classified as a
commercial activity under private law, in contrast with
the characterization of the same activity by NIOC as a
mission carried out in the interest of "public service".
On the other hand, the production of nuclear energy, by
the Government of Iran, has been considered a commercial
activity. Surely, this conflicting result is not entirely
due to the non-application of the "public service" notion
Schreuer, State Immunity.., op cit, fn. 145, at
73.
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in the latter. It is partly because of the over-emphasis
on the arbitration arrangement. Nevertheless, this half
way measure in the unification of the regime of both
immunities may cause certain problems in future.
The impact of the arbitration arrangement, embodied
in two 1975 agreements, in the determination of immunity
from execution of the Iranian assets is another point of
interest in Eurodif case. In this respect too, French
jurisprudence made, by Eurodif, especially by the first
1984 judgment of the Court of Cassation, a change in the
direction of restricting the province of the immunity of
foreign States. Generally speaking, Eurodif, in pursuance
of the favorable jurisprudential policy of French courts
towards the efficacy of the arbitration clauses, attached
a great deal of importance to such arrangements agreed
upon by the States or their emanations. Many impediments,
for example the dilatory tactics of one of the parties, or
problems surrounding the exequatur, in the way of the
effectiveness of the arbitration clauses had already been
overcome, by different judgments of French courts. The
last obstacle, the immunity from execution enjoyed by the
States, even parties to the arbitration proceedings, was
subject to many criticisms. The Court of Cassation availed
itself of the opportunity created by the complex and
politically coloured situation of Franco-Iranian
relationships to circumscribe, precisely, the broad domain
of immunity from execution. Especial focus on the
arbitration arrangement can be traced from the Report of
M. Fabre, the Counsellor of the Court of Cassation. He
criticizes the 21 April 1982 judgment of the Court of
Appeal for not properly taking into account, the
arbitration clause, which could, in his view, have been
construed as a waiver^^^.
Fabre Report, op cit, fn. 218, p. 633, where he
also points out to many interesting points of Eurodif
Cases pertaining to the Law of International Arbitration.
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since, there were two appeals before the Court of
Cassation in 1984, one by the French Claimants, against
the judgement of 21 April 1982 of the Court of Appeal, and
another by the Iranian State, against the July 1982
judgment of the same court confirming the incompetence of
the French judiciary in dealing with the diplomatic
agreements entered into by France, the Supreme Court was
indeed confronted with a dilemma. It had to avoid
contradiction, caused by seemingly dual approach of the
French judiciary towards the French and Iranian States.
While around ten billion Francs of Iranian properties had
been seized by pre-judgment attachments rendered by French
judiciary, the French Government was declared to be
outside the reach of the French courts^^^. If the Court
of Cassation were to confirm the July 1982 judgment as
rendered by the Court of Appeal, by declaring the French
courts incompetent due to the involvement of the
Government of France, it would be very difficult and
unjustifiable for the court to leave this attitude in the
appeal against the 21 April 1982 judgment and tackle that
judgment not in an inter-governmental, but in a commercial
context. Therefore, as was suggested by M. Gulphe, the
public Attorney in 1984 judgments^^^, to avert the
aforementioned dilemma, the Supreme Court, looked into
both cases, from a private law perspective^^^. As to the
appeal against April 1982 judgment it issued that land
mark decision and as to the appeal against July 1982
judgment it held that once the arbitration process had
See: ibid, p. 637, where Fabre clearly points
out to this contradiction.
Gulphe Observations, op cit, fn. 2 07, 2 02 05.
Fabre reminds the court that the resolution of
these complex disputes, emanating from the facts of
international commerce, is not an easy task. He expresses
doubts as to whether the increasing involvement of the
States in the domain of economic life and of the public
entities can be regulated by mere application of
commercial law. Fabre Report, op cit, fn. 218, at p. 629.
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begun, the demand for provision in a ref4r6 proceedings
could not be entertained by the domestic courts, because
after the arbitrators have been seized of the matter, the
national judges jurisdiction could no longer be resorted
to'^^. This technical eloquence in the Court's elimination
of the possible contradiction resulted in bolstering the
arbitration arrangement and in the assertion of the French
courts' jurisdiction in matters of pre-judgment
attachment, in an otherwise intergovernmental transaction.
The fact that there were loan agreements between
Iran and the C.E.A which were guarantied by the French
Government, did not affect the courts' characterization of
the activity. The court only singled out, and focused on,
the arbitration clause of those agreements. The issue of
guaranties made by States, was at stake in a case against
Italy The claimants sued the Italian State and Comite
des Obligations on the basis of the obligations undertaken
by Compagnie des Chemins de Fer Danube-Save-Adriatique,
which had been guaranteed, under a treaty of 1923, by the
Italian State. The court held that the claim against
Italy, to pay the value of some bonds was covered by the
principle of jurisdictional immunities of States.
As has been suggested by some commentators, it would
have been more appropriate if the Court of Cassation had
first determined whether the loan agreement could be
detached from the international agreements between Iran
and France^^'. In this respect, the July 1982 judgment of
Eurodif, second judgment of the Court of
Cassation, see: J.C.P. op cit, fn. 229, 20205.
Faure and Association des Porteurs Frangais de
Scripts Lombards v. Italian State and Comit6 des
Obligataires de la Compagnie des Chemins de fer Danube-
Save-Adriatique, France, Court of Cassation. 5 October
1965, 45 ILR (1972), p. 83.
319 Synvet, op cit, fn. 203, 2 0205.
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the Court of Appeal was, Inter alia, of the view that
C.E.A is the instrument of the French Government through
which the international policies of the said Government in
nuclear energy matters are executed. Therefore, in that
court's view the entire Franco-Iranian legal relationships
in Eurodif were in the context of the diplomatic relations
of the two countries, in the domain of public
international law, and were not within the province of
national judge^^°. The Court of Appeal did not dissociate
the loan agreement containing the arbitration clause from
the rest of the agreements, since in its view if among
certain aspects of the loan contract, only one element of
that body of different agreements, could be subject to a
special regime, due to the arbitration clause or the
applicability of Iranian national laws, that would not be
sufficient for the abstraction and dissociation of the
link which unites the whole body of the international
agreements in an undetachable way^^^. As has been
suggested by writers on arbitration law'^^, the object of
the arbitration clause is to exclude the intervention of
national courts and to put the matter at the hands of the
arbitrators. However, in Eurodif the arbitration process,
intended to serve as a substitute to either of the Iranian
or French judiciary systems, resulted in loss of Iran's
immunity. This result while might discourage developing
countries in joining arbitration arrangements because they
would not exclude the intervention of the municipal courts
of other States, is nevertheless a positive step in making
the arbitration arrangements more meaningful in that the
limited intervention of foreign courts in matters of
provisional measures would provide actual guaranties for
the satisfaction of any future arbitral award. Indeed the
limited intervention of municipal courts would not replace
Gulphe observations, ibid.
321 Ibid.
322 Bourel, op cit/ fn. 242, p.133.
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the arbitration agreement. Rather, it will boost the
arbitration institution.
III. IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION
A. The Criteria For Limiting The Immunity From
Jurisdiction
As pointed earlier^^^ the attempt made by the French
jurisprudence to base the immunity determinations on the
distinction between "actes d'autorit6" and "acts de
gestion" did not meet with success due to the vagueness of
that distinction. The French jurisprudence has, for the
purpose of limiting the domain of immunity from
jurisdiction, transposed some notions of administrative
law to the field of immunities. According to these
criteria the State should be granted immunity where the
acts are accomplished for the purpose of rendering a
public service (finalist approach), on the other hand it
should be deprived of any immunity when it has acted in
the formes of private law (formalist approach) The
case-law has from time to time upheld one of these two
approaches.
However, since the application of each criterion
alone has met with some criticism, by and large, as it has
been suggested by some commentators, the two criteria
are cumulative and there are ample cases to demonstrate
that the courts have applied both criteria cumulatively.
For example, in Perignon^^^ involving contracts for
See supra, fns. 191-192 and the accompanying
text.
Bourel, op cit, 177, at no. 55.
325 Ibid.
Entreprise Perignon v. Gouvernement Des Etats-
Unis, France, Court of Cassation. 8 December 1964. ILR
45, 1972, p. 82 & ILR 65 (1984), p. 39. Clunet, 1964,
p.416, note J.B. Sialelli.
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building flats for the purpose of aGcommodation of U.S.
citizens, involved in "Marshall Plan", the case was
considered to be covered by the principle of immunity from
jurisdiction of States, because apart from the purpose,
the contracts had been signed by the order and on behalf
of the U.S. by State entity of that government.
Furthermore, the contracts contained provisions alien to
private law relating to the prerogatives of the public
authority of the U.S. Government (clauses exorbitante du
droit commun) . In the case of Transshipping v.
Pakistan^^^, the claim based on a contract for preliminary
surveys and construction of water distribution and
drainage works was covered by immunity from jurisdiction,
because the contracts were of a public rather than a
private law character, because they were for public works
with some provisions alien to private law. The court held
that the arbitration clause did not change the public law
character of the contract and did not mean that the State
of Pakistan had waived its jurisdictional immunity. Also
in the celebrated case of Spanish State v. Soci6t6 Anonyme
De L^HStel George V, the court held that the Spanish
National Tourist Office's entry into a contract of lease
of premises as a commercial lease, subject to rules
pertaining to every person, purporting to run a business,
could not be considered ^s an act of public power, nor in
the interest of public service and would not put in issue
the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore, Spain was not
entitled to immunity from jurisdiction.
As it can be seen in these cases the courts'
analysis contained elements of both formalist and finalist
Socidtd Transshipping v. Federation of Pakistan,
France, Court of Cassation, 2 March 1966, ILR 47 (1974),
p. 150.
Spanish State v. Soci6t6 Anonyme De L'Hdtel
George V, France, Court of Cassation (First Civil
Chamber), 17 January 1973), ILR 65 (1984), p. 61.
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approaches. They were not only looking into the forms
adopted in the contracts to see if they resembled private
law forms, but they were also looking for the nature of
the activity upon which the claim was based. In looking
into the nature of the activity the courts took into
account, inter alia, the purpose of the activity in order
to see if it was carried out for the fulfillment of a
public service.
In another case involving an Iranian State agency,
namely the case of Administration des Chemins des Fer
Iranien^^^, the Court of Cassation attempted to
rationalize the application of the restrictive theory.
The case involved a suit, by a french company, against the
Iranian Government Railway Administration. The defendant
claimed immunity from jurisdiction. The court held that
immunity can be granted for the nature of the activity for
those acts which are of public power character and are
performed in the interest of a public service, by a State
entity at the behest or on behalf of foreign State. Since
transport by railway was a commercial activity and not an
activity dependant on the performance of public power the
immunity could not be granted. This case is often
mentioned to be a land mark case in immunity law of
France, because the Court of Cassation seized the
opportunity, to define the restrictive nature of immunity
from jurisdiction and to base it on an objective ground,
i.e. the nature of the activity^^°.
In a case based on a contract of railway
construction, in the former yugoslavia, namely the
Administration des Chemins des Fer du
Gouvernement Iranien v. Soci6t6 Levant Express Transport,
Court of Cassation, 25 Feb. 1969, ILR 52 (1978), p. 315;
R.G.D.I.P., 1969, p. 883.
The case is reported and commented upon as a
land-mark case in; Ancel et Lequette, op cit, fn. 252,
p. 386.
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protracted case of SEEE^^^ the court held that:
In the case of public works or supply contracts,
jurisdictional immunity can only be invoked
where the purpose of the work is to ensure the
functioning of one of the traditional tasks
entrusted to the State or its administrative
departments.
The court, like in the case against the Iranian
Railway, concluded that the purpose of the railway
construction was to satisfy the requirements for the
transport of persons, which was essentially a private
activity, and would make the contract subject to private
law. The court equally focused on the form of the contract
and held that, since the contract lacked provisions which
differ from those normally contained in contracts governed
by the ordinary law,^^^ The contract was not an act of
public power. The court added another element by saying
that;
These two elements, the purpose and the form of
the contract, are corroborated by the inclusion
of an arbitration clause which demonstrates the
intention of the Yugoslav Government to act,
with regard to the performance of the contract,
as an ordinary private party.
Thus the court took into account three factors, the
economic nature of the contract, determined on the basis
of a finalist approach; the absence of any provisions
alien to private law, determined on the basis of a
formalist approach; and the insertion of an arbitration
Socx6t6 Europ6en Etudes ET D'Entreprises v.
World Bank, Yugoslavia and France, France Court of Appeal
of Rouen, 13 Nov. 1984, ILR (1990), p.58, Clunet 1985,
p.473.
Ibid, ILR, at p. 64.
Ibid, at p.65.
Ibid.
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clause. The focus on arbitration clause is significant in
light of the fact that in some less recent cases, such as
the previously mentioned case against Pakistan,the
existence of arbitration clause was held to have no impact
on the public law character of the contract. As was shown
in previous pages, the arbitration clause gained much
weight in Eurodif cases.
On appeal to the said judgment Yugoslavia argued that
it was entitled to immunity because the act at issue was
a concession for public works and that waiver of such
immunity could not be deduced merely from the presence of
an arbitration clause in the contract.
The Court of Cassation^^' simply held that by
agreeing to the insertion of an arbitration clause in the
original contract Yugoslavia had thereby submitted to the
jurisdiction of arbitrators and accepted that their award
be granted an exequatur. Although the Court of
Cassation did not employ, in detail, the court of appeal's
analyses, and based its reasoning, exclusively on the
arbitration clause, it nevertheless upheld the judgment
under appeal.
Given the fact that the SEES judgment by the Court of
Appeal of Rouen was rendered in Nov. 1984, a few months
after Eurodif, it would be safe to suggest that Eurodif
has influenced both the Court of Appeal of Rouen and later
the Court of Cassation in attaching so much importance to
the arbitration clause.
Transshipping v. Pakistan, op cit, fn. 327 and
the accompanying text.
Soci6t6 europ6enne d'6tudes et d'entreprises,
Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le
developpement c. Etat frangais. Republic socialist
f6d6rale de Yougoslavie, Cour de Cassation (Ire Ch. civ.),
18 Nov.1986, Clunet 114 (1987), case note by: Oppetit B.
p.120, ILR 82 (1990), p.73.
337 Ibid, ILR, at p.74.
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B. Iranian Cases Involving Immunity From Jurisdiction:
There are a few cases, decided by the French courts
after 1979, in which immunity from jurisdiction of some
Iranian State agencies like National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC), Iranian Central Bank etc., was decided in the
context of some contractual claims. As will be seen,
these cases do not entail a significant change in the
immunity law, such as the change brought about by the
Eurodif case in the domain of immunity from execution.
The judgments follow, more or less, the traditional
patterns of the French case-law, relating to immunity from
jurisdiction, shedding light, in certain respects, on some
aspects of immunity law. The interesting point of these
judgments will come to light when they are compared with
the Eurodif judgments.
1. The Case Against National Iranian Oil Company
The first case deals with the immunity from
jurisdiction of NIOC, in a contractual claim concerning
Soci6t6 Pipeline Service (PLS) et NIOC. The claimant, a
French corporation, entered into a contract with NIOC., in
1976, providing for furnishing and installation of
cathodic protection of two oil pipelines connecting
different Iranian cities. In 1981 the claimant sued NIOC
before the French courts asking for damages on the basis
of the contract as well as the nullification of letters of
credit, issued in favor of NIOC as guaranty arrangements.
The Tribunal de Commerce de Nanterre in its judgment of 28
Feb. 1984 dealt with the plea of immunity from
jurisdiction raised by NIOC. The court taking a quick
look at the structure and the function of NIOC as well as
at the nature of the underlying contract rejected the plea
of immunity from jurisdiction holding that; the Articles
of Association of NIOC showed that, though hundred percent
of the capital of NIOC belonged to the Iranian Government,
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it was a commercial organization. Due to its commercial
and industrial objects in the field of activities relating
to oil and gas, the underlying contract was not an
administrative contract but it was a commercial one
lacking any provisions alien to private law^^®.
On appeal, the Cour d'appel de Versailles, affirmed
the above judgment by holding, inter alia, that the
immunity is granted not because of public power of the
State but because of the nature of the activity in
question, that even if NIOC was accomplishing a mission of
public service in which the claimant was involved, this
alone could not confer to NIOC the immunity from
jurisdiction, that the question of public law could not be
raised since the sole provision in the contract, namely
the NIOC's unilateral right of termination for convenience
of the contract, would not exclude the contract from the
field of private law, that NIOC was a commercial joint
stock company of public law^^'.
However, the Court of Cassation^^° reversed the said
judgment, holding that foreign States and their
organizations who acted under their order or on their
behalf enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction not only for the
acts of public power "puissance public", but also for
those acts which were accomplished in the interest of a
public service. Since the court of appeal had
acknowledged the constitutional link between NIOC and the
Government of Iran and the fact that the former was
engaged in a mission of public service in which the
claimant too was involved, but had denied the immunity
because according to lex fori the activities in question
Page 8 of the judgment.
The same court however, rejected the claimant's
argument that since there had been fundamental changes in
Iranian legal system the contract was no longer governed
by the Iranian laws.
Soci6t6 Pipeline Service (PLS) et NIOC, Court of
Cassation, 29 May 1990.
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were of commercial nature, it indeed had violated the
aforementioned principle.
The case was relinquished to the Court of Appeal of
Paris which held in its judgment of 26 May 1992 that, the
supplying of cathodic protection was intended to conserve
the oil pipelines connecting different Iranian cities and
would ensure the conservation of those installations which
had the character of a public work, consequently they were
realized in the interest of an Iranian public service,
namely the distribution and commercialization of basic
materials under the auspices of an organization with a
public character. Moreover, the court held, since NIOC
was acting under the order and on behalf of the Iranian
Government, it was entitled, to the same extent as a
foreign State would, to the immunity from jurisdiction for
the case at hand.
2. The Case Against National Iranian Gas Company
The National Iranian Gas Company too, is entitled to
immunity from jurisdiction according to a judgment by the
Court de Cassation.The claimant had almost a similar
case against NIGC based on a 1978 contract for the
provision and installation of cathodic protection for a
gas pipeline connecting two different Iranian cities.
Except for the dates of the judgments almost the same
sequence of events took place before the Tribunal de
Commerce de Nanterre, Court of Appeal of Paris, Court of
Cassation (Ch. civ.) and again Court of Appeal of Paris.
The result, as in the case of NIOC, was that the NIGC too,
was entitled to immunity from jurisdiction. In both cases,
the Court of Cassation, following its longstanding
tradition granted immunity because the contracts at issue.
Soci6t6 nationale iranienne du gaz c. Soci4t4
pipeline service et autre, Cour de Cassation (Ire Ch.
civ.), 2 May 1990, Rev. crit. d.i.p. vol.80, 1991, p.140.
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though not involving acts of public power, were performed
in the interest of public service.
It would be interesting to compare the cases
involving NIOC and NIGC with a case against Kuwait News
Agency^^^ which was rendered by the same Chamber of the
Court of Cassation two weeks after the NIOC judgment. MR.
Parrot, an English journalist, who had a contract with
Kuwait News Agency, at its Paris office, to provide the
latter with information and articles on economics and
financial matters, sued his employer for not renewing his
employment contract. The Court of Cassation was not
impressed by the News Agency's contention that it
performed acts of public service. The highest court, while
recognizing that the News Agency, despite its financial
and legal independence, was an instrumentality of the
Kuwaiti Government, held that since the activity
underlying the case was an act de gestion, and MR. Parrot
did not have a particular responsibility within the News
Agency, the respondent was not entitled to immunity from
jurisdiction:
342 The Court, among other things, stated that:
Les Etats etrangers et les organismes agissant
par leur ordre et pour leur compte beneficient
de I'immunite de juridiction non seulement pour
les actes de puissance publigue mais aussi pour
ceux accomplis dans I'interet d'un service
public. A viole le principe susvise une cour
d'appel qui, apres avoir reconnu 1'existence de
liens constitutifs entre I'Etat iranien et la
societe iranienne de gaz et le fait que cette
societe accomplissait une mission de service
public a laquelle participait la societe
demanderesse, a enonce que cette consideration
ne saurait a elle seule entrainer I'immunite de
juridiction.
Ibid, at p.141.
Kuwait News Agency c. Parrot, Court of
Cassation, 12 June 1990 (1st. civ. Chamber) , Rev. crit.
d.i.p. vol.80, 1991, p.142, with case not by Bourel P.,
covering this case and the case against NIGC.
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Mais attendu qu'il results des productions que
I'agence de presse du Koweit est dotee de la
personnalite morale et de 1'independance
budgetaire; que la cour d'appel a exactement
decide que ne saurait porter atteinte aux
interets proteges de I'Etat du Koweit justifiant
I'iininunite de jurisdiction, I'acte de gestion
par lequel une agence de presse, ftit-elle
1'emanation de cet fitat, a licencie un
jouranliste noime par 1'agence dans le cadre des
activites propres de celle-ci et qui, selon les
constations souveraines de sa decision, n'etait
charge d'aucune responsabilite particuliere;-
D'oti il suit qu'en aucune de ses deux branches,
le moyen n'est fonde.^^^
One might think that a State News Agency is no less
involved in activities of public service, than, for
instance, NIGC is in cases of construction of pipelines.
The highest court's qualification of the activities of MR.
Parrot as acts de gestion, consequently might be
surprising. However, the French courts' determination of
immunity is based on appreciation of facts, in each case
surrounded by different political, economical and social
considerations. As has been suggested by some
commentators,^^® the rejection of immunity in cases
involving NIOC and NIGC, could do damage to the then
reapproachment between France and Iran, while, denying the
Kuwaiti News Agency immunity from jurisdiction,in a case
brought by a part time journalist, was not capable of
inflicting any harm on interests of Kuwait.
3. The Case Against the Iranian Central Bank and Others
In Soci4t4 Tomson v.Iranian Central Bank the
claimant, a french corporation, had entered in 1978, into
a contract with the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
(IRIB) providing for the installation of six video centers
in different Iranian television stations. Different
Ibid, at p. 142.
Bourel, ibid, at p. 145.
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payment and guaranty arrangements were made through
letters of credit, issued by La Banqne De Paris Et De Pays
Bas S.A., and Bank Mellat of Iran. In 1981, the Iranian
Broadcasting demanded the payment of letters of credit.
The claimant asked the Tribunal De Commerce De Paris, to
forbid the Paribas and the Iranian Banks from honoring the
demands of IRIB. The Iranian Broadcasting and the Iranian
Central Bank raised, inter alia, the issue that they
enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction, because both were
governmental entities engaged in sovereign activities.
Moreover, the Iranian Broadcasting contended that the
contract underlying the claim involved activities which
were of a sovereign nature emanating from "puissance
public" of the Iranian State. The court rejected the
immunity plea of the Central Bank, holding that, the claim
should be limited to and examined from the view point of
the letters of credit. In the court's view letters of
credit fell within the domain of international trade and
were regulated by the rules and the usage pertinent to
them. Therefore, no exception of immunity from
jurisdiction could validly be relied upon by the Central
Bank^^^. As to the immunity plea of the Iranian
Soci6t6 Tomson C.S.F.C. la Banque Markazi Iran
(Iranian Central Bank), L' Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcasting (IRIB), Ordonnance of 28 October 1981 of the
Tribunal De Commerce De Paris, pp. 7 and 8. The judgment
does not signify a departure from the approach taken in
comparable cases. For instance, an argument, almost within
the same line, was raised by Cameroon Development Bank
(CDB), a State banking institution, in an action involving
bills of exchange drawn by the State of Cameroons and
guaranteed by CDB to ensure credit for the construction of
a public sector hospital in Cameroons. The Court of
Cassation rejected the immunity plea of the Bank, saying
that:
[w]hateve the transaction underlying the bill
[of exchange] at issue, the guarantee given by
the CDB on behalf of the State of the Cameroons,
since it was for the benefit of a legal person
governed by private law, constituted an ordinary
commercial act performed in the normal exercise
of the CDB's banking activities and quite
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Broadcasting, the court^^^ held that even if IRIB was an
Iranian public organization, apparently it was involved in
a commercial contract. The financial arrangements of that
contract were undertaken by different financial
institutions, which were themselves of commercial status,
engaged in financial matters, especially in the field of
guaranties and letters of credit. Moreover, the court
added, the claim was essentially directed against, la
Parisbas, a french commercial corporation^^®.
C. Observations
Among the aforementioned judgments, especially those
involving NIOC and NIGC are of some interesting features,
particularly in a comparative context with Eurodif. These
judgments, unlike most cases decided under the FSIA which
take into account, only the nature of the activity rather
than its purpose, have to a large extent taken into
account the purpose of the activity, which would result in
the preservation of Iranian public properties and in the
better provision, commercialization and distribution of
oil to the Iranian public.
In the cases concerning NIOC and NIGC, finalist and
unrelated to the exercise of public power.
Cameroons Development Bank v. Soci6t4 Des Etablissements
Robber, Court of Cassation (1st civ. ch.) 18 Nov. 1986,
ILR 77 (1988), p.532, at 533; Clunet 1987, p.632.
Tomson v. Banque Markazi, ibid, Ordonnance of 12
Nov. 1981.
The Iranian respondents later appealed, but Cour
d'Appel de Paris, in its judgment of 23 November 1988,
rejected the appeal because it was made beyond the
permissible period for appeals. The Court of Cassation
too, affirmed the Court of Appeal's rejection of the
appeal. Therefore, nothing was said by the Court of Appeal
and the Court of Cassation on the immunity plea. Judgment
of 14 Nov. 1990 of the Court of Cassation, (2d. Civil
Chamber).
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formalist considerations were taken into account.
Moreover, although the French case-law hardly follows the
structuralist approach, unlike the German court practice
which is mainly a structuralist one^^', the courts seem to
have paid special attention to the structure and functions
of NIOC and NIGC to see whether they were engaged in a
mission, on behalf of the Government of Iran, involving an
activity carried out in the interest of public service.
NIOC and NIGC cases may support the assumption that
structure or "quality juridique"'^^^, of NIOC as well as
their functions were taken into account. The fact that
NIOC and NIGC have legal personalities separate from the
Government of Iran, did not deprive them of immunity from
jurisdiction because they carried out a mission of public
service^®^. The emphasis was put on the nature of the
activity, which involved, in turn, the purpose of the
activity too.
Another interesting aspect of these two cases is
that, as will be explained in next chapters, they seem to
be in conflict with the German courts' decisions on the
status of NIOC^®^. Also a quick comparison of the case
with the Eurodif reveals that while the French Judiciary
characterizes the cathodic protection of oil Pipelines, as
an activity serving a public purpose and the claim
thereunder covered by immunity from jurisdiction, on the
other hand it considers the proliferation of nuclear
energy for pacific purposes as a commercial activity.
While in the case involving NIOC and NIGC, the sole
Schreuer, op cit, fn. 145, p. 107.
Bourel, op cit, fn. 177, nos. 39 & 40.
Idem, nos. 32-47; Ancel et Lequette, op cit, fn.
252, p. 392.
National Iranian Oil Company Legal Status case,
infra, fn. 381, p.199.
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reference, in the contracts, to the Iranian public law was
the NIGC and NIOC's unilateral right of termination of the
contract, thereby boosting their public nature, the fact
that in Eurodif there were several intergovernmental
agreements in the highest level would not change the
commercial nature of the underlying activities^".
Likewise the Iranian Government's involvement in the
nuclear energy project did not alter the characterization
of the activity as commercial.
In the case of letters of credit against the Iranian
Central Bank and the notorious commerciality of the
activities, the court did not deem it necessary to look
into the purpose of the contract. The Tribunal de Commerce
de Paris did not take into consideration the purpose of
the contract for installation of video centers in
different Iranian television stations. Though the court
affirmed that IRIB was a public organization, it did not
heed the fact that IRIB's activities were virtually non
commercial and carried out as a public service. The
reason was that the case involved letter of credit issues,
which are clear examples of commercial dealings. The
court was neither persuaded by the argument that the
Iranian Central Bank's involvement, even in issues
involving the L.C. arrangements of Iranian State entities,
was because of the role entrusted to the Central Bank to
control the foreign exchanges of the country.
The function of foreign exchange control, which was
overshadowed by the letters of credit, has been considered
as sovereign activity in some cases. For instance in
These judgments, in contrast with Eurodif, did
not entail conspicuous political or financial elements.
The claimant was not a huge multinational like Eurodif.
The total relief sought in the case against NIOC was about
59,408,120 Iranian Rials equal to 85,000.00 U.S. dollars.
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Blagojevic^ the claimant sued the Bank of Japan alleging
that the Bank's intervention, under the guise of exchange
control, in the execution of the agreement between the
claimant and a Japanese film company, resulted in the
repudiation of the contract causing damages to the
claimant. The Court of Cassation held that Bank of Japan
was entitled to immunity from jurisdiction because while
performing its duties in control of foreign exchange it
acted under the order and on behalf of the Japanese
Government and did so in the interest of public
service. This case, though not involving letter of
credit issues, puts exchange control functions of a
foreign central bank outside the jurisdiction of the
French courts.
If we compare the above-mentioned judgments with
Eurodif, in which the production of uranium was held to be
commercial, we will find that in Eurodif, the focus was
solely on the nature of the activity, without any regard
to the notion of public service in the characterization of
the activity. The court only held that the contracts did
not contain any provisions outside private law.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
1. In Eurodif, the Court of Cassation held that
immunity from execution is the principle, but it can be
ruled out in exceptional circumstances. Indeed, the court
made it clear that the immunity from execution is not of
an absolute nature. The properties belonging to a foreign
State are immune from any measures of execution unless the
court determines that the property sought to be attached
is allocated, though not explicitly, to the commercial
Blagojevic v. Bank of Japan, France, Court of
Cassation (First Civil Chamber), 19 May 1976, 65 ILR
(1984), p. 63.
3" Ibid.
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activity of private law giving rise to the dispute between
the parties.
2. By Eurodif, the notion of commercial activity,
which normally plays the greatest role in immunity from
jurisdiction determinations, has got a role to play, also,
in immunity from execution determinations, and thus
Eurodif has taken a step forward in the direction of
unification of the legal regime regulating both
immunities.
3. However, the application of Eurodif formula, which
discards the "public service" notion in its
characterization of the activity giving rise to the claim,
may lead to a result where the domain of immunity from
jurisdiction is more limited than the domain of immunity
from execution as illustrated by the cases against
Sonatrach and NIOC. Unless, the notion of "public service"
too, plays a role in the delimitation of the domain of
immunity from execution, this unexpected result may recur
from time to time.
4. In qualifying the activity giving rise to the
claim, Eurodifspecial attention to the existence, in
the contract, of the arbitration clause was followed by
some cases. Thus, the mere existence of the arbitration
clause might be taken, at least, as an indication of the
commercial nature of the contract. In the context of
Eurodifformula in immunity from execution
determinations, such a clause would, indirectly,
contribute to the setting aside of that immunity.
Consequently the arbitration clause, which is mainly
intended to avoid national jurisdiction of parties might
lead to the establishment of that jurisdiction, albeit in
the limited area of immunity from execution.
5. The collapse of the uranium production project,
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following the 1979 profound changes in the political
environment of Iran, strained further the uncertain
relationships between that country and France and put at
stake the fate of several billion francs. The hesitant
and half-hearted effort by the French judiciary for the
restriction of the domain of immunity from execution which
had begun since 1969, by the Englander judgment, gained
momentum through Eurodif, as a result of this unique
politico-financial situation. Seizing this opportunity,
the Court of Cassation managed to bring about the change,
needed and expected since long time ago, and aligned , to
a large extent, the French immunity law with that of the
United States and other major industrial countries of
Europe like the U.K. and Germany. This major step was
supplemented by the decision of the same court in
Sonatrach involving a State-entity of Algeria. Both
decisions are in harmony with the existing trend in
international law that recognizes a broader domain of
immunity for properties of a State in comparison to the
properties of a State owned entity.
6. After Eurodif, in cases against NIOC and NIGC, the
Court of Cassation, reverting to the line established by
cases following the landmark case of Administration des
Chemins des Per du Government Iranian,held that both
NIGC and NIOC were immune from jurisdiction, in cases
involving the interests of Iranian public service. These
cases did not, however, involve important political and
financial complications, as Eurodif did. The French courts
determination of what constitutes an act of public power
or a commercial activity, and whether or not the
activities are carried out in the interest of public
service, while following the mainstream of the related
case law is, an appreciation of facts, influenced by
legal, political and economical considerations.
Supra, fn. 329 and the accompanying text.
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The comparison made between Eurodif and other judgments
which were all rendered in reliance on the restrictive
theory may help to prove this proposition.
CHAPTER THREE
CLAIMS INVOLVING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN BEFORE THE GERMAN COURTS
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMMUNITY LAW IN GERMANY
A. Pre-1945 Case-law on Immunity From Jurisdiction:
In Germany the development of the doctrine of
immunity dates back to the era of original German States.
In Prussia, the General Statute Governing the
administration of Justice in the Prussian States of 6 July
1793, covered inter alia, the issues of arrest and
attachment and at section 76 provided that if a high
ranking alien was to be subject of personal arrest, the
Department of Foreign Affairs must be notified^^^. The
issue then would be decided by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. During the Nineteenth Century the issue of
immunity, partly covering diplomatic immunities, was
subject of legislation and decisions, first in Prussia and
later in the Empire^^®. Since Nineteenth Century the
German court practice has followed an erratic course^®'.
In 1882, the Court of Conflicts in Berlin, decided that
the claim brought by Ziemer, an engineer, against the
Romanian Government, and the application for seizure of
Romanian properties for the execution of a judgment
rendered by lower courts in favor of the claimant had to
be decided by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and not by
the Prussian courts^^°. The Court of Conflicts held that
it was an established principle of international law that
Allen, op cit, fn. 55, p. 57.
Ibid, pp. 59-61.
Sucharitkul, op cit, fn. 5, at p. 146.
The case was taken up by the Court of Conflicts
upon the intervention by Bismarck, who was then the
Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs and strongly
supporting the incompetence of judicial bodies vis a vis
foreign States. See: Allen op cit, fn. 55, pp. 62 et seq.
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a foreign State could not be impleaded before the courts
of another State. A few years later in 1885, the Bavarian
Court of Conflicts of Jurisdiction in a rather similar
case of Heizer g. Kaizer - Franz - Joseph Bahn A.G. which
was brought against the Austrian State as the owner of a
railway, made a distinction between private and public law
activities and held, inter alia, that:
The question must be considered whether the
principle referred to would be applicable
without exception also when the issue pertains
to private law relationships. Such a critical
distinction between the applicability of this
premise in the domain of public law on the one
hand, and private law on the other, seems the
more justified since it was a generally
recognized principle in Roman law, and one which
has been consistently adhered to in modern
legislation and, especially, in the Austrian
civil law and public law, that the State assumes
as soon as it enters the domain of private law,
the position to which a private law subject is
entitled, with respect to its rights and
obligations and with respect to judicial
proceedings serving the protection of such
rights.
However, the restrictive trend was reversed in 1905,
by the Imperial Court in a case involving the Belgian
State Railroad^*^^. The Imperial Court upheld the
dismissal, by the lower courts, of the case due to lack of
jurisdiction and ruled that immunity was regulated by
international law and not the German law. The court
though tacitly recognized the fact that the general
agreement among the States as to the absolute immunity of
foreign States was only with respect to acts undertaken in
the exercise of sovereignty and that such agreement did
not prevailed as the private law activities of State were
Quoted by the Harvard Draft, op cit. fn. 50,
comment to Article 7, p. 534.
Journal de Tribunaux (Beiges), 1906, 855, quoted
by Allen, op cit, fn. 55, p. 82.
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at issue. Nevertheless the court held that, to assert
jurisdiction over a foreign State, without its consent,
even in private law matters, would subject the latter to
the political authority of the forum State and would
affront its independence^^'.
The fact that the Belgian courts in those years had
rejected the immunity of foreign States in claims
concerning private law matters, did not made the court to
adopt the same course. In 1910, in the case of Hellfeld
g. den Fiskus des Russichen Reiches^^, and in 1915 in
another case brought against the Russian Government in
connection with the services rendered to an exhibition at
Leipzig the absolute doctrine was upheld by German
courts^'^^. In 1921, in the famous case of Ice King, the
German Reichsgericht upheld, though with some hesitation,
the principle of absolute immunity'^. It was in light of
these cases that the German Constitutional Court observed
in 1963 that:
Until 1945 Germany was amongst those States
whose courts granted unlimited immunity, even as
regards private law claims''^.
363
364
Allen, ibid, p. 83.
S. 1912-IV-l, with a note by A. de Lapradelle;
AJIL, 5 (1911), p. 490, quoted by Sucharitkul. op cit, fn.
5, p. 147.
Lautherpacht, op cit, fn. 11, p. 2 67.
Gustaf Selling v. United States Shipping Board
(the Ice King), Annual Digest, 1919-22 case no. 102.
ILR 45 (1972), p. 62.
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B. Post 1945 Case-law on Immunity from Jurisdiction
1. Broad Jurisdiction of the German Courts
As discussed earlier, jurisdiction of the forum
State and, consequently, immunity from its jurisdiction is
distinct from the international competence of the forum
State. In Germany too, there are certain limits to the
jurisdiction of^^' the courts. For instance, sections 18,
19 and 20 of the Gerichtsverfassungsgestz (Constitution of
the Courts Law) exclude certain persons from the German
jurisdiction. According to section 20 of the said law:
Furthermore, German jurisdiction does not extend
to persons other than those mentioned in Section
18 [persons immune in virtue of the Vienna
Convention of Diplomatic Relations] and in
Section 19 [persons immune in virtue of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations], in so
far as they are immune from German jurisdiction
in virtue of general rules of public
international law, on international agreements
or of other legal rules.
The essence of these sections is that the German
Courts have no jurisdiction over extra-territorial
persons.
a) Jurisdiction Ratione Loci
Among other things, jurisdiction Ration^ loci,
See supra, fns. 15-28 and the accompanying text.
369 Steinberger, op cit,fn. 19, p.428.; Paussmeyer,
op cit, fn.l9, at p. 429; Shaumann & Habscheid, op cit,
fn. 19, at pp. 304, 305.
Peaslee A.J., Constitutions of Nations, vol. 2,
2nd ed. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1956, p. 34., quoted by Seidl
- Hohenveldern I., "State Immunity: Federal Republic of
Germany", NYIL. 10 (1979), at p. 55
Cohn E. J., Manual Of German Law (in two
volumes), Oceana Publications, 1971, vol.11, p.169 et seq.
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provides the basis of many rules on the competence of the
German courts (section 13 et seq. of ZPO (Zivil
Prozessordning or Code of Civil Procedure) According
to a long established practice of the courts, if under the
rules contained in those sections, a German court has
domestic jurisdiction ration^ loci, it shall have
international jurisdiction too. Conversely if a court
lacks jurisdiction under those rules it will lack
international competence as well.^^
This rule though seemingly fair, because it places an
2^2 Ibid, p. 172.
373 Paussmeyer, op cit, fn.l9, p. 429; See, for
instance. The Chilean Copper Nationalization Case, where
the Superior Court of Hamburg held that;
The court has international and local
jurisdiction. German international procedural
law governs the international competence
indirectly via the provisions concerning local
competence (Sees. 12 et seq. of the Code of
Civil Procedure). In accordance with Sees. 937
and 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
Landgericht (Superior Court) of Hamburg is
proper venue since the defendant has its
registered office here. International
jurisdiction is thus also present.
vol. 12 (1973), p. 251, at p. 265. In another
stage of the said case, the Supreme Court of Hamburg held:
The international jurisdiction and the local
jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Hamburg
exists since the general place of jurisdiction
for the defendants, based on their domicile, is
Hamburg (Section 17 paragraph I of the Code of
Civil Procedure).
German international procedural law does not
contain any special rules of law for the
international competence of the German courts in
disputes in the field of property rights. It is
therefore determined by the provisions on
general jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 12 et
seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Superior Court of Hamburg Interlocutory Decision in case
concerning Chilean Nationalization of El Teniente Mine
(Nationality of split corporation), ILM. vol XIII (1974),
p. 1115, at p. 1119.
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alien claimant or respondent on the same level as a german
litigant, is subject, as far as the claims against foreign
persons are concerned, to Section 23 of Zivil
Prozessordning ZPO (Code of Civil Procedure)
The courts, on the basis of a broad interpretation of
section 23 have established German Jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims against foreign States, which have
otherwise little contact with the German law. Since the
dichotomy of actio in rent versus actio in personam does
not exist in German law and all actions must be brought
against persons^^. Section 23 is relevant to the problem
of jurisdictional immunities of States, and even in cases
pertaining property rights of foreign States, the rules
concerning the jurisdictional immunity will come to play.
b) Monetary Claims
According to the said section, jurisdiction in
respect of monetary claims against persons having no
domicile in Germany, is rested in the court of any place
in Germany where the object of the claim has been
located^^^. This rule has been applied by the German
courts so extensively that has led to absurd results.
Thus, location, in Germany, of an asset of a purely
nominal value has been considered sufficient ground to
extend the German jurisdiction over the owner of that
asset. A contingent claim against a debtor, residing in
Germany, or a claim which is not yet due, has been held
sufficient to come under the ambit of the German
Cohn, op cit, fn. 371, p. 173.
Seidl-Hohenveldern, op cit, fn. 370, p. 56;
Paussmeyer, op cit, fn. 19, p. 424.
Seidl-Hohenveldern, ibid.
Ibid.
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jurisdiction^^®. This rule has been applied also to
assets owned by a foreign State^^' or a State controlled
entity. For instance, in the case concerning NIOC Legal
Status^^'^ the court held that:
The fact that the defendant [NIOC] is a foreign
legal person does not prevent the application of
Article 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
c) The Nigerian Cement Case
In the case concerning the Central Bank of
Nigeria^®^, The District Court of Frankfurt, affirmed its
jurisdiction and then dealt with the immunity issue. This
case, was one of many celebrated cases brought against the
Military Government of Nigeria before different courts
worldwide.In 1975 and 1977, The Nigerian government
entered into a number of contracts for the purchase of
enormous amounts of cement.The Government provided
Cohn, op cit, fn.371, p. 173.
Habscheid, W, "Die Immunitat auslandischer
Staaten nach deutschem Zivilprozessrecht" (the immunity of
foreign States according to German procedural law) in:
Schaumann & Habscheid, op cit, fn.l9, p. 159, at 187,
quoted by Seidl-Hohenveldern, op cit, fn. 370, p. 56.
Re: infra, fns. 437-442 and the accompanying
text.
National Iranian Oil Company Legal Status Case,
Federal Republic of Germany, Superior Provincial Court
(Oberlandesgericht) of Frankfurt, 21 Oct. 1981, ILR
65(1984),P.199, at p. 204.
Nonresident Petitioner v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, Provincial Court (Landgericht) of Frankfurt, 2
Dec. 1975, I.L.M. vol. XVI (1977) p. 501; ILR 65 (1984),
p. 131.
For detailed background and history of the
Nigerian cases see generally Nwogugu, E.I, "The Central
Bank of Nigeria in Foreign Courts", 10 NYIL, p.184.
^®^ Nonresident v. Nigeria, op cit. fn. 382,
pp.131-134.
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the sellers with standard international letters of credit
for the delivery, the price and any demurrage costs
resulting from any delay. Later, due to small size of the
port of Lagos and congestion thereof, the delivery of the
cement coming from different parts of the world became
virtually impossible.^®® To manage the crisis, the
military Government, which had just took over the office,
suspended the import of cement into Nigeria until new
arrangements were made. This suspension led to a series
of litigations in western countries, one of which was
decided by the District Court of Frankfurt. The court
affirmed the attachment of the funds held in Deutsche Bank
in the name of the Central Bank of Nigeria and rejected
the Nigerian plea that the venue was improper.The
court while dealing with the plea of territorial
connection of the claim with Germany held that that
connection was not a requirement of general international
law and went on to say that the important factor was that
the Central Bank did have some funds at the seat of the
court, the funds held at the Deutsche Bank of Frankfurt,
out of which, the amount of the L.Cs were to be paid. In
the court's view, this factor alone provided the
territorial connection under Article 23 of ZPO and made
the venue a proper one.^®^
A close study of the judgements rendered by German
courts, especially the argumentation and the way by which
the Federal Constitutional Court ascertains the existence
of a general international law rule will show that German
courts proceed with the cases against foreign governments,
on a footing similar to that of dealing with ordinary
persons. They will refrain to deal with the case if there
is a clear requirement under customary international law
385 Ibid.
Ibid, p. 131
28^ Ibid, p. 137.
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or treaty law barring hearing the case. In other words, it
can be suggested that in immunity law problems, from the
German courts' perspective the starting point is the non-
immunity of foreign States. Immunity will be granted only
if it is clearly required by the practice of a large
majority of States, not necessarily including Germany.^®®
2. The Role of the Federal Constitutional Court
Except for some international accords, dealing with
immunity matters, to which Germany is a party, there does
not exist in Germany, a special law concerning the
immunity of foreign States^®'.
The Law concerning the judicial Organization
(Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, G. V. G.), in its sections 18
and 19, contains elaborate provisions with respect to the
members of diplomatic and consular missions and their
families' members. These provisions refer expressly to the
Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 concerning Diplomatic
and Consular Relations^'®. The main provision concerning
the immunity of foreign States is in article 25 of the
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany:
The general rules of international law shall
form part of federal law. They shall take
precedence over the laws and create rights and
Claim Against the Empire of Iran Case, Federal
Republic of West Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, 30
Apr. 1963, ILR 45(1972), p. 57
Ohrle, "German Sovereign Immunity Defense
(Interpretation by the German courts)", Florida Journal of
International Law, vol. 6 (1991), p. 445, at p. 461;
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their
Properties, U.N. Legislative Series, N.Y. 1982, p. 88;
Frank R., "L'Immunite d'Execution de I'Etat et des Autres
collectivites publiques en Droit Allemand", L' Immunity
d^Ex6cution de I'Etat et des Autres Collectivites
Publiques, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1990, p. 3, at pp. 7-9
390 Frank, Ibid, at p. 7.
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duties directly for the inhabitants of the
federal territory^'^
After the Second World war several judgments have
been rendered by the Federal Constitutional Court, on the
basis of the abovementioned provision, in order to
determine whether there exists a general rule of
international law which excludes foreign States and their
property totally or partially from the jurisdiction of
German courts.
According to Article 100, paragraph 2, of the Basic
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany; Article 31
paragraph 2, first sentence, and Article 13 (12) of the
Law Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court the
decisions of the said Court have the force of law and
therefore must be observed by all courts of that state^'^.
Since 1945 the German courts too, began to apply the
restrictive theory and assumed jurisdiction over foreign
States in a number of cases where the foreign State had
acted not as a sovereign but as a subject of private
rights and duties^'^. For instance in 1951, the Court of
Appeal of Hann assumed jurisdiction over Italian
Government in an action brought against the latter by the
former owner of a real estate concerning the restitution
of that property. The rationale of the court's holding
was that the Italian State had not acted in its sovereign
capacity but had acted in private law fields^'^. On the
Peaslee, op cit, fn. 370, at p. 34, quoted by
Seidl - Hohenveldern, op cit, fn. 370 at p. 55.
Seidl- Hohenveldern, ibid, at p. 59.
See the decisions quoted by Empire of Iran case,
op cit, fn. 388, at p. 62.
Domke Martin: "Immunity of Foreign States From
German Jurisdiction", note on Kingdom of Denmark case,
decision of March 19, 1953 of the Landgericht of Kiel.
Germany, AJIL, VOL 48 (1954), p.302, at p.303
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other hand in the same period, some German courts upheld
immunity, even in private law matters, on the ground that
there was some connection between the cases and the
sovereign duties of State. Therefore, as was observed by
the German Constitutional Court in 1963, the German post-
1945 case law was not uniform^'^ but there was a strong
trend towards the restrictive theory.
a) The First Ruling of the Federal Constitutional
Court
The Federal Constitutional Court dealt, for the first
time, with immunity problems in 1962, in the case
concerning to the Yugoslav Military Missioi?'^^. In 1946,
the plaintiff, sold a house and a parcel of land in West
Berlin to the Republic of Yugoslavia. The land having
been registered in 1953, in the name of Yugoslavia, was
used for its military mission. Later the plaintiff
brought an action against the Yugoslav republic,
contending that the contract of sale and the conveyance
were null and demanded that the contract be declared
invalid, that the Land Register be rectified to reflect
her name and that the land be evacuated. This case was
dealt with by different German courts such as Provincial
Court (Landgericht) and Superior Court (Kammergericht) of
Berlin and the Federal Supreme Court (B.G.H) which
requested a ruling from Federal Constitutional Court as to
whether German courts can entertain claims of this kind.
The Constitutional Court held that there was no rule of
international law which prohibited German courts from
asserting jurisdiction over a foreign State with respect
to a claim concerning the premises of its mission.
Empire of Iran case, op cit, fn. 388, p. 62.
Jurisdiction Over Yugoslav Military Mission
Case, Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Constitutional
Court, 30 Oct. 1962, ILR 38 (1969), p. 162.
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Nevertheless, the court ruled that since the
evacuation of the premise would impede the functioning of
the mission, which was of a diplomatic nature, that claim
could not be entertained. On the other hand, with regard
to the rectification of the Land Register, the court,
after a thorough review of the jurisprudence of many
countries and opinions of writers, came to the conclusion
that, since a long time ago, there was no established
practice among a majority of States according to which a
foreign State would be exempt from the jurisdiction of the
forum State with respect to every and all claims
pertaining to the premises of its mission. The scope of
the immunity enjoyed by a foreign State was, in the
court's view, limited to the extent where the functions of
the legation would remain unimpeded. Since entertaining
the rectification claim would not hamper the functioning
of the mission the claim by the claimant, in order for her
name be entered in the Land Register, was admissible^'^.
This ruling, while rich in its analysis, is of limited
value because even the absolute doctrine of immunity
recognizes the admissibility of claims relating to
immovable property. In other words when there is a case
involving the premises of a legation it is an instance of
"exception to exception" thus of a special character^'®.
b) Empire of Iran Case:
The first most important post-war development in the
German court practice in immunity law was the decision of
the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverf-
assungsgericht) of 3 0 April 1963 in the celebrated case
of Claim Against the Empire of Iran^'^, by which the
restrictive theory in matters of immunity from
Ibid, p. 169.
Frank, op cit, fn, 389, p. 12.
Op cit, fn.388, p. 57.
143
jurisdiction became irreversible in the former West
Germany.
The case which has attracted worldwide attention for
its survey of the then international law and different
authorities, involved a claim initially lodged against the
Iranian Empire by a firm in Cologne, before the District
Court of Cologne, demanding remuneration for repairs
carried out on the instructions of the Ambassador to the
heating system of the Iranian Embassy^°°. The District
Court declined to fix a date for the oral proceedings or
to serve a writ, because in its view the Iranian Empire,
as a sovereign State, enjoyed under general rules of
international law immunity from German legal proceedings.
The plaintiff appealed to the Landgericht (Higher District
Court) of Cologne'^°\ which court decided to obtain a
ruling from the Federal Constitutional Court as to whether
according to generally recognized rules of international
law, the plaintiff could institute proceedings against the
defendant State in a German federal court. The
amenability of the Iranian State to the jurisdiction of
domestic German courts depended on whether an individual
was directly entitled, by virtue of a rule of
international law, to sue a foreign State for a private
law claim based on a private law activity of foreign
State. The court, after an elaborate analysis, held that
a rule of international law, according to which foreign
States were absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of
national courts of other States with respect to non-
sovereign activities of the former, no longer existed and
was not an integral part of the German federal law.
Ibid.
401 Paussmeyer, op cit, fn. 19 at p. 421.
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c) It's Contributions
Among the contributions to the restrictive theory
made by the court was that it isolated and singled out the
nuclease of the dispute, which was indeed an oral service
contract and as such a purely commercial one, from the
surrounding facts such as the fact that one party to the
contract was a sovereign foreign State and that the
performance of the contract would assist in the well being
of the Embassy personnel which were performing sovereign
diplomatic functions. The general shield of diplomatic
immunities could serve as another source of uncertainty
and ambiguity casting clouds of sovereignty over the whole
transaction, some thing that the court evaded
meticulously. The court, aware of all these difficulties,
looked at the case from a strict angle and held that, it
was the nature of the activity and not its purpose, which
was the decisive factor in determining whether the
activity was of a sovereign character.
The court went on to say that for the purpose of
characterization of an activity as sovereign or non-
sovereign recourse must be had, in principle, to municipal
law^°^. However, the State of the forum is not at
complete liberty to characterize through legislation, even
very well known instances of sovereign activities^"^ as
non-sovereign activities:
National law can only be employed to distinguish
between a sovereign and non-sovereign activity
of a foreign State in so far as it cannot
exclude from the sovereign sphere, and thus from
^^02 The Resolution of 1954 of the Institut de Droit
International, also> provides that whether or not an act
is an act of Sovereignty is to be determined by lex fori.
See; Annuaire de 1'Institut de Droit International, vol.
45 (II), pp. 293-295.
403 Seidl-Hohenveldern, op cit, fn. 370, p. 64.
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immunity, such State dealings as belong to the
field of State authority in the narrow and
proper sense, according to the predominantly
held view of States. In this generally
recognizable field of sovereign activity are
included transactions relating to foreign
affairs and military authority, the legislature,
the exercise of police authority, and the
administration of justice/"^
With regard to the characterization of the activity
as sovereign or non-sovereign the court held that one must
focus on the nature of the activity rather than its
purpose.
The distinction between sovereign and non-
sovereign State activities cannot be drawn
according to the purpose of the State
transaction and whether it stands in a
recognizable relation to the sovereign duties of
the State. For, ultimately, activities of State,
if not wholly then to the widest degree, serve
sovereign purposes and duties, and stand in a
still recognizable relationship to them.
Neither should the distinction depend on whether
the State has acted commercially. Commercial
activities of States are not different in their
nature from other non-sovereign State
activities.
As a means for determining the distinction
between acts jure imperil and jure gestionis one
should rather refer to the nature of the State
transaction or the resulting legal
relationships, and not to the motive or purpose
of the State activity. It thus depends on
whether the foreign State has acted in exercise
of its sovereign authority, that is in public
law, or like a private person, that is in
private law^°®.
By focusing on the nature of the very contract at
404
405
Empire of Iran case, op cit, fn. 388, at p. 81.
Ibid, at p. 80.
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issue and disregarding the purpose of the contract which
was in relation to a sovereign activity of the foreign
State, the court, actually rejected the suggestion made by
Federal Government through a signed statement of its
Minister for justice. The suggestion supported the
application of the restrictive theory but with a view to
safeguarding the diplomatic immunities, drew the dividing
line according to the purpose of the pertinent act i.e.
the conclusion of the contract. Since the contract was
concluded in relation with the sovereign activities of the
State, the Minister suggested that the immunity should be
granted, even though in a different context, the contract
would have been considered a purely private law
contract^°^.
C. Fre-1945 Case-law on Immunity from Execution
Before 1945, German case-law applied the absolute
immunity doctrine with respect to foreign State
propierties'^®^. For instance, in 1910 in the Hellfeld case,
the Prussian Tribunal for Conflicts of jurisdiction made
a distinction between adjudication and execution phases
and held that submission by a foreign State to the
jurisdiction of German courts is not tantamount to waiver
of immunity from execution^"®.
Later in 1920, the same Court of Conflicts in the
Turkish Purchases Commission case held that contractual
submission to the jurisdiction did not imply waiver of
immunity from execution and ruled that a general order of
406 Ibid, at p. 59.
Philippine Embassy Bank Account case. Federal
Republic of Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, 13 Dec.
1977, ILR 65 (1984), p. 146, at p. 175 and the case-law
there cited.
Von Helfeld v. Russian Government, AJIL,
V(1911), p. 490, quoted by Allen op cit, fn. 55, p. 76.
147
the attachment of the Turkish Treasury must be set aside.
Nevertheless, a specific order of attachment of the
banking account of the Turkish Mission was upheld because
the funds in that account had already been earmarked to
satisfy any arising claim and in so doing the commission
was considered as having impliedly agreed to waive its
immunity from execution^"'.
This liberal approach as to the nature of the funds
in the said account did not change the overwhelming
practice of German courts, which upheld until after the
Second World War the absolute immunity of States both from
jurisdiction and consequently from execution^^°.
D. Fost-1945 Case-law on Immunity from EKecution
Since 1945, there has been only a few published
cases, involving questions of execution measures against
foreign States^". However, those few cases, though
hesitantly, were decided on the basis of the restrictive
theory of immunity. In the Spanish Consular Caseh"^^ the
plaintiff sought to enforce a default judgment against the
Spanish State by obtaining attachment order against the
funds held in bank accounts in the name of Spanish
consular agencies. Upon the protest by the Spanish State
that the accounts were immune from execution measures on
the ground that they were used for sovereign purposes, the
issuing court. The District Court of Stuttgart, set aside
the order. Plaintiff appealed and the Provincial Court
409 Turkish Purchases Commission case,Prussian Court
of Conflicts, 1920, Annual Digest, vol. 1, 1919-1922, case
no. 77. p. 114.
Frank, op cit, fn. 389, at p. 14.
Philippine case, op cit, fn. 407, at p. 175.
Spanish Consular Bank Accounts Case, ILR 65
(1984), p. 114.
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(Landgericht) of Stuttgart, dismissed, in 1971, the appeal
by holding that, as a rule of customary international law,
properties of sovereign States which were devoted to
sovereign purposes could not be subject to measures of
execution. The court went on to say that the decisive
factor in determining whether or not the assets were of
public or private nature was the purpose for which the
assets were devoted^^'.
1. The Nigerian Cement Cases
In 1975, German courts got involved in the notorious
Nigerian Cement Cases, which had given rise to parallel
suits in the United Kingdom and Germany. The District
Court of Frankfurt in its decision of 2. Dec. 1975^^^,
which related to demurrage claims arising out of contracts
for the supply of cement to the Nigerian Ministry of
defence, treated immunity from jurisdiction and execution
in a similar footing and rejected the plea made by the
Nigerian Central Bank that its funds were immune from
attachment. The court said:
The restrictive immunity of the foreign State
which applies to a suit on a debt in Germany
applies also to the petition for a preliminary
attachment which is sought by the petitioner....
If exercise of jurisdiction is permissible,
attachment on the local assets of a foreign
State is also admissible. Only those assets
which are dedicated to the public service of the
State are exempted from forcible attachment and
execution. In the present case, petitioner's
attachment seeks to reach respondent's cash and
securities, i.e., assets which are not in the
'public service' of the respondent.... A
possible use of these assets in the future to
finance State business cannot serve to establish
Ibid, p. 119, at pp. 116-18.
Op c±t, fn. 382, case note by H. Booysen,
SAYIL, vol. 3 (1977), p. 212.
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their present immunity^^^.
2. The Philippine Case
Finally, the inconsistency between post-1945 case-law
and the old case-law was removed by the Federal
Constitutional Court's landmark decision of 1977,
involving, like the Empire of Iran Case, a foreign State
Embassy, namely The Philippine Embassy Bank Account
Case^^^. This case too has won a lot of respect for its:
by far the most comprehensive and authoritative
discussion of the problem^'^
of immunity from execution in the case law. In this case,
the court had to determine the extent of immunity enjoyed
by foreign States from execution of judgments rendered
against them in relation to their non-sovereign
activities.
The case was initiated by the plaintiff in 1975, who
obtained a default judgment from the Provincial Court
(Landgericht) of Bonn against the Philippines, for
approximately 95,000 DM comprising the unpaid rent and
repairs costs, pursuant to a tenancy agreement concerning
the rent of a building used for Philippines' Embassy
office, evacuated prematurely by the latter. In 1976, the
plaintiff tried to collect the judgment and obtained from
the District Court (Amtsgericht), of Bonn an attachment
and assignment order against present and future balances
of a bank account in the name of the Embassy used at
least partly for its general expenses. The Embassy
protested against the attachment order arguing that the
415
416
417
Ibid, ILR, at p. 135
Ibid, at p. 146.
Crawford, op cit, fn. 68, at p. 838.
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account attached was not subject to German jurisdiction
because it belonged to the Philippines Embassy. The
District Court stayed the proceedings and sought a ruling
from the Federal Constitutional Court on the question as
follows:
is there a rule of international law according
to which enforcement, under a judgment delivered
against a foreign State in respect of its non-
sovereign activities, on a bank account of this
State or its Embassy, which exists within the
country and is intended to cover the official
expenditure and costs of the Embassy, is
altogether inadmissible or inadmissible in so
far as the functioning of the Embassy as a
diplomatic mission is impaired by the seizure;
is such a rule - if it exists - an integral part
of Federal law^^®?
The court first pointed to the fact that even many of
those jurisdictions in which the foreign States are immune
only with respect to their sovereign activities (acts jure
imperii), granted foreign States full immunity from
execution even though the assets sought to be attached
served non-sovereign or exclusively commercial
purposes^^'. This was, in the court's view, because
execution measures were of a harsh nature and had more
immediate and penetrating effect than the mere exercise of
jurisdiction had^^°. Then, the court on the strength of
an exhaustive study of comparative case law and
legislation of many European and non-European States which
found support in several treaty provisions such as the
Brussels Convention of 1926, came to the conclusion that
customary international law lacked a rule pursuant to
418
Ibid, at p. 165.
^20 , Ibid, at p. 166
Philippine case, op. cit,fn. 407, at p. 147.
Thiel. a-K n. IfiR.
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which the State of the forum was altogether barred from
exercising enforcement measures against the assets of
foreign States^^^.
Nonetheless the court's study showed that, although
general rules of international law did not prohibit
execution measures against the properties of foreign
States, they did place specific limitations on such
measures:
There is an established general custom among
States, backed by a legal consensus, whereby the
State of the forum is prohibited by
international law from levying execution, under
judicial writs against a foreign State, on
property of the foreign State which is situated
or present in the State of the forum and is used
for sovereign purposes of the foreign State,
except with the latter's consent....^"
In order to determine the nature of the assets the
court looked with approval to its previous guideline in
the Empire of Iran Case that the activity giving rise to
the dispute should be, in principle, characterized
according to the law of the forum unless the application
of the national law, would qualify the activity as an acts
jure gestionis contrary to the predominantly held view of
majority of States qualifying the activity in its strict
sense as an act jure imperii. However, since the case
involved embassy funds and involved an exceptional case in
which immunity would be upheld, the court was content to
apply especial rules of international law, holding that:
According to the established view, which began
to emerge even before Grotius (De jure belli ac
pads, L. II, c. XVIII, 9) and Bynkershoek (Foro
Legatorum, sec. ed. (1744), Cap. XVI, XXIII),
Ibid, at pp. 167 et seq.
^22 Ibid, at p. 184.
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preventive measures or measures of execution
against a foreign State may not, under
international law, be levied on property which
at the relevant time was being used by its
diplomatic mission for the performance of its
official f unctions
Though, the transaction of opening and operating a
current account made between the Embassy and the bank
might be considered to be a matter of German domestic law,
the court, carefully studying the terms of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations especially article 3 of
that Convention pertaining to the functions of a
diplomatic mission, took the view that the funds were
essential to the unimpeded functioning of the Embassy,
some thing that international law protected. To expect
the foreign State to give to the authorities of the host
State detailed information on the Embassy bank accounts
would entail undue interference with the functioning of
the diplomatic mission and would be incompatible with the
protection required by international law. A justified
statement pertaining to the nature and purpose of the
account would be sufficient^^^. The operative part of the
judgment summarizes the court's ruling as follows:
There exists the following general rule of
international law:
Forced execution of judgment by the State of the
forum under a writ of execution against a
foreign State which has been issued in respect
of non-sovereign acts (acta jure gestionis) of
that State, on property of that State which is
present or situated in the territory of the
State of the forum is inadmissible without the
consent of the foreign State if, at the time of
the initiation of the measure of execution, such
property serves sovereign purposes of the
foreign State. Claims against a general current
bank account of the embassy of a foreign State
Ibid, at p. 185.
Ibid, at pp. 188-189.
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which exists in the State of the forum and the
purpose of which is to cover the embassy's
costs and expenses are not subject to forced
execution by the State of the forum^^®.
E. Summary:
To summarize, German court practice has since 1945,
departed from the doctrine of absolute immunity of foreign
States and their properties towards a non-absolute or
restrictive one. With respect to immunity from
jurisdiction the Empire of Iran case decisively opted for
a restrictive theory basing it on the proposition that
immunity would be granted only with regard to the
sovereign activities of State. The criteria for
distinguishing sovereign activities from non-sovereign
ones should be determined according to the nature of the
activity and not its purpose.
With respect to immunity from execution, the
Philippine judgement of 1977, though, as will be shown in
this work, has not answered to a number of questions in
the field, has strongly and unambiguously upheld the
restrictive immunity theory. According to this judgment
in principle foreign States properties could be subject to
execution measures except where the properties are
allocated to the sovereign purposes of the State i.e. they
are public assets of the State. The most crucial question
as to what and where the borderline is between public and
private assets of the State remained unanswered because
the court was dealing with diplomatic funds which are
exceptionally treated as serving sovereign purposes, due
to the principle of ne impediatur legaticf*^^.
By these judgments which have the force of law.
^25 Ibid, at p. 150.
Sinclair, op cit, fn. 10, at p. 242.
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Germany undoubtedly, was in late Seventies, and still is,
in the ever expanding camp of non absolute immunity
doctrine.
II. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN THE GERMAN IMMUNITY LAW IN
El^LY 1980S
As was mentioned earlier, by 1979, the Federal
Constitutional Court had dealt with immunity of foreign
States and their properties only in three cases^^^.
Besides, due to especial circumstances of each case, not
all aspects of immunity law were tackled and resolved by
those judgments.
In the Iranian Empire case, which articulates German
law on immunity from jurisdiction,^^® the court held that
foreign States will not enjoy any jurisdictional immunity
with regard to claims arising out of their activities Jure
gestionis''^'^. No issue was raised and dealt with in
respect of jurisdictional immunities of State entities.
The Yugoslav Military Mission case too, was of limited
value, because it involved a claim concerning the
immovable property.^'® The last pre-1980 judgment of the
Constitutional Court, namely the Philippine, though
establishing, as a binding rule, the principle of
restrictive immunity from execution of foreign States'
properties, is also of limited value, because many
questions pending in German immunity law were, either not
raised, or left unanswered by the said judgment. For
instance:
^27 supra, fns. 396-401, 416-425 and the
accompanying texts
Oehrle, op. cit, fn. 389, p. 451.
Re: supra, fn. 388
Re: supra, fn. 396
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1. Philippine dealt with the admissibility of
enforcement measures against the funds held in the name of
the embassy of a foreign State. The question whether the
funds held in German banks in the name of an organization
of a foreign State and destined for the National Treasury
could be attached was not raised.
2. In Philippine, the problem was the enforcement of
a judgment which had already been issued in relation to an
activity Jure gestionis of the foreign State. The
question whether pre-judgement attachment of funds
belonging to a foreign State or its organs would be
permissible was not at issue.
3. In Philippine the question of qualification of the
assets did not entail significant problems, because, the
funds sought to be attached, belonged to the embassy of a
foreign State and were allocated, at the moment of
initiation of enforcement proceedings, to the daily
expenditure of the embassy. The court heavily relied and
based its reasoning on the customary international law^^^
concerning the diplomatic relations and especially the
principle of ne empediatur legatio. Thus the court did
not decide whether the "purpose test" should apply as a
criterion for determining the public or private nature of
assets, not in use for diplomatic missions.Likewise
the court did not provide a clear cut answer to the
situations where the allocation of the assets was not
definitively and effectively made at the moment of the
initiation of the enforcement proceedings.
4. The burden of proof of allocation was also not
completely decided. In the words of the Philippine
itself;
Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit. fn. 370, at p. 71
Philippine, op cit, fn. 407, at p. 190
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This case does not require a ruling on whether,
and according to what criteria, claims and other
rights arising out of other accounts of a
foreign State with banks in the State of the
forum, such as special accounts in connexion
with procurement purchases or the granting of
loans, or general-purpose accounts, are to be
considered sovereign or non-sovereign property,
and what limits, if any, imposed by
international law are to be observed when it
comes to obtaining evidence in that respect.
5. With regard to jurisdictional immunities of a
foreign State's undertakings and their properties, the
Philippine did have nothing to do. In the German case
law, particularly in the Nigerian case, some aspects of
this problem had already been tackled and responded to.
However, nothing was said by the Philippine on that issue.
The post-1979 Iranian Cases, against the above
background, provided the German courts, especially the
Federal Constitutional Court, excellent opportunity to
pronounce themselves on some unsettled aspects of the
immunity law.^^^
III. SUMMARY OF THE IR2^IAN CASES:
Shortly after the downfall of the former Shah's
regime in February 1979, a number of British and American
claimants, who had some claims against Iran, availed
themselves of the opportunity of resorting to the courts
of the then West Germany and initiated a host of
proceedings vis-a-vis the new Iranian Government and some
of its undertakings, thereby attaching large quantities of
Iranian properties. The attachments were acquired and
levied over the assets, situated in West Germany, of
National Iranian Oil Company and amounted to about 200
Ibid.
Paussmeyer, op. cit. fn. 19, p. 418.
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Million
The proceedings almost totally involved interim
measures of protection for the attachment of Iranian
properties, and in relation to claims filed mostly in the
United States. The proceedings led to different
attachment orders and decisions. Three of those decisions
issued in cases involving National Iranian Oil Company are
vastly published and have attracted worldwide comment.
Since all three judgements deal with different aspects of
immunity law in Germany, it seems appropriate to have a
brief account of them here in chronological order.
A: NIOC Legal Status
This judgment, rendered shortly after the
establishment of the Islamic Government in Iran, dealt for
the first time in Germany, with the legal status of the
National Iranian Oil Company, an important State-owned
organization with worldwide interests in oil, natural gas
and petrochemicals. The question whether NIOC is entitled
to personal immunity from jurisdiction under German law
was raised, in a twisted way, and responded to by the
court. The facts were these:
The Claimant, who had already obtained a pre-judgment
attachment against the Iranian assets in the U.S. in a
case pending there against NIOC, acquired and levied in
Germany pre-judgment attachment over NIOC's funds located
there, with respect to the said claim. The respondent,
relying on Article 926(1) of ZPO, demanded that a time
National Iranian Oil Company Revenues From Oil
Sales Case, op cit, fn. 171, p. 218.
Ibid, at p. 215.
National Iranian Oil Company Legal Status Case,
op cit, fn. 381
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limit be set for the initiation, in Germany, by the
claimant of the main action. The Registrar of the
Provincial Court (Landgericht) rejected the application on
the ground that, the claim on merits of the case, had
already been initiated in the U.S., hence the commencement
of it could not be ordered in FRG. NIOC, objected to the
decision of the Registrar contending that the U.S. claim
was different from the claim which was the basis of
prejudgment attachment in Germany. The case was submitted
to the Superior Provincial Court of Frankfurt. The Court
dismissed the appeal and held that NIOC's application for
the initiation of the main action was rightly rejected.
In so doing the court must have had some idea of Lis
pendens, since the pendency elsewhere of an earlier
instituted claim is a bar to the adjudication by German
courts^^®. By rejection of the application the court
impliedly confirmed that the U.S. claim was identical with
the claim which was the basis of the attachment in Germany
and that German courts could be used for acquisition of
additional pre-judgment attachments,^^' for claims which
were pending outside Germany, between the nationals of a
third country and the respondent State. The court only
warned that if the U.S. judgement were contrary to the
norms of international law in immunity matters, the German
courts would not recognize that judgment.
Martiny Dieter, "Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal Republic of
Germany", The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 35
(1987), p. 721.
In the U.S. courts proceedings, assets of NIOC
for a total of US$596 million had been attached. supra,
fn, 381, at p. 204.
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Foreign judgment which infringed the norms of
international law concerning the exemption of
specific persons from the jurisdiction of the
foreign State in which that judgment had been
pronounced was contrary to international law.
The recognition of such a judgment was
prohibited under a general rule of international
159
As to whether NIOC was entitled to personal immunity the
court held that:
According to Article 20 of the Law on the
Constitution of the Courts (GVG) taken in
conjunction with the general rules of
international law, commercial undertakings of a
foreign State which had been endowed with their
own independent legal personality did not enjoy
any immunity
To support this ruling, the court first paid a short
attention to the functions of NIOC, noting, inter alia,
that NIOC was entrusted with the task of exploiting the
property rights of the Iranian people over the deposits of
oil and natural gas in Iran. Then the structure of NIOC,
likewise in brief, was looked at, persuading the court to
say that though NIOC was, from commercial point of view,
closely interlocked with the Iranian State, its being a
joint-stock company and an independent legal person under
Iranian law would not entitle it to personal immunity.
B: NIOC Pipeline Contracts Case**^
In relation to a claim over the performance of some
law transformed into German law by Article 25(1)
of the Basic Law (GG) of the Federal Republic.
Ibid, at p. 200. As can be seen, the case has made some
contribution to the issue of recognition of foreign
judgments, or at least has clarified the matter, since it
clearly reconfirms the generally held view in Germany that
if a judgment has violated internationally established
norms on jurisdictional immunities of States, it would be
denied recognition. On recognition of judgments in
Germany see generally; Martiny, op. cit. fn. 438.
ILR, ibid, p. 202.
Ibid, p. 203.
National Iranian Oil Company Pipeline Contracts
Case, Federal Republic of Germany, Superior Provincial
Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Frankfurt, 4 May 1982, ILR.
vol. 65 (1984), p. 212.
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contracts to build oil and natural gas pipelines, the
Claimant obtained from the Provincial Court (Landgericht)
of Frankfurt, Pre-judgment attachment over the funds held
in Germany in the name of NIOC. The respondent contended
that it was a part of the Iranian State and was entitled
to both immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from
execution^^^, NIOC whose pleas were rejected by the
provincial court, appealed to the superior provincial
court. The said court suspended the proceedings as to
whether NIOC's funds were immune from attachment, pending
a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court^'^®. As to
whether NIOC was entitled to personal immunity the court,
recalling its earlier decision in the NIOC Legal Status
case, pointed that the decisive factor was that NIOC was
organized under Iranian law as a public limited company,
as a legal person in private law enjoying autonomy vis-a-
vis the Iranian State. The court denying NIOC immunity
from jurisdiction pointed, obiter dictum, that:
... Nevertheless where an undertaking with its
own personality acted on a sovereign basis for
the State concerned" State immunity could in
principle be claimed'^^^
NIOC's other plea was that the United Nations General
Assembly had adopted a number of Resolutions, pursuant to
which oil related activities of the member States of the
OPEC had to be regarded as sovereign activities. In
NIOC's view those Resolutions, particularly the Resolution
No. 1803 of 1962, were relevant to the case and reflective
of the customary international law.^^^ The court rejected
NIOC's contention that the activities underlying the claim
involved, as oil-related activities, sovereign activities
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 214.
Ibid, p. 212.
Ibid, iat p. 214.
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and held that those activities involved financial
performance of the contracts and they could be considered,
at best, as a preliminary step to sovereign activity/^®
C; NIOC Revenues Case*^'
This case provided the Constitutional Court a second
opportunity to deal with the problem of immunity of
foreign States from execution^^°.
The enormity of the amounts of the pre-judgment
attachments, levied through the Provincial Court of
Frankfurt, over NIOC's funds and the fact that those
attachments were mostly additional or duplicate interim
measures on top of the large number of attachments against
Iranian properties in the United States, made NIOC to
challenge the legality, in German law as well as
conformity with international law, of those
attachments.
1. The Lower Courts' Rulings
NIOC first made its objections before the Provincial
Court of Frankfurt, The main argument of NIOC was that the
funds held in German banks in the name of NIOC were the
proceeds of the sale of oil, exploited and sold on behalf
of the Iranian nation which had, pursuant to Iranian law,
to be transferred to the State Treasury at the accounts
Ibid.
National Iranian Oil Company Revenues From Oil
Sales Case, op cit, fn. 171
^50 Frank R. , op cit, fn. 389, at p. 21; Prevault J.
et Hellman W.,"Immunites de juridiction et immunites
d'execution en droit francais et en droit allemand", ann.
de la Fac. de Droit et de Sci. Polit. 22. 1985/86, at p.
127.
451 Op cit, fn. 171, p. 215.
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held by the Iranian Central Bank to finance the State
budgetary expenditure. NIOC, maintained that it was
merely a trustee and not the real and the beneficial owner
of the funds. The Provincial Court of Frankfurt, rejected
NIOC's arguments on the ground that the funds were held,
in German banks, in accounts in the name of NIOC itself
and not in the accounts of the Iranian Government.
Furthermore, in the court's view, on the day of
commencement of the interim proceedings for the attachment
of the funds, those funds were not clearly allocated to
the sovereign activities of the Iranian State. NIOC
appealed to the Superior Provincial Court of Frankfurt,
which court dismissed NIOC's appeal. NIOC subsequently
filed a constitutional complaint before the Federal
Constitutional Court on the ground that the lower courts,
by not seeking a ruling of the Constitutional Court on the
issue of immunity from Execution of NIOC, had indeed
violated Article 100(2)^®^ and 101(1)^®^ of the Basic Law.
452 [Article 100 of the Basic Law provides;
(1)If a court considers unconstitutional a law
the validity of which is relevant to its
decision, the proceedings shall be stayed, and
a decision shall be obtained from the Land court
competent for constitutional disputes if the
constitution of a Land court is held to be
violated, or from the Federal Constitutional
Court if this Basic Law is held to be violated.
This shall also apply if this Basic Law is held
to be violated by Land law or if a Land law is
held to be incompatible with a federal law.
(2)If, in the course of litigation, doubt exists
whether a rule of public international law is an
integral part of federal law and whether such
rule directly creates rights and duties for the
individual (Article 25), the court shall obtain
a decision from the Federal Constitutional
Court.
(3) If the constitutional court of a Land, in
interpreting this Basic Law, intends to deviate
from a decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court or of the constitutional court of another
Land, it must obtain a decision from the Federal
Constitutional Court.
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2. The Constitutional Court's Ruling
The Federal Constitutional Court admitted the
constitutional complaints but ruled them to be
unfounded.The court agreed with NIOC that the lower
courts had to stay the proceedings and seek a ruling from
the Constitutional Court and that they had failed to do
so. Nonetheless, in the highest court's view this failure
would not affect the legality of their decisions, because
the Constitutional Court too, would have reached the same
result as they had: That general international law did
not contain a rule which would prohibit the attachment, in
interim proceedings, of funds held in German banks, in the
name of NIOC and destined to the State treasury accounts
held by the Iranian Central Bank.^^®
The Constitutional Court, like in Philippine and
Empire of Iran cases, aimed at an overall study of the
admissibility of post-judgment and pre-judgement
enforcement measures. In so doing it relied on the court
practice in Europe and elsewhere, different immunity laws
of some States and the doctrine. On the strength of its
comparative study, the court held that it was not
necessary for it to decide whether foreign State entities
with independent legal personality were entitled to
immunity, because even if they were entitled to such
immunity, the attachment of their bank accounts, would not
Quoted from ILR 65 (1984), p. 118.]
[Article 101 provides:
(1)Extraordinary courts shall be inadmissible.
No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of
his lawful judge.
(2)Courts for special fields may be established
only by legislation.
Quoted from NIOC Revenues Case, op cit, fn. 171, p. 216].
Ibid.
Ibid, at pp. 216-217.
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be prohibited, as in the case of the bank accounts of the
foreign State itself, except where the accounts had
directly been allocated to sovereign activities of the
State. The court went on to say that in fact NIOC's funds
lacked such a qualification, until they were put under the
control of the Iranian Central Bank, who was the competent
authority to finance the Iranian budget. Before that, the
funds could have, at best, an indirect allocation for
sovereign purposes, an allocation that, under public
international law, would not entitle the funds to
immunity. In the court's view, the fact that under the
Iranian law those funds were considered to have been
allocated to sovereign purposes was not decisive, because
public international law did not preclude the forum State,
to qualify the assets in a manner different than the
foreign State did.^^^
IV. THE IMPACT OP IRANIAN CASES ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF IMMUNITY LAW IN GERMANY
A. In the Field of Immunity From jurisdiction
1. Criteria For Limiting the Immunity From
jurisdiction
As was pointed out before since 1963, according to
The Empire of Iran Case, immunity would be granted to
foreign States only in claims based on their sovereign
activities^^^. Thus a large number of claims based on
non-sovereign activities (or acts jure gestionis) of
foreign States could be subject to the jurisdiction of
German courts. With respect to the classification of the
activities, the Empire of Iran held that as a means for
determining between act jure gestionis and acts jure
imperii one should look to the nature of the transaction
or the act and not its purpose, because referring to the
^56 Frank, op. cit, fn. 389, at p. 21.
Empire of Iran Case, op cit, fn. 388, at p. 57
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purpose will be fruitless since ultimately State
activities if not wholly, then to the widest degree serve
sovereign purposes and stand in a recognizable
relationship to them^^®. German courts have consistently
applied the nature of the act test as the criterion for
distinguishing between sovereign and non-sovereign
activities^59^
a) Construction of Oil and Gas Pipelines, Commercial
Activity
The act jure gestionis criterion was reaffirmed in
1982, in NIOC Pipeline case^^. In that case, the
interesting questions pertaining economic development and
classification of the activities in that field were
raised. NIOC, relied on different resolutions adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations^^^ on new
International Economic Order and especially the Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (Res. No. 1803 of
1962).
458 Ibid, p. 80.
Judgment of Sept. 26, 1969 (Hungarian Embassy
Case), No. V ZR 122/65, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], ILR. 65
(1984), p. 110. (F.R.G.) (for an earlier stage in the
proceedings see 28 ILR. 392); Judgment of Oct. 10, 1972
(Arms Sales Commission Agreement Case), Case No. 6 U
520/68, OLGZ, Coblenz, 1971-75, ILR. 65 (1984) p. 119
(1984) (F.R.G.); Judgment of Aug. 12, 1975 {Oder-Neisse
Property Expropriation Case), Case No. 1 W 1347/75, OLGZ,
Munich, ILR. 65 (1984), p. 127; Judgment of June 30, 1977
(Spanish State Tourist Office Case), OLGZ, Frankfurt, ILR.
65 (1984) p. 140, (F.R.G.); Judgment of Mar. 4, 1981
{Conrade v. United Kingdom Hanover Labour Court) , Case No.
2 Ca. 10/80, ILR. 65 (1984) p. 205 (F.R.G.).
See supra, fn. 443 and the related text.
See esp. GA Res. 1803(XVII), 2158(XXI).
317(XXVIII). 3201(S-VI), 3281(XXIX), 36/103. See also the
respective Articles 1(2) of the two Human Rights Covenants
adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 2200(XXI).
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The court first reiterated the Empire of Iran ruling
that:
There was no general rule of public
international law to the effect that domestic
jurisdiction was excluded for actions against a
foreign State (or a State enterprise or quasi-
State enterprise) in relation to its non-
sovereign activity (acta jure gestionis)'*^^.
in applying the said test to the claims, which were
pending in the United States against NIOC^^^ and were
related to the contracts for building of oil and gas
pipelines, The court, adopted a rigorous approach in
identification of the relevant activity. Though the
underlying contracts were concluded for the construction
of oil pipelines, the court accepted the claimants
submission that the dispute was related to the financial
arrangements of the said contracts. So the way for the
application of the nature test was paved and the court
held that even if UN Resolutions had the effect of making
the oil exploitation a sovereign activity, the contracts
for the construction of oil pipelines, which were
contracts for the supply of goods and services, were at
best a preliminary step to that sovereign activity^^^.
ILR 65 (1984), p. 212.
Only pre-Judgment attachment proceedings were
pending before the German court.
464
The defendant states in relation to the
sovereign action asserted by it that the United
Nations have determined in a whole series of UN
Resolutions that the oil-related activities of
the OPEC States are to be regarded as sovereign,
and not as commercial activities, in which
connection UN Resolution No. 1803 of 1962
possesses special relevance. The assignment of
the exploitation of oil resources to the inner
sphere of State sovereignty, argues the
defendant, is thus customary international
law
This court considers, however, that it is unable
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b) Comparative study
This judgment is in line with two other judgments
rendered in the Netherlands and France. A few years
earlier, in the Cabolent case/^® the Court of Appeal of
the Hague, after a detailed examination of the structure
and functions of NIOC, came to the same conclusion that
petroleum development contracts by NIOC were non
sovereign. The French Court of Cassation in the Case
concerning Sonatrach'*^, held that the activities of the
Algerian State oil company were of private law nature and
thus its funds enjoyed no immunity^^^.
However, the Sonatrach judgment as well as the
Pipeline case, decided by the Frankfurt court, stand in
sharp contrast with the decision of the French Court of
Cassation involving NIOC where it was granted immunity
from jurisdiction with regard to a claim based on a
contract for the supply of cathodic protection for oil
pipelines.The court did not deal with the question
to accept that there is sovereign activity here
for the simple reason that the present case does
not involve the actual exploitation of oil
resources by the defendant in the attachment
proceedings. The parties are in dispute over the
financial performance of contracts for the
building of oil and gas pipelines. In this
respect, moreover, the defendant contracted with
the plaintiff on a purely private commercial
basis (contracts for work) . It did not carry out
any oil-related activities on a sovereign basis.
The conclusion of the contracts for oil and gas
pipelines was at most a preliminary step or a
sequel to possible sovereign activity.
Op cit, fn. 443, at p.214.
Op cit, fn. 58
See supra, fn. 296 and the related text.
Schreuer, op. cit. fn. 145, at p. 30
Pipeline Service v. NIOC, op cit, fn. 340
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whether the supply of cathodic protection for the oil
pipelines was an oil related activity and as such,
connected to the sovereign sphere of Iranian State. The
French highest court looked to the matter, inter alia,
from the angle that the cathodic protection of the oil
pipelines would serve the distribution and
commercialization of oil which was a public service thus
entitling NIOC to immunity from jurisdiction.
However, this approach was not used by the Frankfurt
court, although it might be suggested that construction of
an oil pipeline can be more easily considered as an oil
related activity than the supply of cathodic protection
for such pipeline. The result is that with regard to an
almost identical activity of NIOC, in the courts of two
industrial States, both of which, especially Germany, are
important trade partners of Iran, NIOC would have
different jurisdictional positions. This may be explained,
as far as the textual context of the judgments are
concerned, by the notion of "public service", which unlike
in French jurisprudence, seems to have no role to play in
immunity determinations in the German court practice.
The NIOC Pipeline judgment affirms the view, held by
some commentators^^', that with regard to classification
of the exploitation of natural resources, European case
law tend to consider them as commercial activities unlike
the U.S. courts which have considered them^^° as sovereign
activities^^^.
2. Immunity of State Entities
Delaume , op cit, fn. 170, p. 321.
Except in most Iranian cases.
Schreuer, op. clt. fn. 145 at pp. 29-32;
Delaume, op cit, fn. 170, at pp. 321-328
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Ever increasing involvement of governments in the
fields of industry, trade, agriculture etc., has led to
the creation of different State-owned or State-controlled
entities, especially since the Second World War. These
entities though with diverse forms and structures^^ may
be categorized, as far as their connection with their
respective government is concerned, in three main
categories^^. They may appear as departments or
instrumentalities without separate legal personality under
the direct control of government. They may have separate
legal personality and established under the rules of
public law or they may have separate legal personality but
established and administered under the rules of private
law^^^
The functions of these entities, especially in
developing countries can serve a broad range of objectives
from defence and military purposes to national development
programs^^. Therefore, a large portion of State's extra
territorial transactions is carried out through these
undertakings. Thus, jurisdictional immunities of these
entities and of their properties have resulted in a large
number of judgments attracting a lot of commentary.
In most countries, those undertakings who lack any
independent personality and are under the direct control
of their governments, are normally treated as governments
and are, in principle, entitled to personal immunity
whereas with regard to entities with independent judicial
structure, the court practice is divergent and
Schreuer, ibid, at p. 92.
Frank, op. cit. fn.389, at p. 23.
Ibid, at p. 24.
Schreuer, op. cit. fn. 145, at p. 92.
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inconsistent^^'.
a) Function or structure
In Germany, the State entities' immunity from
jurisdiction, has not yet been decided outright by the
Federal Constitutional Court^^. There appears to be a
general reluctance on the courts' part to treat the State-
entities with separate legal personality as the State
itself. Thus even at the era of absolute immunity of
States such entities were not granted immunity^^®. Indeed
the separate entity rule has been the prevailing rule in
Germany^^'. On the other hand, since there was no
distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign
activities, if the undertaking with an essential function
in the field of public administration could be identified
with the State then immunity would be granted^®". The
decisive criterion was the status of the entity which
would be verified by structuralist approach under which
different factors such as judicial personality,
incorporation, capacity to sue and to be sued, capacity to
hold property and government control had to be
examined^®^.
In 1955, the German Federal Supreme Court rejected
Steinberger, op. cit. fn. 19, at p. 434.
See, NIOC Revenues Case, op. cit fn. 171, at P.
216 which leaves the question, albeit with its
qualifications, open.
Seidl Hohenveldern op. cit. fn. 370, p. 59.
Hoffman W.C., "The Separate Entity Rule In
International Perspective: Should State Ownership of
Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign Status For Immunity
Purposes?", Tulane Law Review, vol. 65 (1991), No. 3, p.
535, at p. 554.
Schaumann, op cit, fn. 19, at p. 299.
Schreuer, op cit, fn. 145, at p. 93.
171
the immunity claimed by a commercial organization of the
Tchecoslovac State^®^. The entity had already pleaded
before the lower courts that it had a distinct personality
from the State itself. After the Empire of Iran case,
German courts' reluctance to grant immunity to State
entities is all more apparent. For instance, in the
Chilean Copper Nationalization case, the court held, inter
alia, that firstly it was the Copper Corporation and not
the State of Chile who was the direct respondent, secondly
the respondent, as a State enterprise, had its own legal
personality, thirdly activities of State monopolies by
which they partake in economic life could not be
considered as sovereign acts^®^.
Furthermore, ever since the Empire of Iran has opted
for the restrictive theory, based on the nature of the
activity test which is indeed a functionalist criterion,
German courts in their immunity determinations, with
respect to State-entities, are not content with a mere
structuralist analysis of the status of the entity
concerned. They pay attention, in varying degrees, to
what the functions of the organization are, and more
particularly, what the activity, giving rise to the claim,
is. Despite this amalgamated approach, commentators'
views on this point are far from unanimous and some of
them, based on an overall study of recent German
judgments, hold that German practice is a consistently
structuralist and status-oriented"^®^ one.
Confiscation of Trade Mark Case, ILR 22 (1955) ,
p. 15, at p. 17.
Case Concerning Chilean Nationalization of EL
Tencente Mine (Nationality of Split Corporation) , Superior
Court of Hamburg Interlocutory Decision, ILM vol. 13
(1974), p. 1120
Schreuer, op. cit.. fn. 145, at p. 106 where he
relies especially on NIOC's cases to prove, in the German
court practice, the continuation of the structuralist
approach.
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This view, however, overlooks, as shall be seen
later, different references of the NIOC judgements to the
functions of NIOC as well as to the nature of the
activities giving rise to the dispute. Indeed as has been
suggested by another commentator, the courts are bound by
the ruling of the Empire of Iran to grant immunity, where
the claim is based on sovereign activities. Nevertheless,
the view^®® that since the Empire of Iran the
determination of the status of the entity concerned has
become irrelevant or discretionary seems difficult to
accept^®^.
487(i) The Nigerian Cement Case
As the Nigerian Cement case show, both structure and
functions of the entity concerned are looked at in varying
degrees. The court did not deem it necessary to determine
whether the Nigerian Central Bank, on the basis of
responsibilities assigned to it performed sovereign
activities'^®®. The court, in passing, stated
categorically that separate legal entities of a foreign
country are not entitled to immunity^®'. It went on to
say, again with a glance to the status of the Bank, that
the determination of the question whether the Bank could
partake of the government's immunity, because of the
latter's control over the former's activities, was
unnecessary. The court instead, put emphasis on the
Empire of Iran ruling and held that since the claim arose
from a private law activity of the Bank, namely the
^®® Oehrle, op. cit. fn. 389, at pp. 456-457
^®^ Ibid.
^®^ Non-Resident Petitioner v. Nigeria, The judgment
of 2 dec. 1975 op. cit., fn. 382
^®® Ibid, ILR 65 (1984), at p. 134.
^®9 Ibid.
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establishment of letters of credit, and not its sovereign
activities/'" even if the Bank were an integral
instrumentality of the Nigerian Government, it could not
enjoy immunity^'^. It is thus clear that in the judgment
of 1975, the emphasis is more put on the nature of the
activity, and less on the structure of the Bank. Later
the judgment of 25 August 1976 of the same court, which
dealt with the merit of the case, affirmed its prior non-
immunity determination, merely, by holding that:
The defendant does not enjoy the benefit of
immunity in the Federal Republic of Germany for
its private law activity involving opening of a
letter of credit as part of its banking
business.
(ii) The NIOC Cases
Now, turning to the NIOC cases, in all three
judgments inununity of NIOC from the jurisdiction of German
courts was dealt with either directly or indirectly. In
the NIOC Legal Status Case^'^, the court said that NIOC
did not enjoy personal immunity. Then the court added
categorically that:
Commercial undertakings of a foreign State
which have been endowed with their own legal
personality do not enjoy any immunity.
After this holding the court dealt with the status as
well as the functions of NIOC, rather briefly and in a
mingled way, and came to the conclusion that although from
490
491
492
493
494
Ibid, at p. 139.
Ibid, at p. 134.
Ibid, at p. 139.
Op cit, fn. 381
Ibid, at p. 202.
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the commercial point of view NIOC was closely interlocked
with the Iranian State, this would not change its legal
independence, based on its being a joint-stock company and
a judicial person under Iranian law. Consequently,
NIOC was not entitled to personal immunity^'®. It
therefore, seems clear that even when the personal
immunity of a State entity is being determined, in
addition to its structure, its functions too are looked
at.
In the NIOC Pipeline Case which, as mentioned
earlier, is a case mainly dealing with immunity ratione
materia, the court reiterated, once again, that commercial
undertakings of a foreign State, with their own
independent legal personality, did not enjoy any personal
immunity^'^. Then the court took a functionalist approach
holding that:
A foreign State - or a State enterprise or
quasi-State enterprise-only enjoys freedom from
German jurisdiction in relation to its sovereign
activity (acta iure imperii), but not in
relation to its non-sovereign activity (acta
iure gestionis, ....)
in so holding the court made a reference to the Nigerian
judgments. However, it must be noted that the Nigerian
case, is not so clear in that regard. It is in the
Pipeline case that for the first time, the court indicates
clearly, though obiter dictum, that a State enterprise or
a quasi-State enterprise, presumably like NIOC with
separate and independent legal personality, can enjoy
immunity if it performs sovereign activities. This
possibility of reliance on immunity by State entities, is
a break-through in German immunity law which was brought
Ibid, at p. 203.
Ibid, at p. 213.
Ibid.
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about by the Pipeline case, even though ultimately
immunity was rejected because the dispute was seen, by the
court, to have been based on a private law activity.
One year later in NIOC Revenues case which was
decided by the Federal Constitutional Court^'® the
amenability of foreign State-entities to the German
jurisdiction was indirectly at issue. The court, this time
in detail, dealt with the structure^" and functions of
NIOC. Since the point at issue was the immunity of the
NIOC's funds and not its immunity from suit, the court
said:
It need not be decided here whether undertakings
of foreign States with their own legal
personalities enjoy the right under customary
international law to claim immunity from
municipal jurisdiction or are placed by
international law wholly or in certain respects
on the same footing as their 'mother State'.
Even if undertakings of foreign States with
their own legal personality were to be granted
immunity to the same extent as those States
themselves attachment would still not conflict
with any requirement of general international
law5°°.
This passage alone shows that the Constitutional
Court, though leaving undecided the issue of immunity from
suit of foreign State-enterprises, is cognizant of the
fact that in some instances like where the entities
involved perform sovereign activities, for and on behalf
of their 'mother government', they might enjoy immunity.
Indeed this implicit ruling boosts the dictum of the
Pipeline case, where it indicates that State-entities can
enjoy immunity for their activities jure imperii. The
498 Op cit, fn. 171
As will be explained later, the status of a
State-entity is more relevant and often discussed in
immunity from execution determinations, see infra Chap. 8.
5°° ILR 65 (1984), at p. 229.
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separate entity rule applied by German courts, creates a
presumption of non-immunity which can be rebutted if the
entity concerned establishes that it acted for its mother
State on a sovereign basis. By these two judgements,
German court practice gets closer to the European case
law, where generally immunity is denied to a foreign
State-controlled entity unless the entity involved
establishes that it acted in the name and on behalf of the
foreign State^°'.
b) Criteria for Determining Whether an Entity is
Separate
According to various judgments of German courts the
criteria for separateness of an entity from the government
are: establishment as a legal person, capacity to sue and
to be sued, capacity to hold property, governmental
control through management or ownership over the entity,
the laws and regulations under which the entity is
administered and the nature of the functions of the
entity, be it sovereign or non-sovereign activities^®^.
6. The Impact Of Iranian Cases In The Field Of Immunity
From Execution (Pre-Judgment Attachment)
Since measures taken against Iranian properties
consisted only of pre-judgment attachments, the impact of
those cases naturally will be limited to the domain of
However, as has been suggested by some writers,
the Eurodif judgment goes against, and is inconsistent
with, the general European trend, because the direct
involvement of the Iranian Government did not change the
French court's characterization of the activity. See
Delaume, op cit, fn. 170, at p. 321.
Central Bank of Nigeria, op cit, fn. 382, at p.
132; the Trade Mark Case, op cit, at p. 18; The NIOC Legal
Status Case, op cit, fn. 381,at p. 202; The NIOC Pipeline
Case, op cit, fn. 443,at p. 214; The NIOC Revenues Case,
op cit, fn. 171, p. 222 et seq.
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immunity from pre-judgment attachment. Another feature of
German courts' decisions against NIOC is the fact that
they involved additional or double pre-judgment
attachments of the NIOC assets in former west Germany
amounting to 200 million U.S. Dollars. It is clear from
the legal Status case that the main claims relating to the
merits of the case were pending, not in the then West
Germany, but before U.S. courts^®' where another 600
million U.S. Dollars of Iranian properties had been
attached in interim proceedings®"^. The German court did
not have the chance to examine the main claim and indeed
it deemed it unnecessary to order the claimant to file its
main claim in Germany. Thus, except for the Pipeline case,
where the nature of the relationship between NIOC and the
claimant which had given rise to the claim was examined
and was ruled to be commercial, for the other attachments
which were related to claims based on contracts other than
the construction of oil pipelines, the Frankfurt court did
not reach the stage to determine whether it had
jurisdiction at all in dealing with the main claim®°®.
True, that the Legal Status case includes a caveat that if
the judgment which would be issued in the United States
infringed the norms of international law on immunity
questions it would not be recognized in Germany, but this
warning was no bar to the actual pre-judgment attachment
of NIOC's assets which gave the U.S. claimants an
additional security boosting their bargaining positions
NIOC Legal Status Case, ibid, at p. 199
Ibid, at p. 200.
The necessity of ascertaining the existence of
immunity from jurisdiction, in cases of immunity from
execution, was alluded to in the judgment of 2 Dec. 1975
of the Nigerian case (op. cit fn. 382, at p. 135) where
the court held inter alia that:
If exercise of jurisdiction is permissible,
attachment on the local assets of a foreign
State is also admissible.
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vis-a-vis the Iranian Government. By the judgments
involving NIOC, especially the Revenues case, where the
Constitutional Court provides the most recent insight into
the German immunity law, the admissibility of pre-judgment
attachments were decided in the affirmative^®*^. Therefore,
it seems appropriate to see in what aspects of immunity
from attachment, the Iranian cases have made impact on the
development of the restrictive immunity doctrine.
1. Territorial Connection
An important aspect of the NIOC cases is the
confirmation of the liberal approach taken by German
courts with regard to the jurisdictional requirement of
"territorial connection".
a) Chilean Copper Nationalization Case
A few years prior to NIOC cases, in the Chilean
Copper Nationalization case, lack of "territorial
connection" or lack of significant contacts with the
Federal Republic of Germany was the main reason for the
Superior Court of Hamburg in vacating the attachment^°^.
The court, though held that the nationalization of the
copper industry by the Chilean Government was contrary to
international law and against German public policy,
refused to restore the attached copper to the claimant
(appearing before German courts as the non-nationalized
ex-Chilean "split company") due to lack of sufficient
In Philippine the issue was the admissibility of
the attachment after the issuance of a judgment in
Germany.
Chilean Nationalization of EL Tencente Mine
case, op cit, fn. 483.
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connection of the case with the German jurisdiction^®®,
b) The Nigerian Cement Case
The territorial connection requirement was later
interpreted in a liberal manner by German courts^®'. In
the aforementioned Nigerian Cement case^^° the claim on
merits was filed in Germany, the claimant was a
Liechtenstein firm and the respondent was the Central Bank
of Nigeria. The contract concerning the delivery of cement
had not been concluded in Germany and was not supposed to
be executed there®^\ The only connection with Germany
was that the Bank had an account before a German bank.
Against this background the court took the position that
the principle that States enjoyed immunity only in respect
of acta iure imperil was not limited in its application to
cases where there was a special connection between the
facts of the case and the forum. Moreover, in the court's
view, the respondent's promise to make payment in
Frankfurt under the letter of credit from assets on
deposit in Germany constituted sufficient contacts with
Germany^^^^ judgment of the same court took the
Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Federal Republic of
Germany" in: Lauterpacht, E. and Collier, J.G. ed.
Individual Rights and the State in Foreign Affairs, An
International Compendium, New York, Praeger Publishers,
1977, p. 243 at pp. 256 & 260; Idem, "Chilean Copper
Nationalization Cases before German Courts", 69 AJIL 110-
19 (1975) .
Though some writers suggest that territorial
connection is rather a matter of international competence
than a matter of immunity (see; Schaumann & Habscheid, op.
cit. fn. 19, at p. 303), in many immunity cases, the issue
has been dealt with when the foreign State along with its
immunity plea, has raised the issue of lack of territorial
connection.
op cit, fn. 382
Frank, op. cit. fn. 389, at p. 16.
512 Op cit, fn. 382, at p. 135.
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same position holding that though the territorial
connection requirement was not a part of international
law, according to section 23 of ZPO, the venue was proper
since the L.C.s were supposed to be paid out of the funds
held at accounts in a Frankfurt bank^^^. However, in
another case involving the Central Bank of Nigeria before
British courts, the Court of Appeal, including Lord
Denning, ruled, inter alia, that there must be a real
connection between the forum and the facts of the case^^^.
In NIOC cases, even this degree of territorial
connection was not present. The only fact was that NIOC
possessed in Germany, out of contracts for the sale of
oil, some funds, at accounts in German banks, which were
routinely to be transferred to the Iranian Central Bank.
c) Liamco Case
In Liamco '^^ ^ the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland, allowed the appeal of the Libyan Government
and annulled the order of attachment and the seizure of
the assets because in the court's view, there was not a
close connection between the subject matter of the case
and Switzerland. The fact that the arbitration which had
resulted in the judgment whose enforcement was sought,
took place in Geneva, according to the discretion of the
sole arbitrator was not sufficient to form a close
connection between swiss jurisdiction and the subject
matter of the claim. Lack of sufficient contacts with
Switzerland was enough for the court not to allow
Ibid, at p. 137.
51^ Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 1977 ILR. 64 (1983), p. 111.
Socialist Libyan Arab Popular Jamahirya v.
Libyan American Oil Company, Switzerland, Federal Supreme
Court, First Public Law Department, 19 June 1980, ILR 62
(1982), p. 228, at p. 235.
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proceedings against a foreign State and thus it was
unnecessary to decide whether Libya had acted jure
gestionis or, had waived its immunity by the arbitration
clause in the concessions®^^. The Court while stating
that the requirement of domestic relationship was not a
part of international law, was careful to add that:
Likewise, no State is obligated by international
law to permit enforcement proceedings against
foreign States because of non-sovereign matters.
It is, on the contrary, entitled to impose on
itself a certain restriction within the scope of
its domestic laws. Every State must, therefore,
by establishing the local jurisdiction of its
governmental authorities determine in accordance
with its domestic laws the limits within which
it feels called upon to decide disputes arising
from non-sovereign actions of foreign
States®!^.
Caution should be voiced against expansive
jurisdiction of domestic courts in claims involving other
foreign States and their properties. As suggested by some
commentators®^® it is a requirement of public
international law that States should refrain from
extending their international competence to claims which
lack reasonable connection with the forum State. Not only
the limitations of international competence of domestic
courts militate against broad jurisdiction of such courts
over other foreign States, but practical considerations
such as undesirability of forum shopping®^' activities and
516
517
518
519
Ibid, at p. 235 et seq.
Ibid, at p. 234.
Steinberger, op cit, fn. 19, p.428.
In doctrine too, there is some voice in favor of
necessity of real connection between the claim and the
State of forum. See; for instance, Synvet, op cit, fn.
211, at p. 885, where he criticizes the idea of forum
shopping by which claims without real connection with the
State of forum are filed, solely because some properties
of the respondent State are located there. See also.
182
the necessity of avoidance of political frictions between
the forum State and the respondent State, calls for a
certain degree of Jurisdictional restraint in claims which
have little connection with the State of the forum.
2. Factual Connection Between the Claim Secured and the
Assets Attached
As was seen in the Chapter dealing with the French
cases, in actions where the attachment of the assets
belonging to a foreign government are at issue, the
formulation adopted by the Eurodif judgment makes it clear
that only those properties which have been allocated for
the performance of the contract upon which the main claim
is based can be attached. On the other hand, in cases of
execution against a State entity this factual connection
between the claim and the assets sought to be attached
seems to be unnecessary®^". In the Untied States, the
requirement of factual connection is expressly provided
for at Sec. 1610(a)(2) of the FSIA"^
However, the Constitutional Court, at the Revenues
case, categorically ruled that:
International law does not impose as a condition
for the admissibility of safeguarding measures
any requirement that there should be a factual
connection between the claim being secured by a
safeguarding measure and the assets being
attached®^^.
The Court while cognizant of such a requirement in
supra. Chapter 1 and infra Chapter 6, the discussions
dealing with the territorial connection requirement.
520 See; Sonatrach, supra, fn. 296 and the
pertaining discussion.
See infra Chapter 7
"2 ilr 65 (1984) at p. 242.
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the U.S. law, argued that United States the law provision
was there, not because of its existence in international
law, but because, the U.S. Congress was mindful of
disregard of separate activities of State which would
result in reciprocal treatment abroad of the United States
governmental institutions^^^.
3. Classification of the Assets and its Difficulties:
a) criteria for Distinguishing Immune Assets
The essence of the German immunity law is that
international law requires immunity from jurisdiction in
respect of sovereign acts (act jure imperii) and immunity
from execution in respect of property used for sovereign
purposes^^^.
The fundamental principle pertaining to the immunity
from execution was established by the 1977 Philippine
judgment, according to which immunity that was already
functionally limited, by the Empire of Iran Case, to
sovereign activities in trial proceedings, applied also to
enforcement proceedings against the properties of a
foreign State^^®. The judgment added that general
international law did not allow execution measures on the
property used by a foreign State for sovereign purposes,
including a bank account maintained in the forum State by
a foreign State to cover the expenditure of its embassy.
Case law shows that when a State entity is involved
in execution proceedings, the status of the entity becomes
523 Ibid.
524 "Note from the Charge d' Affairs of the
Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to
the [ON] Secretariat on 7 August 1979", UN Legislative
Series, Materials on jurisdictional Immunities of
States,Hew York, 1982, pp. 88-89.
525 Ibid, at p. 88.
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important and courts try to verify whether the entity can
be identified with the State, or it is a separate
organization with independent legal personality®^^. The
reason behind this investigation might be the fact that
immunity being a requirement of international law, covers
only its subjects, namely, the sovereign States, and not
their different undertakings which may not come under the
public international law regulation, unless some
requirements are met. Furthermore, when the property
sought to be attached has an owner different from the
State itself, the application of immunity rules becomes
redundant. That is why, both at the era of absolute
immunity®^^ and of the restrictive immunity the
examination of the status of the entity, occupies a part
of every immunity judgment in cases against State
entities.
Indeed, where immunity from execution of the
properties of a State entity is at issue, the status of
the entity holding the assets will have an impact on the
classification of the. asset®^®. The other factor, which
is a fundamental criterion according to both Philippine
and the Revenues judgments, is the purpose for which the
asset is allocated®^'. That purpose must be a sovereign
one, otherwise immunity would be denied.
In the Revenues^ view the funds in question would
As was pointed out earlier, almost every German
case dealing with the immunity of State-entities, examines
in brief or detail, the structure of that entity, see for
example, the Confiscation of Trade Mark case, ILR 22
(1955), p. 17; Central Bank of Nigeria, op. cit. fn. 382
The Three NIOC Pipeline, Legal Status and Revenues cases
discussed earlier and the Chilean Copper Nationalization
case op. cit. fn. 483.
Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit. fn. 370, at p. 59.
Oehrle, op. cit. fn. 389, at pp. 467-468.
"9 Ibid, at p. 468.
185
derive their decisive definition of purpose, according to
the wishes of the foreign State, only when they have come
under the control of the central bank. Even then, from
the stand point of public international law, the State of
the forum would not be required to classify the funds as
serving public purposes, unless upon their transfer into
the account of the foreign State at its central bank they
were dedicated for purposes which could be classified as
sovereign"". The court went on to say that, in the case
at hand, circumstances to require it to classify the
assets as public assets were absent. The court then noting
the classification of the funds according to the Iranian
laws said:
It is not decisive in this context whether the
funds are regarded as serving sovereign purposes
according to the law of the foreign State in
question. If the State of the forum classifies
the allocated purpose of the funds in a manner
different from that of the foreign State this
does not constitute a violation of the
prohibition against intervention under
international law. (For a different view, with
the qualification that it "does not represent a
return to 'absolute' immunity", cf. Gramlich,
RabelsZ 45, (1981), p. 572 ff.at p. 593). This
is so because a legal measure based on a
different classification is generally, and
especially in the present case, not intended as
a means of pressure through which the State of
the forum can pursue the aim of influencing the
organization of the political or economic order
of the foreign State in question"^.
The court was of the view furthermore, that the
classification of the funds situated at the State of the
forum was not exclusively the concern of the foreign
State"^. The court, here, in support of its ruling,
pointed to section 13 (5) of State Immunity Act of the
Op cit, fn. 171, at p. 243.
Ibid, at p. 244.
"2 Ibid,
186
United Kingdom arguing that the said provision did not
prevent British courts from classifying the assets
differently from the foreign State. That section provides,
inter alia:
[F]or the purposes of subsection (4) above, his
certificate to the effect that any property is
not in use or intended for use by or on behalf
of the State for commercial purposes shall be
accepted as sufficient evidence of that fact
unless the contrary is proved.
As is evident from the text of the provision, the
State Immunity Act considers the classification of the
assets, at least primarily, a concern of the foreign
State, and accepts the classification given to the funds
by the foreign State unless the other party can prove the
contrary.
Finally the Revenues judgment turned to German law
where according to the jurisprudence and literature"^,
there is a distinction between the financial assets
(Finanzvermdgen) of the State and its administrative
assets (Verwaltungsvermdgen)^^. According to the said
distinction the administrative assets of the State are
public property and can not be subject to enforcement
measures. The court considered the funds held in the name
of NIOC belonging to the category of financial or fiscal
assets and thus governed by private law. The court,
referring to the interpretation given to Article 882 a (2)
of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to which only
properties indispensable to the fulfillment of public
functions of the State were immune from seizure, held that
NIOC's funds were not indispensable for the fulfillment of
See Philippine, op. cit. fn. 407, at p. 152;
Spanish Consular Bank Account Case, provincial court
(Landgericht) of Stuttgart, 21 Sep. 1971, ILR 65 (1984),
pp. 114-1199.
Philippine, ibid.
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the public functions of the Iranian State"®.
b) Formal Ownership of the Assets
The general trend followed by German case-law seems
to restrict as far as possible, the domain of Immunity.
This trend is more conspicuous when a State-entity, rather
than the State itself, is involved in a litigation.
Consequently when a property, which is subject to some
enforcement measures, belong even formally and for a
transitional period, to a State-entity, that formal
ownership plays a major part in the classification of the
asset as for non-sovereign purposes. For example, in the
Nigerian case, though the court rejected the immunity
because the issuance of letters of credit made the
immunity from jurisdiction hence the immunity from
execution impossible, the fact that the funds attached
belonged to the Central Bank, a separate entity from the
Nigerian Government, seems to have been a persuasive
factor for the denial of immunity"^.
The factor of legal or formal ownership gained more
importance by the NIOC cases, especially in the Revenues
case. NIOC's main argument was that it was true that the
funds were kept, for a while, in the accounts, which were
formally in the name of NIOC, nevertheless, firstly NIOC
had to be granted personal immunity, because it was
totally owned and controlled by the Government of Iran,
and pursuant to article 4 of its Articles of Association
was "exploiting the property rights of the Iranian nation
over reserves of oil and natural gas and was responsible
for pursuing activities in the oil, natural gas and
The Court seems to have paid little attention to
the fact that the revenues from oil sales are, since long
time ago, the major source of financing the public
expenditure of the Iranian Nation.
536 Op cit, fn. 382, at p. 134.
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petrochemical sectors as well as in related industries,
both inside and outside the country"^." Secondly, NIOC
contended it was, according to Article 3(1) of the Iranian
Petroleum Law, merely a trustee of the Iranian people in
exercising their sovereign rights over the oil reserves of
Iran, thus the funds were indeed funds held at trust
accounts, which had to be transferred to the Iranian
Central Bank. Those funds, according to NIOC, had
emanated from oil exploitation activities which belonged,
according to general international law,"® to the sphere
of State sovereignty and had to be transferred to the
Iranian Central Bank. Furthermore, the funds were
dedicated, in NIOC's view, for sovereign activities,
because once in Central Bank they were to finance the
State Budget of Iran. In support of this argument NIOC
contended that the garnishees had received written
instructions before the attachment proceedings began, to
transfer the amounts due to the Iranian Central Bank"'.
Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran was, from the
economic point of view, the legal holder of the funds^^°.
NIOC further argued that the attachment of those
funds would deprive the Iranian Government of its
essential resources and would jeopardize its State power.
NIOC consequently was of the view that those funds were
not different, neither in ownership, nor in nature than
the embassy funds, decided by Philippine, and were
entitled according to general international law to
immunity from attachment. The Constitutional Court,
clearly made a distinction between a foreign State's
ownership of a fund and that of a State-entity by holding
Op cit, fn. 171, at p. 222.
"8 See: the Pipeline Case, supra, fn. 443, and the
relating discussion.
Revenues case, op cit, fn. 171, at p. 223.
5^° Ibid.
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that:
There is no general rule of international law
requiring a foreign State to be treated as the
holder of claims [to funds] arising out of
accounts held at banks in the State of the forum
and standing in the name of an undertaking of
the foreign State with its own legal
personality^^'.
The court then emphasized that it would recognize as
the owner of the funds, the legal owner of those funds;
The State of the forum is not precluded from
regarding the undertaking in question as
entitled to those claims [to funds] and
obtaining their attachment as security for an
enforceable claim, on the basis of a writ of
execution issued against the undertaking in
interim proceedings concerning its non-sovereign
conduct^^^.
The court would recognize the legal owner, as the owner of
the funds regardless of the fact that whether the funds
were freely disposable by the account holder or as in the
case of revenues from the sale of oil, they were destined,
according to the Iranian law, "for transfer to an account
of the foreign State at its Central Bank®^^".
By so holding. The court, presumably aware and
mindful of the possibility, in international law, of
piercing the corporate veil, pursuant to which the mother-
State becomes liable for the obligations of its entities,
took at Revenues case, an opposite line of argument. It
once again reiterated the notion of formal or legal
ownership by holding that;
In determining the ownership of and power of
Ibid, at p. 228.
5^2 Ibid.
5^3 Ibid.
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disposal over bank accounts the factor which is
in principle of decisive importance according to
German law is the designation of the account (cf
Canaris in NIW 1973, p. 825ff.). Where an
account is opened by a party in its own name
that party becomes the creditor of the bank with
respect to its funds^^^.
The Court then adjusted the notion of legal ownership
in paying a short attention, albeit in Obiter, to the
notion of third party ownership by saying that:
It is then necessary to establish from the
special circumstances of the cases that a third
party holds claims on the account.
Nevertheless, the court rejected the argument about
the economic ownership of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
which seems to have been considered by the court as a
version of beneficial ownership. On this point the court
had this, by way of obiter, to say:
A trust account is only to be treated as the
property of the beneficiary in matters of
enforcement and bankruptcy where the designation
of the account or other factors clearly identify
the account as being in the nature of a
trusts^'.
Apparently, decisive for the court was not the fact
that according to Iranian laws the funds, were the
property of Iranian nation and dedicated for its budget,
by definition a public plan of expenditures. What
mattered was the fact that under German law, the bank
accounts were the property of NIOC and not the Government
of Iran. An international law implication of the ownership
issue is that, in an immunity case, the points at issue
are more likely to be construed against the principle of
immunity.
5^^ Ibid.
5^5 Ibid.
Ibid.
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c) Timing of the Allocation (Classification)
The Philippine Case dealt with the interesting
question of the timing of the classification of the funds
by saying that the classification would be made at the
moment when the proceedings were commenced. The Revenues
case explicitly reaffirmed that ruling by holding that the
timing would be the "moment when the safeguarding measures
were initiated®^^." If on that moment the funds were
allocated clearly for public purposes, the funds would be
classified, as public funds. This ruling which dispenses
with the origin and to some extent with the future of the
assets is in variance with the precedent established in
France, by Eurodif, where a time prior to the initiation
of the proceedings would be the time for the allocation of
the assets sought to be attached®^®.
d) Burden of Proof of Allocation
In the Philippine, the court distributed the burden
of proof as to the allocation of the funds. The court on
the one hand, was mindful of the fact that except with the
consent of the sending State the authorities of the
receiving State were prohibited under international law to
require the former to provide details of the past, present
and future uses of the funds. To do so would result in
interference in the matters which were exclusively within
sovereign sphere of the sending State's activities®^'. On
the other hand, the court acknowledged that general
international law would not bar the receiving State to ask
the sending State to give it due assurances, made by its
competent authorities, in order to substantiate the fact
that a given account is used for the continued performance
Ibid, at p. 245.
Re: supra Chapter Two.
Philippine case, op cit, fn. 407, at p. 189.
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Of the functions and activities of an embassy.
This way of distribution of burden of proof®^° seems
to have emanated largely from the fact that the court was
dealing with a bank account held by an embassy of a
foreign State and the principle ne impediatur legatio,
required the court to exclude even an abstract danger to
the ability of the diplomatic mission®®^. The court held
so by even admitting that this rule might, in some cases,
lead to abuse on the part of the sending State, by
conducting some non-immune transactions through such
accounts^®^.
The Revenues case, by treating the funds as to belong
to a State entity, suggested another way in which the
burden of proving the public nature of the funds were
distributed. The court construed the separate entity rule
in almost every respect against immunity. The judgment
took the view that in principle there is no immunity for
the funds held in an account in the name of a separate
entity. The judgment even did not state clearly whether
defendant proved to the court that the funds were at the
moment of initiation of the proceedings dedicated for
public purposes. That is another area where the Rsvenues
is in variance with the Philippine. The court seems to
have left open, or to have not explicitly answered, the
question that under what circumstances the State entity
can claim immunity. But it can be said, on the basis of
general line of argument of the judgment, that the burden
Some consider this distribution favorable to the
foreign State. See: Seidl-Hohenveldern op. cit. fn. 370,
at p. 71.
Op cit, fn. 407, at p. 186.
At the same point, the court advises the private
parties to safeguard their claims through wavier
provisions and reminds the German authorities to counter
a non-functional use of the immunity in such cases, Ibid.
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is clearly put on the foreign State to show that the funds
were, at moment of initiation of the proceedings,
dedicated for the sovereign purposes of the foreign
State"3.
By the Revenues case, the German court practice gets
closer to the practice developed by U.S. courts in dealing
with some Iranian cases^^^.
e) Applicable Law
As it became clear in previous pages, German courts
would grant immunity from jurisdiction when the claim is
based upon the conduct of a foreign State performed jure
imperil and will grant immunity from execution when the
property sought to be attached is devoted for sovereign
purposes of the State. Therefore, the determination of
whether the activity performed is sovereign or the
property serves public purposes will need some criteria.
The Federal Constitutional Court held in Empire of Iran
case that the nature of the activity will be determined,
in principle, according to national law applicable in each
case,®®® because international law, at least usually, does
not contain any criteria for this determination®®^. This
reference to national law, while having some support in
the doctrine®®^ and the case-law, is however limited by
public international law so as the result, i.e. the grant
of immunity in cases of acts jure imperil, can be achieved
®®^ Ibid, at pp. 241-244.
®®^ Re: infra Chapter 7.
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184.
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Op cit, fn. 388, at 81.
Ibid, at p. 80; Philippine, op cit, fn. 407, at
AIDI, vol. 45 II (1954), p. 294. For the cases
supporting the application of lex fori see: Seidl-
Hohenveldern, op cit, fn. 370, at p. 65.
194
no matter what domestic technics are employed®^®. This
view is discussed in detail in Empire of Iran case, where
the court, after affirming the applicability of the
national law, qualifies it by saying that:
National law can only be employed to distinguish
between a sovereign and non-sovereign activity
of a foreign State in so far as it cannot
exclude form the sovereign sphere, and thus from
immunity, such State dealings as belong to the
field of State authority in the narrow and
proper sense, according to the predominantly
held view of States. In this generally
recognizable field of sovereign activity are
included transactions relating to foreign
affairs and military authority, the legislature,
the exercise of police authority and the
administration of justice^^'.
The Philippine case endorsed this general formula,
adding that in the case of admissibility of enforcement
measures against the current account of an embassy,
special rules of international law for the protection of
the performance of the functions of diplomatic mission
i.e., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, will
apply.
Many judgments have followed this general formula
using the term "national law" which may refer to both lex
fori and the national law of the defendant State. On the
other hand, some judgments, before and after the Empire of
Iran case, have used the term Lex fori which excludes the
law of the defendant State. For instance, in Oder-Neisse
case®^ the court ruled that law-making activity of the
Polish State was, according to German legal opinion, a
sovereign activity. In the case of Conrades v. UK
558 steinberger, op. cit. fn. 19, at p. 438.
Op cit, fn. 388, at p. 81.
5^° Oder-Neisse Property Expropriation case,
Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Munich,
12 Aug. 1975, ILR 65 (1984). P. 127, at 129, .
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involving the claim of an employee of the British
consulate^^\ the court specifically referred to the Empire
of Iran case and affirmed the applicability of national
law. The same thing was done by the Spanish State Tourist
Office case,®^^ the Land Purchase Broker ^s Commission
case®'^ and the Arms Sales Commission Agreement case®^.
In the Hungarian Embassy case^^^, German law was applied
because, as the judgment explained, the encumbered land
was situated in Berlin and;
the center of gravity {Schwerpunkt) of the legal
relationship was located at the place where the
mortgaged land was and the claim for interest
was thus also located in West Berlin^*^^.
Before the Empire of Iran decision In re the
Charkow, a lower court held that the nature of the
activity would be determined according to lex fori^^^.
However, The Empire of Iran language was affirmed
Conrades v. United Kingdom of Great Britain,
Hanover Labour Court, Judgment of 4 March 1981, ILR 65
(1984) p. 205, at p. 207.
Spanish State Tourist Office case. Judgment of
30 June 1977, Superior Provincial court
(Oberlandesgericht), ILR 65 (1984), p. 141.
Land Puchase Broker's Comission case. Judgment
of 19 Dec. 1974 of Superior Provincial Court of Munich,
ILR 65 (1984), p. 125, at 126.
Arms Sales Commission Agreement case. Judgment
of 10 Oct. 1972 of Superior Provincial Court
(Oberlandesgericht) of Coblenz, ILR 65 (1984), p. 119, at
121.
Hungarian Embassy case, decided on 26 Sep. 1969,
by the Federal Supreme Court, ILR 65 (1984), p. 110 at p.
112 et seq.
Ibid, at p. 113.
567 2*6 the Charkow case, the Provincial Court
(Landgericht) of Breman, 21 Dec. 1959 and 8 Feb. 1962, ILR
65 (1984) p. 101.
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once again in the Nigerian Case where the court stated
that:
The characterization of a state activity as
governmental or non-governmental is to be made
under domestic law, except where a rule of
international law provides otherwise.®^
After the Philippine the Federal Supreme Court in a
case against the United Kingdom in granting immunity held
that nature of the act must be determined according to lex
fori even if English law considers it a private
activity569.
It is why some commentators suggest that according to
the German case-law the applicable law for the
qualification of the activity is lex fori. This
suggestion, while supported by some cases, overlooks the
clear language of the judgments using the more general
term of national law applicable in each case and not lex
fori. The allusion to the words "applicable in each case"
connotes conflict of laws determinations which may lead
from case to case to the applicability of lex fori or the
national law of the foreign State. In other words, in
immunity determinations, German courts do take into
account the national law of the foreign State for the
classification of the activity which is the basis of the
claim. For example, in the Pipelines case reference was
made to the Iranian laws pertaining the activities of
NIOC. The Revenues case shed some more light on the
notion of applicable law for the qualification of an
activity or an asset. The Empire of Iran had left open
the question whether the classification of an asset would
be made, as in the case of determination of the nature of
an activity, according to the national law applicable in
The Nigerian Case, op. cit. fn. 382, at p. 136.
Church of Scientology case, FRG, Federal Supreme
Court, 26 sep. 1978, ILR 64 (1984), p. 193, at 197.
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each case. Philippine too, did not answer this question
because it was of the view that the question could be
answered without recourse to municipal law by reference to
special rules regarding the protection of diplomatic
functions®^". It was in the Revenues Case where this
problem was tackled and responded to. The court recalling
the abovementioned rulings held that:
It was unnecessary to refer to municipal law in
order to make the classification®^^
of the funds in question. The necessity of referring to
municipal law, given the fact that the court eventually
applied the German law, is a clear indication that the
terms "national law" or "municipal law", used by the same
court at Empire of Iran and Philippine, were meant to
cover if not solely the national law of the foreign State,
at least both the Lex fori and the domestic law of the
foreign State.
To sum up, the ruling in Revenues case, as far as the
applicable law for the classification of the activity
giving rise to the claim is concerned, clarifies the
ambiguity created by some judgments and commentators and
by implication makes it plain that applicable law would be
the national law which may from case to case be the lex
fori or the law of the foreign State. Since the
requirements of international law are, according to
Article 25 of the Basic Law of the courts, enforceable in
Germany, this application of the national law will be
subject to the qualification made in Empire of Iran case
that the application of the national law should be
permissible in so far as it does not conflict with rules
of international law. With respect to the applicable law
Revenues Case, ILR op. cit. fn. 171, at. 243.
571 Ibid.
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for the qualification of the purpose of the assets in
enforcement proceedings, the court while endorsing the
general formula contained in its former case, eventually
applied lex fori, the German law.
4. Comparative study on the Admissibility of Enforcement
Measures
The Constitutional Court, in Revenues, relied on a
number of judgments especially on the European ones, in
support of its ruling that enforcement measures are in
principle admissible against the properties of a foreign
State, serving non-public purposes. However, as will be
shown, those judgments differ in many respects with the
Revenues case. Besides, there are many cases, even in
those jurisdictions in which the immunity from execution
is not absolute, where pre-judgment attachments have not
been upheld.
572 International Law Association, which has
endeavored to regulate immunity law on the basis of the
restrictive theory, in its Montreal Draft Articles for a
Convention on State immunity that was adopted in 1982,
while in article VII of the said Draft endorses the idea
that:
A foreign State's property in the forum State
shall be immune from attachment, arrest, and
execution, except as provided in Article VIII,
sets in article VIII, some conditions for the removal of
that immunity and with regard to pre-judgment attachment,
permits it in exceptional circumstances by providing that:
A. A foreign State's property in the forum
State, shall not be immune from any measure for
the enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration
award if:
1. The foreign State has waived its
immunity either expressly or by
implication from such measures. A
waiver may not be withdrawn except in
accordance with its terms; or
2. The property is in use for the
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In the case of Chemins de fer d^^tat italiens 573
purposes of commercial activity or was
in use for the commercial activity
upon which the claim is based; or
3. Execution is against property which
has been taken in violation of
international law, or which has been
exchanged for property taken in
violation of international law and is
pursuant to a judgment or an arbitral
award establishing rights in such
property.
B. In the case of mixed financial accounts that
proportion duly identified of the account used
for non-commercial activity shall be entitled to
immunity.
C. Attachment or execution shall not be
permitted, if;
1. The property against which
execution is sought to be had is used
for diplomatic or consular purposes;
or
2. The property is of a military
character or is used or intended for
use for military purposes; or
3. The property is that of a State
central bank held by it for central
banking purposes; or
4. The property is that of a State
monetary authority held by it for
monetary purposes;
unless the foreign State has made an
explicit waver with respect to such
property.
D. In exceptional circumstances, a tribunal of
the forum State may order interim measures
against the property of a foreign State,
available under this convention for attachment,
arrest, or execution, including prejudgment
attachment of assets and injunctive relief, if
a party presents a prima facie case that such
assets within the territorial limits of the
forum State may be removed, dissipated or
otherwise dealt with by the foreign State before
the tribunal renders judgment and there is a
reasonable probability that such action will
frustrate execution of any such judgment.
ILA Report of the Sixtieth Conference, held at Montreal,
1982, p. 6 et seq).
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the Swiss Federal Tribunal determined that the shares,
owned by the Italian State Railways in Eurofima, an
international company, established by fourteen European
railway authorities, together with the dividends payable
on them, belonged to the category of biens administratif
(administrative assets), and could not be subject to
enforcement measures because those assets, unlike biens
patrimoniaux (private assets) served public functions of
the Italian National Railways. Since, in the court's
view, the Italian State Railway had no independent legal
personality and was an administrative subdivision of that
State, the attachments would put in question the immunity
of State's property.
In a judgment concerning the Government of Algeria,
the said Tribunal considered the bank deposits belonging
to the said government, as private assets (biens
pratrimoniaux) and confirmed the attachments^^^.
As can be seen from these two judgments, the case
concerning the Algerian Government is more close to the
Revenues case, since in both of them assets belonging to
NIOC and the Algerian State were considered to fall under
the category of private assets, whereas, the shares and
the profits thereof, belonging to the Italian Railways, an
entity involved in the transportation business, were
considered as administrative assets.
From the Dutch jurisprudence, at least two cases,
comparable to the Revenues, can be cited. In the first
R6publique italienne, Ministdre italien des
transports et Chemins de fer d'etat italiens v. Beta
Holding SA et Autorit6 de s6^estre de BSle-Ville.
Annuaire Swisse de Droit Internationale, 1975, p. 219; ILR
65 (1984), p. 394.
Banque Commerciale Arabe SA case, 27 April 1977,
ILR 65 (1984), p. 412.
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one, namely Kingdom of Morocco,the court rejected the
objection of Morocco that the sums held in a bank account
served public purposes of that country. The court
eventually vacated the attachments, because the default of
Morocco in meeting its financial obligations had not been
proven®^'.
The second Dutch case was Caholent^^ where the Court
of Appeal of the Hague reversed the ruling of the lower
court and held that the funds due, by four oil companies
with their seats in the Hague, to NIOC could be subject to
attachment. The court did not uphold the NIOC argument
that since the proceeds from oil sale were to go under the
control of the Iranian Finance Ministry and later to be
used for budgetary purposes, they had to be considered as
assets serving public services. The court put the
emphasis on the fact that the funds due were payable to
NIOC and not to the Government of Iran and as such they
could not be considered as assets dedicated for sovereign
purposes of Iran. The court's stress on the notion of
formal ownership of funds by NIOC and line of
argumentation, seems to have been, followed almost exactly
and with more elaboration at the Revenues case.
However, there are some distinctions between Cabolent
and Revenues. In the former case the attachments were
initiated pursuant to an arbitration award and the court
dealt in detail with the issue of the immunity from
jurisdiction of NIOC, whereas in Revenues the point at
issue was the admissibility of prejudgment attachment.
Moreover, the attachments in the Netherlands seem to have
Kingdom of Morocco v. Stitching Revalidatie
Centrum "de Trappenberg", the District Court of Amsterdam,
judgment of 18 May 1978, ILR 65 (1984), p. 375.
NYIL 10 (1979), p. 445.
577 Qp cit, fn. 58.
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been the only enforcement measure taken against NIOC in
the case of Cabolent, whereas in Revenues, as was stated
before, the pre-judgment attachments were additional or
parallel interim measures.
In Institute Bank Account case®^® the claimant, an
ex-employee of the trade section, in Koln, of a foreign
State embassy, sought to enforce a default judgment
against the embassy of a foreign State. The point at
issue was whether the claimant could attach the funds at
bank accounts held in the name of an institute for foreign
trade of the foreign State in Hamburg which also
functioned as the trade section of the consulate general
of that State. The Provincial Court of Hamburg, affirmed
the attachment ordered by the lower court, by basing its
judgment on the following grounds: In the curt's view, the
institute was legally distinct from that of the embassy,
and since the accounts were held in the name of the
institute and not the embassy, the funds could not be
considered as belonging to the embassy^^' and their
attachment would not hinder the functioning of the ebassy.
Furthermore, the institute's functions in Germany had to
be regarded private law activities and commercial in
nature, though indirectly they might pursue sovereign
purposes as well®®°.
This judgment, which was contemporaneous to NIOC
cases, serves as a precedent for the admissibility in
Germany of execution measures. It relied on the separate
entity rule and the notion of legal ownership, but is
distinct from NIOC cases in a few respects. Firstly
Re: Foreign Trade Institute Bank Account case.
Federal Republic of Germany, provincial court (Land-
gericht) of Hamburg, 26 March, 1981, ILR 65 (1984), p.
209.
Ibid, at p. 211.
580 Ibid.
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contrary to NIOC cases the execution at the case under
discussion was a post-judgment proceedings. Secondly the
proceedings seem to have been the sole remedy for the
execution of the default judgment against the embassy of
the foreign State, whereas the attachments against NIOC
were additional interim measures. Lastly, the Foreign
Trade Institute case, represented a case where there was
a strong territorial connection between the claim and the
Federal Republic of Germany, because the claimant was a
German national, the contract giving rise to the claim had
been concluded in Germany and had been performed there.
Further, the Respondent, the embassy of the foreign State
as well as the branch of the institute for foreign trade
were located in Germany, whereas in NIOC cases, except for
the presence of NIOC's funds in Germany, there were no
other territorial connection with that country.
The Constitutional Court, in Revenues, noted the fact
that according to section 1610(d) of FSIA pre-judgement
attachment against the properties of a foreign State would
be permissible if the foreign State waived its immunity.
The Court also noted that section 13(2)(a)(3) of the
British State Immunity Act allows interim relief if only
there is the written consent of the foreign State.
Nevertheless, the court was of the view that those
provisions did not reflect a prohibition in accordance
with international law. The court got support, for its
ruling, from the admissibility of injunctions against
foreign States in order to prevent them from transferring
their assets®®^. The court even refered to an interim
injunction ordered against the Islamic Republic of Iran,
in the case of American International Group, Inc. v. The
Islamic Republic of Iran^^^. Aware of the non-
Revenues, op cit, fn. 171, at p. 240.
ILR 63 (1982) p. 453; on injunctions see infra,
Chapter 7.
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admissibility of injunctions against a foreign State the
court refered to the Nigerian cases where the British
Court of Appeal held in the so-called Mareva injunctions
that under international law, the Nigerian Central Bank
could be forbidden from the disposal of certain funds
belonging to it^®'.
5. Questions Unanswered by the MIOC Judgments
The NIOC cases, especially the Revenues case, while
responding to a host of immunity law questions have not
provided an answer at least a direct one to, two main
questions. The first question is, under what conditions
commercial undertakings of a foreign State can claim
immunity? The superior provincial Court of Frankfurt held
in the Pipeline case that those entities endowed with
their own legal personality did not enjoy any immunity^®^.
The Court then held in Obiter that, if an undertaking was
acting on a sovereign basis for the State concerned State
immunity could in principle be claimed^®®. However the
Revenues case, faced with the same question, saw it
unnecessary to decide the question. The Court went on to
say that even if such undertakings were to be granted
immunity to the same extent as those States themselves
attachment would still not have conflicted with any
requirements of general international law^®^.
Another question expressly pointed to, but not
clearly answered by the Revenues case is the question of
Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, (1977), 2 W.L.R. 356 and ILR 64 (1983) p. Ill at
p. 122; Hispano Americana Mercantile SA v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, (1979) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 277, C.A. and ILR 64 (1983)
p. 221.
Op cit, fn. 443, p. 213.
Ibid, at 214.
Ibid, at p. 229.
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immunity from execution, in the forum State, of the funds
held in the name of a foreign State for monetary or
central banking purposes. The court, though declining to
give a sharp answer, held that such a case would, as a
normal rule, give rise directly to an allocation for
sovereign purposes. The original proceedings did not,
however, in the court's view involve such a case^®^.
V. CONCLUSIONS
1. Iranian cases, particularly the Revenues case, in
line with the existing German jurisprudence confirm the
proposition that in Germany, the starting point in an
immunity determination is the principle of the territorial
jurisdiction. The case falls under the broad jurisdiction
of German courts unless a clear and well established
requirement of public international law prohibits the
exercise of such jurisdiction. It is in this context that
State immunity may appear as an exception to the
jurisdiction of German Courts.The strictness of the
courts in ascertaining the requirement plays against
immunity and reduces the chance of it being granted only
to clear cut and widely accepted instances of immune
activities and assets.
2. In applying the exception of immunity German
courts, follow the restrictive doctrine and determine the
587 *Ibid, at p. 245. This presumption of immunity
was absent in the Nigerian case where the Frankfurt court
dealt with the immunity of the funds of the Central Bank
of Nigeria from a different perspective. Although The
Bank contended that its funds served monetary purposes of
the Nigerian Government, the court held that the issue was
a letter of credit problem. Therefore, the transaction and
the funds at Frankfurt Bank served a commercial purpose.
See the Nigerian case op cit, fn. 382, p. 131, and
Nwogugo, op cit, fn. 383.
See supra. Chapter 1, fns. 81-91 and the
accompanying discussion "Whether Immunity is a Principle
or an Exception"
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immunity of a foreign State and of its properties on the
basis of the nature of the foreign State's activity or its
assets and on their classification as public or private.
3. Some courts, especially the Federal Constitutional
Court, availed themselves of the opportunity created by
the NIOC cases to address some aspects of the immunity law
in Germany. The attempt was in the direction of
restricting the domain of the immunity of States and their
property, resulting in the expansion of the German
jurisdiction.
4. The separate entity rule was resorted to by the
German courts and on that basis NIOC was refused personal
immunity from the German jurisdiction. Alongside the
separate entity rule the principle of formal or legal
ownership too, was decisive in the classification of the
funds. The Constitutional Court did not heed the
ultimate, real, or beneficial ownership of the funds by
the Iranian State and considered the funds to belong to
their legal owner, NIOC, a separate entity.
5. Apart from the structuralist approach, flowed from
the separate entity rule, the courts have employed, in
their immunity determinations, functionalist approach too.
For instance, in the Pipeline case the activities for the
construction of the Oil Pipelines were considered to be
non-sovereign activities.
6. According to the Constitutional Court, there does
not exist in customary international law a principle
pursuant to which enforcement measures against the
properties of a foreign State devoted to commercial
purposes may be prohibited. The Constitutional Court
extended lack of such prohibition to the stage of pre-
judgment attachments and interim measures of protection.
Thus the most important achievement of the Revenues case
207
is the admissibility of pre-judgment attachments against
the properties of State-entities with legal personality
distinct from their government.
7. The said pre-judgment attachments were themselves
of some important aspects. Firstly the main actions
pertaining those attachments were not pending before the
German courts, but they were pending before the United
States courts. Secondly the attachments were all parallel
or additional pre-judgment attachments. .
8. The liberal construction of the requirement of
"the territorial connection" is another aspect of the
German courts through the NIOC cases. The German courts
are of the view that the territorial connection is not a
requirement of general international law. Thus, the mere
existence in Germany of some properties belonging to NIOC
was sufficient to establish the German jurisdiction.
9. On the question of the classification of the
funds, the Revenues case upheld in principle the
Philippineruling according to which only those assets
dedicated for public purposes of a State would be immune.
Nevertheless, the Revenues, by applying more stringent
tests on the issues of the allocation of the assets and
their nature, the timing of such allocation and its burden
of proof, practically further limited the extent of the
immunity. Thus, due to the fact that on the moment of
initiation of the proceedings, the funds were under the
ownership of the NIOC, a State entity, and an obvious and
concrete allocation on that moment was absent, immunity
was denied.
10. In the Philippine there was a presumption as to
the immunity of a foreign State's funds held at its
embassy's bank accounts, and the private claimant bore the
burden of proving the private nature of such funds. In
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Revenues, on the other hand, the burden of proof has to be
fulfilled differently because the properties were
considered to belong not to a State, but to a State
entity. In principle, the funds, held formally in the name
of a State entity, are not immune from execution measures,
unless the entity concerned, or the foreign State, comes
with sufficient proof that the funds are dedicated for a
sovereign purpose.
11. The Constitutional Court, while considered
relevant the national law of the foreign State in
classification problems, eventually adopted the German
domestic laws. The court considered revenues from oil
sales not indispensable for the fulfillment of public
functions. The funds were governed by private law under
the category of financial assets (FinanzVermdgen).
12. It is perhaps because of the NIOC cases'
experience in Germany that the Iranian Government try as
much as they can, not to keep Iranian funds within the
German jurisdiction, despite the fact that in the post-
Islamic Revolution era the Federal Republic of Germany has
been one of the largest trade partners of Iran^®'.
From the interview of the writer with Mr.
Allahyar Mouri, former principal counsel to the NIOC, who
was involved in the NIOC cases in Germany.
PART THREE
CLAIMS INVOLVING THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN BEFORE THE UNITED
STATES COURTS
CHAPTER FOUR
fflSTORY OF IMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES AND OF THE IRANIAN CASES FILED THERE
AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF 1979
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OP IMMUNITY LAW, IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. Iimunity From Jurisdiction Before 1976
1. The Schooner Exchange Case
The doctrine of sovereign iimunity in the United
States dates back to 1812, when Chief Justice Marshall in
the celebrated case of The Schooner Exchange^^° fashioned
and established the absolute doctrine. The immunity upheld
by the Supreme Court, had already been suggested by the
executive branch of the U.S. Government"^ This was done
in spite of the express language of Article III of the
U.S. Constitution providing subject matter jurisdiction
for the federal courts in claims against foreign
States^'^. The case which is often cited as the first
judicial expression of the absolute theory, involved a
libel action filed by Mc Faddon and his partner, former
owners of a schooner in the name of Exchange, captured by
Napoleon forces in 1809 and converted into a French ship
Schooner Exchange v. Mc Faddon and others^ op
cit, fn. 95
Legislative History of Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976; House Report No. 94-1487", U.N.
Leg, Ser. Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property, N.Y. 1982, p. 98, at p. 100.
592
The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases....
between a State, or the citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or subjects,
U.S. Constitution, Art. III. 82, quoted by Carl B.M.,
"Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice",
S.W.L.J, vol. 33 (1979). p. 1009, at p. 1001.
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Of war. The action was filed in the U.S. while the
Exchange was in the Port of Philadelphia. After two
inconsistent judgements by lower U.S. courts the case was
before the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall first
emphasized the absolute and exclusive nature of the
territorial jurisdiction of the local State in the
following words:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving
validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of
the restriction, and an investment of that
sovereignty to the same extent in that power
which could impose such restriction.
'All exceptions, therefore, to the full and
complete power of a nation within its own
territories, must be traced up to the consent of
the nation itself. They can flow no other
sources.
He went on to say that the consent of the host State,
express or implied, could make exceptions to this
exclusive and absolute territorial jurisdiction which
would not seem to extend to foreign sovereigns and their
rights:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction
being alike the attribute of every sovereign,
and being incapable of conferring extra
territorial power, would not seem to contemplate
foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as
its objects. One sovereign being in no respect
amenable to another, and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to
degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing
himself or its sovereign rights within the
jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory only under an express
license, or in the confidence that the
immunities belonging to his independent
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sovereign status, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and
will be extended to him^'^.
The court held that the amenability to the local
jurisdiction of a foreign ship of war would clearly damage
the foreign sovereign's dignity:
the Exchange, being a public armed ship, in the
service of a foreign sovereign, with whom the
government of the United States is at peace, and
having entered an American port, opened for her
reception, on terms on which ships of war are
generally permitted to enter the ports of a
friendly power, must be considered as having
come into the American territory, under an
implied promise, that while necessarily within
it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner,
she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of
the country^'^.
In 1921, in the case of Berizzi Bros. Co."®, Julian
Mack, a distinguished district court judge, held that
immunity must be rejected at least with regard to
admiralty cases. Since Pesaro case, unlike Schooner which
was a ship of war, involved a merchant ship owned and
operated by Italian Government, immunity was rejected. On
appeal the absolute doctrine, as enunciated in the
Schooner Exchange, was once again upheld by the Supreme
Court. The court underscored not the commercial nature of
the ship's mission, but its governmental purpose and
granted the ship almost the same immunity granted to ships
593
594
595
11 Schooner, op cit, fn. 95, at 137.
Ibid, at 146.
Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 211 Fed. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) quoted by Von Mehren, op cit, fn. 41, at
p. 39.
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Of war"6.
2. The Role of the Executive Branch
In early Forties, the Supreme Court decided two
cases, in which it unambiguously determined that the
courts will be bound by the suggestions made by the
Executive Branch on the appropriateness of granting or
denying immunity in any given case. In the first one,
namely, the Ex Parte Republic of Peru®'^ the court said:
.... The certification and the request that the
vessel be declared immune must be accepted by
the courts as a conclusive determination by the
political arm of the Government that the
continued retention of the vessel interferes
with the proper conduct of our foreign
relations. Upon the submission of this
certification to the district court, it becomes
the court's duty, in conformity to established
principles, to release the vessel and to proceed
no further in the cause®'®.
The rationale for the court's duty to accept the
Executive suggestions was that disputes with foreign
States could better be settled through diplomatic channels
than through adjudication. In the second case, namely
Hoffman^^^ the court ruled:
... It is therefore not for the courts to deny
an immunity which our government has seen fit to
allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds
Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562
(1926) at 574.
597
598
599
(1945).
Ex Parts Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
Ibid, at 589.
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30
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which the government has not seen fit to
recognize^°°.
The court indeed imposed a political question
restriction on the jurisdiction of the courts^®''.
Since 1945, the U.S. Government got, increasingly,
involved in litigations before foreign courts in cases
pertaining to purchase of goods, services, etc. In the
mid 1950s, in the first large series of foreign suits the
U.S. Government pleaded sovereign immunity in almost all
those cases. This policy, however, was abandoned, when it
became clear that, except for Great Britain, almost every
West European country had began to follow the restrictive
theory of immunity^"^.
3. The Tate Letter
Following the increased involvement of the State
Department in immunity matters, the trend towards the
application of the restrictive theory in Western Europe,
and the hints in some cases to the applicability of the
restrictive doctrine,Jack B. Tate, the then Acting
Legal Adviser of the State Department issued in 1952, a
letter, stating that thereupon the State Department would
be guided, in making suggestions to the courts, by the
restrictive doctrine, not to grant immunity to foreign
States in cases arising out of private or commercial
activities:
600 Ibid, at 35.
Von Mehren op. cit. fn. 41, at p. 40.
House Report, op. cit. fn. 591, at p. 100.
603 For example the hint in Hoffman case which is
discussed in Dowd D., "Sovereign immunity _ Act of State
Doctrine", Vander. J.Transnat.L. vol. 14 (1981), p. 909,
at 913.
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The Department of State has for some time had
under consideration the question whether the
practice of the Government in granting immunity
from suit to foreign governments made parties
defendant in the courts of the United States
without their consent should not be changed.
The Department has now reached the conclusion
that such immunity should no longer be granted
in certain types of cases.
• • • •
....[W]ith the possible exception of the United
Kingdom little support has been found except on
the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites
for continued full acceptance of the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity. There are
evidences that British authorities are aware of
its deficiencies and ready for a change. The
reasons which obviously motivate State trading
countries in adhering to the theory with perhaps
increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the
United States should change its policies.
Furthermore, the granting of sovereign immunity
to foreign governments in the courts of the
United States is most inconsistent with the
action of the Government of the United States in
subjecting itself to suit in these same courts
in both contract and tort and with its long
established policy of not claiming immunity in
foreign jurisdictions for its merchant vessels.
Finally, the Department feels that the
widespread and increasing practice on the part
of governments of engaging in commercial
activities make necessary a practice which will
enable persons doing business with them to have
their rights determined in the courts. for
these reasons it will hereafter be the
Department's policy to follow the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in the
consideration of requests of foreign governments
for a grant of sovereign immunity^°^.
604 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (1952) pp. 984-85,
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The letter, however, did not contain any criteria for
determining how and where an activity could be
characterized as a sovereign or private law activity^"^.
The issuance of the Tate letter was in harmony with
another policy of the United States which had began since
after World War II by providing limited wavier provisions
in treaties with foreign States. These waiver provisions
obligated each contracting party to waive its immunity for
State-controlled entities engaged in business activities
within the territory of the other party.
Thereafter, the foreign State had the initiative, it
could seek an immunity determination either by claiming it
directly in the court or by requesting the State
Department to make an immunity recommendation on its
behalfIn practice, an administrative procedure was
1
developed within the State Department, pursuant to which
the parties could attend an informal hearing at the
Department to present their oral arguments and written
statements on the issue of sovereign immunity^°^.
4. After the Tate Letter
Following the Tate letter, the restrictive theory was
adopted in Victory Transport and in a number of other
cases decided by lower courts^°' which distinguished
between public and commercial activities of the States,
granting them immunity when they were involved in claims
Von Mehren, op cit. fn. 41, p. 41.
Carl. op. cit. fn. 592, at p. 1012.
607 70 Proc. Amer. Soc'y. Int'l. L. 46-47.
Victory Transport Inc. v. Commissaria General de
Aba- stecimientos y. Transportes, 336 F. 2d. 354 (1964).
6°' For these cases see Von Mehren, op. cit. fn. 41,
at p. 42; Carl, op. cit. fn. 592, at p. 1012.
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arising out of their sovereign acts^^°. These judgments
however, could not override the clear holding of the
Supreme Court in Pesaro. It was the decision of the
Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of London^^^ which cast
doubt on the Authority of Pesaro. Though Alfred Dunhill
was an Act of State case the status of immunity law,
particularly in the U.S., was discussed in detail^^^ among
the judges. Some of them were of the view that the Pesaro
ruling had been overruled and the restrictive theory had
been established as the prevailing law in the U.S.^^^.
However, the majority of the court was of the view that
the disposition of the case did not require determination
of the status of the immunity law. Therefore, as some
writers have suggested, the absolute immunity doctrine
formulated by Pesaro, was arguably, a valid precedent for
the courts in 1976, on the eve of the adoption of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act^^^.
Immunity would be granted if there were a
suggestion by the State Department. If that Department
filed no suggestion, its silence would be taken as a hint
for the court involved, to reject the immunity. See
Martin Jeffrey N., "Sovereign Immunity Limits of Judicial
Control- The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976",
Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 18 (1977), p. 429,
at p. 435.
Alfred Dunhill of London^ Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
Martin, op cit, fn.610 at p. 434.
Justice White stated:
Indeed it is fair to say that the "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity appears to be
generally accepted as the prevailing law in this
county.
Op. cit, fn.611, at. 703.
Martin, op. cit. fn. 610, at p. 435,
nevertheless, some writers believe that since the Tate
letter of 1952 the restrictive theory, albeit in matters
of immunity from jurisdiction, was the prevailing law in
the U.S. See Carl, op. cit. fn. 592, at p. 1012.
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B. Immunity Prom Execution Before 1976
Apart from the attachment proceedings which were used
normally as a means of securing jurisdiction over a
foreign State^^®, the U.S. courts continued to apply the
doctrine of absolute immunity as regards the execution of
judgments against foreign States, even in ordinary
commercial cases where commercial properties were
available for satisfaction of a judgment, despite the
shift announced by the Tate letter of 1952 and up to the
entry into force of the Immunities Act of
The State Department, in a letter filed with the
court dealing with Weilamann case^^^ made it clear that
immunity from execution is distinct from immunity from
jurisdiction and that property of a foreign State is
immune even in a case where the foreign State has
consented to the suit^^®.
Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, ILR 28
(1963), p. 165.
Von Mehren, op. cit. fn. 41, at p. 42; Carl, op.
cit. fn. 592, at p. 1014; House Report, op. cit. fn. 591,
at p. 99.
Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, ILR 28
(1963), p. 165.
The letter stated:
The Department has always recognized the
distinction between 'immunity from jurisdiction'
and 'immunity from execution'. The Department
has maintained the view that under international
law property of a foreign sovereign is immune
from execution to satisfy even a judgment
obtained in an action against a foreign
sovereign where there is no immunity from suit.
'As you will recall there is precedent for not
permitting execution of a judgment obtained in
a proceeding when the foreign sovereign has
consented to suit. Dixter and Carpenter, Inc.
V. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyvelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir., 1930); followed in Bradford v. Chase
National Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28, 38 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.
1938). Where the foreign sovereign has not
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court it
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C. Comprehensive Legislation on Immunity
Law Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976
Despite the fact the United States Government had in
1952, with the issuance of the Tate letter, effectively
embraced the restrictive immunity doctrine, the
developments following the Tate letter, show that in 1976,
the status of Immunity law in the U.S. was not free of
uncertainties, ambiguities and difficulties. No
comprehensive provisions exited in the U.S. laws
regulating immunity matters^^'.
There was no clear way of securing in personam
jurisdiction over foreign States"®. The claimants, would
normally initiate the proceedings against a foreign State
by obtaining attachment orders against the properties of
that country. By claiming title of the attached property
(in rem jurisdiction) or by attaching a bank deposit
(quasi in rem jurisdiction) belonging to a foreign State,
the private claimants could bring that State, before a
U.S. court"^. Because there was no in personam
would be an a Fortiori case.
'The Department is of the further view that even
when the attachment of the property of a foreign
sovereign is not prohibited for the purpose of
jurisdiction, nevertheless the property so
attached and levied upon cannot be retained to
satisfy a judgment ensuing from the suit
because, in the Department's view, under
international law the property of a foreign
sovereign is immune from execution even in a
case where the foreign sovereign is not immune
from suit.
Whiteman M., Digest Of International Law 6(1968) p. 709,
at pp. 711-712.
House Report, op. cit. fn. 591, at p. 98.
"0 For the difficulties in this regard see Carl, op
cit, fn. 592, at pp. 1012 et seq.
Delaume G. "Three Perspectives on Sovereign
Immunity", AJIL, vol. 71 (1977), p. 399.
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jurisdiction against them, Some plaintiffs would try to
obtain numerous attachments on properties of foreign
States located in different parts of the U.S. causing
serious embarrassment to the country concerned^^^.
Due to involvement of the State Department in
immunity determinations, immunity cases would often tend
to be politicized, some times giving rise to difficulty
and embarrassment in foreign relations with other
countries. Besides, enjoyment by foreign States of
absolute immunity from execution even in commercial cases
had created a lot of difficulties to the private claimants
and seemed to be an anachronistic approach. To overcome
these problems and to remove uncertainties. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act was adopted by both Houses of
Congress in 1976 and took effect on 19 January 1977"'.
The Act changed dramatically many aspects of the
immunity law, especially that of immunity from
execution*^^^. The Act carries forward the restrictive
theory in matters relating to jurisdictional immunities of
foreign States, their instrumentalities and their
properties, that is to say:
immunity of a foreign State is "restricted" to
suits involving a foreign State's public acts
(jure imperii) and does not extend to suits
based on its commercial or private acts (jure
gestionis)^^^.
Other objectives of the Act are firstly to ensure the
determination of immunity matters by the U.S. courts and
House Report^ op. cit. fn. 591, at pp. 99 et
seq.
Metzger S.D. "Immunity of Foreign State Property
From Attachment or Execution in the U.S.A." NYIL 10
(1979), p. 131.
Ibid.
House Report, op. cit, fn. 591, at p. 99.
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not by the State Department^^^ which would indeed
depoliticize the immunity questions to a large extent.
Secondly the Act abandoned the process of obtaining
attachments against foreign States for the purpose
asserting jurisdiction over them since it, for the first
time, provided statutory provisions for service of process
upon foreign States in order that in personam jurisdiction
can be established against them. Finally the act would
abandon the absolute doctrine with regard to execution of
judgments against properties belonging to a foreign
State"''.
Two years after the adoption of Immunities Act in the
U.S., the huge bulk of cases filed against the new Iranian
Government and its agencies, provided the U.S. courts with
a unique and unprecedented opportunity to exercise their
apt latitude in implementing different provisions of the
FSIA. Before embarking on the study of immunity law
aspects of those cases, it would be useful to have a look
at the history of relationships between Iran and the
United States.
II. BACKGROUND OF IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS
It is not the purpose of this work to study in detail
the history of the Iran-U.S. relationships. However, a
short look at that history is necessary in order to better
understand the flood of lawsuits brought against Iran and
its agencies, in the U.S. courts, in 1979-1981. Before
the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 the United States
was, for more than two decades, Iran's major partner in
trade, politics, and strategic affairs. United States'
close relationships with Iran dated back to August 1953,
when the democratically elected government of late Dr. M.
JJbid, at p. 131.
627 Ibid.
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Mossadegh was overthrown by a coup d'etat^^®. Pursuant to
that coup, Mossadegh was imprisoned and the former Shah of
Iran who had already fled the country returned to Iran and
gained access to the throne again. Since then the
relationships"' between the two countries expanded and
On the 1953 Coup d'etat see generally: Kermit
Roosvelt, Counter Coup, the Struggle For the Control of
Iran, McGrow- Hill Book Co. New York, 1979; Mark J.
Gasiorowski, The Coup D^etat in Iran, Department of
Political Sciences, Louisiana State University, 1988; The
United States and Iran, A Documentary History: Prepared in
Association with the World Studies Programs, the Center
For Strategic And International Studies, Gorge Town
University, 1980; Boyle, F.A., World Politics and
International Law, (1985), U.S.A., Duke University Press,
p. 188. These sources all clearly support the general
belief among Iranians, that the United States was behind
that coup d'etat. In the words of a U.S. publicist:
One does not need to know much about Iranian
history to know that the American embassy in
Tehran was the center of the CIA plot in 1953
which has been widely acknowledged and
documented in recent years. It was this plot
which brought the Shah back to power in defiance
of the constitutional process of Iran.
Falk Richard, "Comments on International Law and the
United States Response to the Iranian Revolution", Rutgers
Law Review, vol.23 (1981) No.2, p.399 at p.408.
A court in an immunity determination involving
96 Iranian cases, referred to those relationships as
follows:
I need not recount the longstanding political
and commercial relationship which has existed
between the United States and Iran. It is
sufficient to say that over the years since
World War II, the political ties between this
country and Iran grew stronger. And, just as
the political relationship strengthened, the
commercial contacts between the countries also
increased and flourished.
However, in the final days of 1978, the
political situation in Iran became volatile.
The Iranian Government, which had enjoyed a
close relationship with the United States, was
now under siege from within. Part and parcel of
the attack upon the Iranian Government was an
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deepened, albeit in the eyes of the iranian
intelligentsia, much to the favour of the U.S, in a way
and to such an extent that by mid 1970s, it led to a
strong anti-american sentiment among the Iranian people.
By 1979 at the climax of the revolutionary fervour, one of
the main objectives of the Revolution was to liberate the
country from the economical and political hegemony of the
United States. Thus it was not surprising that by autumn
1978, programmed evacuation of the United States nationals
from Iran had begun under the supervision of the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran. Unlike in 1953 the United States
attempts to control the events, or to channel them in an
agreeable direction, yielded little results and on 11
February 1979, the Islamic Revolution gained success under
the leadership of Late Ayatollah Khomeini bringing the
Iran-U.S. relationships into a different phase.
By that time most of U.S. nationals had left Iran and
most of contracts and projects involving U.S. parties had
stopped. This situation later resulted in a flood of
lawsuits against Iran and raised Iran's immunity in U.S.
courts. Those claims can be categorized chronologically in
three distinct periods
1. The period between Feb. 1979 and 14 Nov. 1979, the
date on which all Iranian properties were frozen
pursuant to U.S. presidential freeze orders. (The
Pre-Freeze Period).
2. The period between 14 Nov. 1979 and 19 Jan. 1979, the
attack upon the United States' political and
commercial interests in Iran.
New England Merchants National Bank and Others v. Iran
Power Generation and Transmission Company and Others, U.S.
District Court, {S.D.N.Y., 28 Sep. 1980), ILR 63 (1982),
p. 497, at p. 499.
Before 1979, cases against Iran, involving
immunity matters, were very few, like Upton et al v.
Empire of Iran, U.S. District Court (D.C. 19 Oct. 1978),
ILR 63 (1982), p.211.
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date on which the Algerian Declarations entered into
force. (The Freeze Period)
3. The Post-Algerian Declarations Period. (The Post-
Freeze Period).
III. THE FRE-FREEZE PERIOD
In this period, which covers February 1979 till 14
November 1979, most of the hundreds of contracts and
projects involving United States firms and nationals
continued to suffer from uncertainties and work stoppage,
occurred during the months of Revolution. Despite
uncertainties, only a few U.S. claimants filed suits
against Iran and triggered the examination of Iran's
immunity before the United States courts.In one of
those suits the court took the judicial notice of the fact
that the Iranian Revolution, resulting in the overthrow of
the Imperial Government of the Shah, threw commercial and
political relations between Iran and the U.S. into
disarray.
The relationships deteriorated even more when the
United States admitted the deposed Shah into the United
States and refused to extradite him to Iran, to be tried
Those cases were: Behring International INC. V.
Imperial Iranian Air Force, et al.. Judgements of 24 July
and 13 Aug. 1979 of the U.S. District Court, District of
New Jersey, ILR 63 (1982),p. 261 et seq.; Harris
International Telecommunications, INC. v. Bank Melli Iran,
No. 279-802 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 22, 1979); Electronic Data
Systems Corp. Iran V. Social Security Organization of
Iran, No. CA3-79-0218-F (N.D.Tex. June 21, 1979);
Stromherg-Carlson Corp v. Bank Melli Iran 467 F. Supp.
530, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where the court granted an
injunction to the claimant. lALR. p. 88; Reading and
Bates Corp. V. National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), 79-CV
44 21 S.D.N.Y. For some information about those
proceedings see lALR, PP 58 and 87. Except in Reading and
Bates where NIOC's immunity was upheld by Judge Duffy, in
other cases Iran's immunity was rejected. 10 NYB Int.L
(1979) p. 18. lALR pp. 58, 87 and 242-244.
^22 stromberg Carlson, ibid, Iranian Assets
Litigation Reporter (lALR), p.88.
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by the Iranian courts for crimes attributed to him. This
development, alongside the suspicions which existed among
iranians about the activities of the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran, raised the fear, rightly or wrongly, among the
young revolutionaries that something unfortunate like the
August 1953 events might be in the offing and led to the
seizure on 4 Nov. 1979 of the U.S. Embassy and the
detention of its personnel in Tehran by some university
students. The students demanded, inter alia, the return to
Iran of the deposed Shah and the properties, unlawfully
expatriated by him and his family. The Hostage crisis
began.
IV. THE FREEZE PERIOD:
On 14 November 1979, ten days after the seizure of
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the then President of the
United States, relying on the provisions of International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (lEEPA) froze all Iranian
properties which were held by the United States persons
and in which the Government of Iran or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities had an interest.The Freeze order
alleged to be in response to the announcement made by the
then Iranian Economic and Finance Minister that Iran would
withdraw all of its funds held on deposit in U.S. banks
and to the threat caused by the political situation in
Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union
forces.The Freeze by the United States of foreign
countries' assets had some precedents. The U.S. had in
the past frozen the assets of People's Republic of China,
"Symposium on the Settlement With Iran", Lawyer
of the Americas, The University of Miami Journal of
International Law, Vol.13 (1981) Appendix 206.
Iran in an open letter to American business
community stated that it would honor all its legitimate
foreign debts, see Wallstreet Journal, Dec. 3, 1979.
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North Korea, Cambodia, Vietnam and Cuba^^^. However, the
freeze of Iranian assets was unprecedented with regard to
the amount and probably the variety of the assets
involved.
The United States, relying on the Vienna Conventions
of 1961 and 1963 on diplomatic and consular relations and
on the Treaty of Amity of 1955 between Iran and the United
States, filed an action against Iran before the
International Court of Justice/^'
After the Freeze Order, the Treasury Department
issued implementing regulations, the first set of which,
inter alia, prohibited any transaction with respect to
Iranian assets and initiation of judicial proceedings
against Iran. On Nov. 26 1979 the Treasury revised that
regulation, whereby the initiation of proceedings and
acquiring pre-judgment attachments were permitted while
entry of any judgment against Iran, order or decree in any
proceedings affecting its assets were prohibited.
Thus the Hostage Crisis created or paralleled with a
situation where the flood of judicial proceedings against
Iran and its agencies or instrumentalities began to flow.
635 Carl, op cit, fn.592, at p.1049.
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Provisional
Measures, order of 15 Dec. 1979, I.C.J. Reports 1979, p.7;
and the judgment (on merits) of 24 May 1980, I.C.J.
Reports 1980, p.3. Iran did not take part in the case and
did not abide by the order of interim measures and the
judgment of the court to release the detainees. Iran also
did not abide by the Resolutions of the U.N. Security
Council No. 457 (18 ILM, 1644 (1979) and No. 461, 19 ILM,
250 (1980), which called for the immediate release of the
hostages.
Re: Proceedings of the hearing of 10 July 1980,
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Partial Summary
Judgement in the case of American Int'l Group v. Iran et
al, in which the United States Government attorneys
intervened in order to persuade the court not to enter any
judgement. Despite this clear intervention by the U.S. in
favor of Iran, a partial summary judgement was issued
against Iran. Some attachments too, were already levied on
Iranian properties in this case. lALR, pp. 1207-1208.
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First of all, many claimants acquired easily ex parte,
pre-judgment attachments on the properties of Iran. Those
attachments were subject to a confirmation proceeding at
the court issuing the initial attachment. It was at these
confirmation proceedings that a host of opinions by
various district courts throughout the United States were
issued. These opinions, which were, often, divergent and
inconsistent, dealt mainly with Iran's plea of immunity
from jurisdiction and execution measures, particularly in
proceedings pertaining to pre-judgment attachments. The
number of cases against Iran reached, by January 1981, to
more than 3 00. Moreover, some claimants, seeking and
acquiring another remedy, the preliminary injunction,
avoided the more stringent requirements of prejudgment
attachment.
Most of the cases, filed against Iran, were based on
transactions or contracts between an American party and a
particular Iranian entity having some connection with the
Government of Iran. The claimants were seeking to impose
liability not only on the contracting entity, having the
primary obligation, but also on the Government of Iran
itself and other Iranian agencies and instrumentalities,
such as the Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi).
Likewise, claimants were seeking attachments on the
properties held by Iranian entities, other than the
contractual obligee, such as Bank Markazi, the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Government of Iran
itself.The legal basis presented by U.S. claimants,
for naming entities other than the contractual party and
^ McGreevy, "The Iranian Crisis and U.S. Law",
Northwest J. Int'l. L. and Business^ Vol. 2. (1980), p.
389, at p. 422. Also re: infra. Chapter 7, the discussion
relating to injunctions.
litigation Involving the State of Iran (Islamic
Republic of Iran), before the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, the "Amicus Curiae Memorandum of
United States (supporting mainly Iran's motions for
consolidation of 151 different cases), reprinted at lALR,
p. 454, at p. 456.
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attaching properties unrelated to the relevant Iranian
entity, was that the Government of Iran, the contractual
obligee and those additional defendants were indeed the
same person and "alter ego" of each other, under the
principles of international law and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act^°. Relying on that theory, claimants
argued that the properties of one entity could be attached
and eventually executed upon to satisfy a judgment against
the contractual party.Iran contended that many of the
defendants were named by the plaintiffs, purposely and
knowingly, to enable the plaintiffs to obtain attachments
or injunctions encumbering Iranian properties in the
United States.^^ Iran's arguments against the alter ego
theory and its implications^^ as well as its immunity
pleas were, in one way or another, rejected in almost all
three hundred or more cases. Consequently, the Claimants
in the U.S. were soon able to attach, by pre-judgment
attachment or injunctions, all $2.5 billion funds and
assets of Bank Markazi before the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, which were assets, solely, for central banking
purposes^^ plus other properties, funds and interests
belonging to the government of Iran or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities, so that from over $10 billion of
Iranian assets, more than 4 billion of them were subject
to attachments, when the Algerian Declarations were
640
641
Re: infra. Chapter 8
U.S. Amicus Curiae Brief in American Int'l,
lALR, p. 456.
"Iran's Motion For An Order Transferring Related
Actions for Consolidated Or Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings", in re; The Iranian Cases, Before Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, lALR, p. 245.
As will be shown in Chapter 8.
Later a court recognized those funds as
sovereign funds re: Pfizer et al. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran et al.. District Court, (D.C. Columbia, Dec. 1980),
lALR. p.1968 at p. 1974.
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adhered to by Iran and the U.S. on 19 January 1981.'^®
A. Multidistrict Consolidation.
Large number of cases and enormity of the amounts
involved, in cases throughout the United States, made Iran
to move for the consolidation of 159 cases for pre-trial
determination of some questions of fact and law. Those
cases were pending in 15 districts before, at least, 63
separate district judges'^'. Most important of those
issues were "alter ego" and "immunity" issues. Iran asked
for the transfer of all those cases to the Southern
District of New York. Iran's request was rejected by the
judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on the ground
that proponents of the consolidation had not met their
burden of proving that all actions involved common
questions of fact.^^ However, that denial did not affect
the pre-trial determination of, inter alia, the immunity
of the Government of Iran and its entities in 96 cases,
before Judge K. Duffy of Southern District of New York.
Those cases had initially been filed in that District.^®
Later, a second request of the Iranian Government for the
transfer and consolidation of 178 cases were again
rejected by the judicial Panel.In both instances, the
United States Executive Branch filed amicus curiae briefs
supporting the consolidation for consistent legal standard
reason and foreign policy considerations^®®.
lALR, pp. 2133 and 2392.
Ibid, p. 454.
Order of 7 May 1980, denying the consolidation,
lALR p. 763.
See infra, Chapter 7, the discussion pertaining
to the waiver of immunity from pre-Judgment attachment.
Order denying consolidation, lALR p. 1199.
Ibid, pp. 457-8 and 1024.
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The Freeze orders and regulations had prohibited the
entry of judgments^^^ Moreover, Freeze Period is unique
for many features, including the large number of cases
against Iran,'^®^ the enormity of the assets encumbered and
most particularly for the fact that during that period
Iran virtually enjoyed no immunity, even for quite classic
examples of immunity such as nationalization and central
banking activities, and for the fact that almost every and
all categories of Iranian properties lost their immunity.
This was, because the U.S. claimants were vigorously
pushing the argument that Iran had forfeited its right to
sovereign immunity by its role in the continuation of the
Hostage Crisis'^" and the courts explicitly or tacitly
were accepting that argument.
At least two judgments were issued in this
Period, despite the clear prohibiting language of the
Freeze order. The first one was in American Int'l Group
Inc. et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran and Central
Insurance of Iran (American Int,l) (D. C. Columb. 10 July
1980), ILR 63 (1982), p.459, and the second one was in
Data Systems, op cit, fn. 631
Except for Behring (op cit, fn. 631) and Data
Systems (ibid) virtually all attachments were granted
during the Freeze Period. See Root, Anthony;"Settlement
of the Iranian Hostage Crisis: An Exercise of
Constitutional and Statutory Executive Prerogative in
Foreign Affairs", New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, vol. 13 (1981), No. 4, p.
993, at p. 1023.
"U.S. Amicus Curiae Memorandum in Support of
Iran's Motion for the Transfer and Consolidation of 159
Cases." lALR p. 458. The U.S. Government however, did
not endorse this view. On the contrary the history of
numerous interventions by the Executive Branch in the
Iranian cases clearly demonstrates that the U.S.
Government supported the immunity of Iran for many reasons
including foreign policy considerations re: the discussion
under the Position of the Parties on the Waiver Provision
of the Treaty of Amity, infra. Chapter 6.
Like the Duffy's ruling in New England Merchants
Bank, op cit, fn. 629
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V. THE POST-DECLARATIONS OR THE POST-FREEZE PERIOD:
The Freeze Period was ended on 19 January 1981, when
Iran and the United States adhered to the Algerian
Declarations by which the Hostage Crisis too came to an
end. Before that date, the Iranian Parliament, had listed
in its demands for the termination of the Hostage Crisis,
inter alia, the cancellation and termination by the United
States of all American claims, judgments and attachments
against Iran/^®
The United States was committed, according to
principle B of the General Declaration:
to terminate all legal proceedings in United
States courts involving claims of United States
persons and institutions against Iran and its
state enterprises, to nullify all attachments
and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all
further litigation based on such claims, and to
bring about the termination of such claims
through binding arbitration/®^
To implement the Algerian accords, the U.S. President
issued Executive Orders 12776 through 12285, pursuant to
which all restraints, rights and powers, such as
attachments, court orders and the like on Iranian
properties were revoked and nullified. Furthermore, all
persons subject to the U.S. jurisdiction were prohibited,
apparently for an indefinite period of time, from
acquiring, creating and exercising any new rights on those
"Report, on 25 Jan. 1981, of late Prime Minister
M.A. Rajaee to the Iranian Parliament on the Settlement of
the Hostage Crisis and the Algerian Declarations", The Law
Review of the Bureau For International Legal Services of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 2 (1985), p.249 et seq;
New York Times, Sept. 13, 1980, at A6 col. 1.
656 "Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration)", 19
January 1981, 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. Grotius Publications,
Cambridge, 1983, p. 3.
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properties/®^ Challenges to the Algerian Declarations
surfaced two days after the Declarations were adhered
to^®® and continued in some cases. The challenges were
finally settled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dames and
Moore V. Regan^^^ where the highest court held the
Algerian accords to be constitutional. The United States,
in implementing the termination obligation, suspended the
cases before the United States courts^^°.
Those cases were to be filed before Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, which was set up, for adjudicating, mainly the
claims filed against Iran during the Pre-Freeze and the
Freeze Periods. While the Tribunal was charged with the
duty, inter alia, of deciding the large number of U.S.
claimants' claims against Iran, in reality during the
Post-Freeze Period, Iran was still involved in some
litigations, albeit on a scale by no means comparable to
the Freeze Period, in the United States as follows:
A. Claims of Iran Against Others.
These claims consist of two categories. The first
concerns the claims of Iran against private individuals or
companies arid the second involves the claims of Iran
against the former Shah of Iran and his family. With
Due to strict language of the prohibition of
acquiring any new right on Iranian properties some writers
have suggested that the Executive Orders have permanently
immunized the Iranian properties. Se: Root, op cit, fn.
652, at p. 998.
Jafari et al. v. Islalmic Republic of Iran et al.
(ND.IL), lALR, p.4575.
Dames and Moore v. Reagan, the U.S. Supreme Court,
453 U.S. (1981) 654, lALR, p.3349.
Iran took issue with the suspension of claims
and filed a claim against the United States before the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal asserting that the United States
had violated, by not terminating the U.S. proceedings, the
explicit terms of Principle B of the General Declaration
[Case No. A15 (claim IV)], the Statement of Claim.
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regard to these claims no immunity issue has been raised
since Iran has been a claimant. However, an issue
contrasting with the problem of immunity, i.e. recognition
of Iran, has been dealt with in some cases which Iran
filed before the U.S. courts.
1. Recognition:
As a strong reason for restricting the absolute
immunity of States it has been suggested that States in
entering the market place should not expect to be treated
differently than a merchant is treated and that they
should be accountable for the claims against them. This
argtiment while in cases based on commercial activities of
States may help to strip them of their immunity as
respondents before foreign courts, it can not help them to
easily gain access to foreign courts when they are unhappy
with their commercial and contractual partners. Statehood
always raises and carries with itself especial problems.
In many jurisdictions the claimant State must be among
those States who are recognized by the forum State. The
problem of recognition was encountered at least by one
Iranian governmental entity, in the United States
courts.
The National Petrochemical Company of Iran (NPC) sued
the defendants, several shipping lines, contending that
during the Freeze Period it (NPC) chartered ships to
deliver to Iran, chemicals purchased by NPC through some
intermediaries, but that the defendants sold fraudulently
In at least one case, namely A. Varshowsaz case,
the Respondent filed a counterclaim against Iran whereby
Iran resorted to the Act of State Doctrine and the
counterclaim was dismissed. See infra. Chapter 9, fns.
1184-1192 and the accompanying text.
National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. The
M/T Stolt Sheaf, her Engines, Boilers etc., Posiden
Navigation, Inc., et al. District Court (S.D.N.Y...)
lALR. 15479.
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the cargo in Taiwan without accounting to NPC. The court
pointed to another action in which the issue of
recognition of Iranian Government had been raised.In
that case the State Department in reply to some questions
from one of the parties had written flatly that the United
States did not recognize the Islamic Government of
Iran.^ The court dealing with NPC'S claim dismissed
with prejudice, on the basis of that unrelated case, the
NPC's claim. NPC appealed and the United States
Government, for the first time, appeared in the
proceedings, filing an amicus curiae brief signed by the
Justice and the State Departments, urging the court that
NPC be granted access to the U.S. courts.
The appellate court (Second Circuit), disagreed with
the District Court and held that although the United
States had not formally recognized the Islamic Government
of Iran, the absence of formal recognition did not
necessarily result in a foreign government being refused
access to the United States courts.The Court first
noted that in order for a foreign State and the government
representing it take advantage of diversity jurisdiction
of the U.S. courts it must be recognized by the United
States.^ Then the court noted that unlike the
Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Center v. Marjan
Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, at 1280, n.4. (S.D.N.Y.
1987)
664 That position could hardly have been considered
in harmony with the United States previous position when
the State Department held, at the first days of the
establishment of the Islamic Government of Iran, that the
recognition by the U.S. of the Imperial Government of Iran
carried over, without the need to a fresh formal
declaration, to the newly established Islamic Government
of Iran. See N.Y. Times Feb. 13, 1979, Col. 1, at 1.
National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. The
M/T Slot et al. (31 Oct. 1988, 2d. Cir.), lALR, p.16543.
^ The court alluded to Pfizer, Inc. v. India 434
U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978), quoted by the court, ibid, at p.
16544.
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recognition of States which was required by international
law if certain conditions were met, the recognition of the
particular government in control of another State was not
mandatory. The Case of Banco National de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, appears to have influenced the court where it
relies, several times, on that judgment, quoting that:
A break in diplomatic relations with another
government does not automatically signify denial
of access to federal courts^''
The court rejected the defendants arguments that to allow
NPC's claim to proceed would result in arbitrary and
unpredictable pronouncements on the status of foreign
governments. The court went on to say that it was the
prerogative of the Executive Branch and particularly of
the President of the U.S. to determine which government
could have access to the United States courts and
continued to note that the Treaty of Amity remained in
full force. The court continued that:
here the Executive Branch — after entering into
treaties with Iran, after establishing a claims
tribunal to adjudicate disputes between the two
countries, and after complying with U.S.-Iran
agreements — expressly entered this case as
Amicus requesting that Iran be given access to
our courts.^
Under such circumstances, the court concluded that NPC
must be permitted to proceed with its suit in District
Court of N.Y. The case was reinstated and remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings.^'
lALR. 16545, citing Sabbatino 376 U.S. 408-412.
^ lALR. p. 16548.
In some countries, for instance in the
Netherlands, determination of statehood or the right of
access by a foreign State to the Dutch courts is made in
accordance with international law. Therefore, the stand
taken by the Executive of the forum State concerning the
recognition, de jure or de facto, of the defendant State
is not binding upon the courts. Dutch courts'
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Thus, the Court of Appeal dealt with the recognition
problem in a narrow sense for the determination of the
Iranian Entity's right of access to the U.S. courts and
recognized that right.
Later, the U.S. Supreme Court denied one of the
defendants' petition to review that ruling.
B. Claims of others Against Iran:
Despite rather broad jurisdiction of Iran-United
Stated Claims Tribunal, in dealing with the U.S. claimants
claims against Iran, since after the Algerian Declarations
there has been a host of different tortious, expropriation
or contractual claims against the Government of iran in
the United States.Almost all these post-freeze cases
involve immunity determinations, which as will be pointed
out in the coming chapters of this work, are sometimes at
contrast with previous immunity determinations and
sometimes have upheld, though with more arguments, the
Freeze Period holdings of the U.S. courts. The clear
difference of these cases with the Freeze Period ones is
independence in determining the sovereign status of
litigant States in State immunity cases is illustrated by
some decisions, for example:
Non recognition of the USSR on the part of the
Dutch Government did not affect the position of
the USSR as a State for the purposes of the
immunity rules;
Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 30 April, 1942 quoted by
Voskuil, op cit, fn. 58, at 253, for other cases see
ibid, pp.253-254.
lALR. 20086.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited in
many respects. For instance the claims arisen after 19
January 1981, or the claims which indirectly belong to
non-U.S. nationals etc., are outside the Tribunal's
jurisdiction. Further, some cases dismissed by the
Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction were revived in the
United States courts on the basis of the U.S.
interpretation of the Algerian Declarations.
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that the courts, even when they reject Iran's immunity
plea, do so by more reasoning and argumentation.
See for example the alter ego discussion in the
case of Foremost McKesson, infra, Chapter 8.
CHAPTER FIVE
IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION
I. FSIA AS THE JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
As was pointed out earlier, FSIA is the statutory
basis
To define the jurisdiction of United States
courts in suits against foreign States, the
circumstances in which foreign States are immune
from suit and in which execution may not be
levied on their property, and for other
purposes.
Indeed different Judgments of the U.S. courts have
made it plain that FSIA is the sole jurisdictional
predicate for suits against foreign States.FSIA is
founded on the principle enunciated in sec.1604 that a
foreign State is "immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States" unless the foreign State's
conduct falls within one of the FSIA's exceptions
Those exceptions, which are enumerated at sections 1605-
1607 of the Act,^^^ are based mainly on the notion of
FSIA, The preamble.
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., Sup. Ct. 23 Jan. 1989, ILR 81 (1990), p. 658, 102
L. Ed. 2d 818 (1989) ; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, Sup. Ct. 23 May 1983, ILR 79 (1989), p. 548, 461
U.S. 480 (1983); Mac Arthur Area Citizens Assim v.
Republic of Peru, 899 F. 2d 918, 919 LD.C.Cir. 1987.
Mc Kesson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et.
al. Opinion of the Court of Appeals, District of Colombia
Circuit, 14 Apr. 1995, lALR. p. 23139 et. Seq., where the
court quotes from Argentine v. Amerada Hess Shipping^
ibid.
676 The exceptions enumerated in the Act include:
[c]ases involving the waiver of immunity, § 1605
(a)(1), commercial activities occurring in the
United States or causing a direct effect in this
country, § 1605 (a) (2), property expropriated in
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"commercial activity"^^. Thus in a simplistic view when
a claim against a foreign State is based upon or is
related to a commercial activity of that foreign State,
within the framework of sections (1605-1607), that State
would no longer be immune from the jurisdiction of the
United States courts, and it can be said that subject
matter jurisdiction exists for the United States courts.
However, as has been noticed by some commentators,^^®
FSIA merges the concepts of subject matter and personal
jurisdiction.^^' Literally, FSIA requires two inquiries
violation of international law, § 1605 (a) (3) ,
real estate, inherited, or gift property located
in the United States § 1605 (a)(4),
noncommercial torts occurring in the United
States, § 1605 (a)(5), and maritime liens, sec.
1605 (b).
Amerada Hess Shipping Ibid, ILR 81 (1990), at p.666.
According to sec. 1602 of FSIA:
Under international law states are not immune
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts in so
far as their commercial activity is concerned.
See also Mc Keel v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
Court of Appeals, 9th. Cir. 30 Dec. 1983, 722 F. 2d at
587, n. 6; ILR 81 (1990), p. 543 at p. 547 and New England
Merchants op cit, fn. 62 9, at p. 502.
Buchman, S., "The Question of Iran's Immunity:
Jurisdiction over a Foreign Sovereign", Brooklyn Journal
of Int'l law, vol. VII, No. 1. p. 41, at p. 47.
679
The substantive element of sovereign immunity
and the procedural element of personal
jurisdiction are closely related under the FSIA.
Chicago Bridge and Iran co. v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran,(D. C. , N. D. Illinois, 12 Nov. 1980), 63 ILR
(1984), p. 511, at p. 513. Indeed a look at sec. 1330 (a)
and (b) will show how interrelated the concepts of subject
matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction are:
$1330. Actions against foreign states
(a) The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction without regard to amount in
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for the establishment of personal jurisdiction: whether
under U.S.C 1330 (a) there exists subject matter
jurisdiction and whether service of process has been
effected upon the foreign State under U.S.C. 1608.^°
controversy of any nonjury civil action against
a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of
this title as to any claim for relief in
personam with respect to which the foreign state
is not entitled to immunity either under
sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any
applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state
shall exist as to every claim for relief over
which the district courts have jurisdiction
under sub-section (a) where service has been
made under section 1608 of this title.
^ This interrelation appears to have no effect on
the fact that these two notions are distinct from each
other. For instance in Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), the Supreme Court of the
United States distinguished subject matter jurisdiction
from personal jurisdiction as follows:
Subject matter jurisdiction, then, is an ART III
as well as a statutory requirement; it functions
as a restriction on federal power, and
contributes to the characterization of the
federal sovereign. Certain legal consequences
directly follow from this. For example, no
action of the parties can confer subject-matter
jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the
consent of the parties is irrelevant.
California v. LaRue, 409 US 109, 34 L.Ed 2d 342,
93 S. Ct. 390 (1972), principles of estoppel do
not apply, American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,
341 US 6, 17-18, 95 L.Ed 702, 71 S.Ct. 534
(1951) , and a party does not waive the
requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction
early in the proceedings. Similarly, a court,
including an appellate court, will raise lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion.
••[T]he rule, springing from the nature and
limits of the judicial power of the United
States is inflexible and without exception,
which requires this court, of its own motion, to
deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of
its appellate power, that of all other courts of
the United States, in all cases where such
jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in
the record." Mansfield^ C. & L. M.R. Co. v.
Swan, iii US 379, 382, 28 L.Ed. 462, 4 S.Ct. 510
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II. The NOTION OP CONSENT TO JURISDICTION OR WAIVER OP
IMMUNITY
Under international law, the obligation on the part
of the forum State to refrain from exercising jurisdiction
over another State is not an absolute obligation and will
disappear if the foreign State consents to the exercise of
jurisdiction.^^ The absence of consent is an essential
element of State immunity and appears to be presumed
rather than asserted in every case against a foreign
State, unless there is proof or evidence to show the
foreign State's willingness or consent to submit to the
jurisdiction.There are several recognizable methods of
signifying or expressing consent, for instance by giving
it in writing in a treaty or a particular contract in
advance of the proceedings or on an ad hoc basis when the
dispute has arisen, or by voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, which itself can take place in
different ways,^ most notably by renunciation or waiver
of immunity.^
(1884). Id., at 702.
Thereafter, the court demonstrated that "none of this
is true with respect to personal jurisdiction," Id. at
702, and concluded that as a matter of individual liberty,
personal jurisdiction, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction,
can be waived if not timely raised in the answer or a
responsive pleading. Id., at 703-704., and that it must
"affirmatively appear in the record." Id.
Sucharitkul, Third Rep. op cit, fn. 20, at
p.141; ILC. Rep. to G.A., 34th Session, ILC.YB. (1982) II-
2, p.107, para.3
Sucharitkul, id.
^ For instance by a foreign State's instituting of
proceedings before the court or by appearing before the
court of its own volition, see sucharitkul, ibid, pp.141-
150.
^ Consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a
foreign court can not confer competence to that court,
where there exists none. As was pointed out earlier, see
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In the United States, the notion of consent and,
inter alia, waiver of immunity are dealt with elaborately
both in the FSIA and the case-law. The U.S. courts'
personal jurisdiction over foreign States is subject also,
to "existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party...Therefore if there is a waiver
of immunity by a foreign State in a treaty or elsewhere,
the U.S. courts will examine the waiver issue.^ Also
sec. 1605(a)(1) of FSIA provides that the foreign State
shall lose its immunity in any case
in which the foreign State has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
which the foreign State may purport to effect
except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver.
In a number of Iranian cases,^^plaintiffs resorted to
this provision and argued that Iran had waived its
Chapter one, the discussion pertaining to "competence",
the international competence of a court is determined in
accordance with the private international law rules of the
forum State. Consent can remove the hurdle of immunity
which protects a foreign State from the jurisdiction of an
otherwise competent court. See Sucharitkul, 4th Rep., op
cit, fn. 84, at pp.204-205. However, the notion of consent
comes into play in more than one way. In so far as it
concerns the forum State it can, as a principle of
international law, get a facet which goes to the very
heart of the doctrine of immunity and provides an
explanation and legal justification for it, by referring
to the forum State's willingness not to exercise its
jurisdiction within its own territory which "is
necessarily exclusive and absolute" {Schooner Exchange
case, op cit, fn.95; Brownlie, "Contemporary Problems
Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of States",
Preliminary Report, AIDI, the 62, I, 1987, p.13, at p,93;
see also Chapter 1, discussion pertaining to the "Legal
Basis of Immunities".
U.S.C. 1604.
^ See, Behring International, op cit, fn. 631, at
p. 267; Chicago Bridge, op. cit. fn.679, at p. 514.
Some of these cases were nationalization cases
such as American Int'l, Pfizer and Ebrahimi.
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immunity pursuant to Article XI, para. 4 of the Treaty of
Amity, between the United States and Iran,^ which reads
as follows:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party,
including corporations, associations, and
government agencies and instrumentalities, which
is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it
engages in commercial, industrial, shipping or
other business activities within the territories
of the other High Contracting Party, claim or
enjoy, either for itself or for its property,
immunity therein from taxation, suit execution
of judgment or other liability to which
privately owned and controlled enterprises are
subject therein.
A. Positions of Iran and the United States on the Waiver
Provision the Treaty of Amity:
Iran and the United States, though in opposite sides
of the crisis, happened to have almost the same position
as to the meaning of Article XI, para. 4 of the Treaty of
Amity. Iran always maintained that neither it nor its
non-business enterprises had waived their immunity from
jurisdiction^' or execution. In other words, only
business enterprises engaged in business for gain, within
the territory of the United States, were to be excluded
from immunity under the Treaty^'®.
The United States which was, for foreign relations
concerns, unhappy with the broad interpretation of the
waiver clause, shared Iran's views. Thus, in an amicus
^ Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights between the United States and Iran, Aug. 15, 1955,
U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, hereinafter called The
Treaty of Amity.
See for instance, Iranian Attachments Cases,
U.S. District Court, S.D.N.Y., "The Memorandum of the
Government of Iran in Opposition to Confirmation of
Attachments", lALR, p. 708, at pp. 717 et. seq.
690 Ibid, at p. 725.
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brief^'^ the U.S. spelled in detail, its position with
regard to the applicability of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to the Iranian litigations. The waiver
provision of the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the U.S.
was discussed elaborately. According to the U.S. the two
nations waived sovereign immunity in that Treaty only for
the actions against publicly owned or controlled
commercial enterprises of the two contracting States and
their properties, and not for the actions against the
contracting States themselves, or their non-commercial
instrumentalities and agencies or their property.
The brief was accompanied by several exhibits and
historical documents all of which emphasizing that the
waiver provision in all FCN treaties were almost identical
and it related solely to business enterprises and their
properties. In order for the waiver provision to apply
firstly there must be an entity that can properly be
described as an enterprize which is publicly owned or
controlled by Iran, secondly that entity must be one that
engages in business activities. That wording, according
to the U.S. was:
[c]alculated to exclude from the provision the
State as such and the component elements of the
government in its "sovereign capacity.
691 "Brief for the United States as Amicus Curias"
, October 1979, filed in; Electronic Data Systems
Corporation Iran v. The Social Security Organization of
Iran, (hereinafter called Data Systems), Court of Appeals
(Second Circuit), lALR, p. 317.
"Letter of August 13, 1957 from Legal Adviser,
U.S. Department of State to Department of Justice", lALR
p. 333;
A spokesman at the Department of Justice says
that immunity provisions in its Treaty of Amity
with Iran are nearly identical to those
contained in 11 treaties now in force. In
addition to Iran those treaties apply to
Nicaragua, Korea, The Netherlands, Italy, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Denmark,
Greece, Israel, and Ireland. lALR p. 214.
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The U.S. further stated that:
The Treaty waiver provision does not correspond
to the entire restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.
Since in its view, the historical documents
pertaining to several FCN Treaties, which were annexed to
the U.S. brief might, if taken out of context, be
interpreted as equating the waiver provision of the Treaty
with the doctrine of restrictive immunity, the United
States noted that Foreign Service Despatch No. 2181 from
the High Commissioner for Germany, dated 9 Feb. 1954,^'^
made it clear that the United States had for some time,
been breaking away from the doctrine of absolute immunity
and that the waiver clause was an effort to reflect the
then practice of the United States which was believed to
be in harmony with the majority international practice in
that connection.''® However, the U.S. warned that
references to those historical documents, when viewed in
the light of all relevant interpretive material, and
examined with regard to the actual context and purpose of
the treaties in which the waiver clause appeared, it would
be clear that the waiver clause:
was not intended to incorporate the entire Jure
imperil/Jure gestionis distinction of the
restrictive theory, but only the restrictive
theory's treatment of state-owned commercial or
business enterprises^'^.
In other words, in the U.S. view Iran and the U.S.
did not waive, by the said provision, their immunity for
U.S. Amicus Brief, op, cit., fn.691, at p. 329.
Exh. E to the Amicus Brief, ibid, at p. 3 39.
U.S. made reference also to the Department of
State Instruction to the American Embassy at the Hague, 4
August 1953, Appendix C to its Brief, reproduced in lALR,
p. 339.
696 Ibid, at p. 329.
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all their private or commercial acts or their properties.
They waived it for the acts and properties of their
business enterprises. The U.S. went on to give an example
that:
the waiver would apply to a purchase of goods
by a State-owned tourist hotel, but not by the
army6'^
This limited application of the waiver clause was in
numerous instances affirmed by the United States. For
instance, in a letter^'® the U.S. was of the view that
purchase of supplies by the Government of Iran or its
departments for the fulfillment of their public functions
was not commercial activity covered by the Treaty of Amity
waiver provision.
The Government of Iran, while sharing the U.S. view,
reiterated in its pleading that the purpose of the Treaty
waiver provision was to retain absolute immunity for the
contracting States, while restricting the immunity of
State "enterprises" when they were competing with private
commercial entities. Thus, in Iran's view the parties
envisaged that in no event would they be subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the other High Contracting
Party.
697 Ibid, at p. 330.
^9® The U.S. State Department letter of July 24,
1979 to the County Counsel of the County of Santa Clara,
reproduced in lALR, p. 335.
American Int'l., op cit, fn. 651, "Iran's
Memorandum of points and Authorities in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in
Response to Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum", reprinted in
lALR, P. 1124, at p. 1133.
247
B. The U.S. Courts' Interpretations of the Waiver
Provision in Matters of Immunity From Jurisdiction:
1. District Court cases That Found a Waiver
a) American Int'l
However, some courts did not agree with these
interpretations of the waiver clause. In American
which was the leading nationalization case of
the Freeze Period, the Government of Iran and the Central
Insurance of Iran (CII) were sued for the expropriation of
claimants' minority shares in some Iranian insurance
companies, nationalized in 1979. The District Court
deiced on Dec. 19, 1979, that Iran had waived its immunity
pursuant to the Treaty of Amity. Later, the same District
Court dealt with the waiver issue, again in a cursory
manner, and rejected Iran's arguments by holding that the
action was not barred by sovereign immunity because the
case concerned a commercial activity in respect of which
Iran had waived its immunity by the waiver clause of the
Treaty of Amity. The court alluded to the State
Department's interpretation of the waiver provision in the
case of Data Systems. The American Int'l court held that
even if that interpretation was accepted, CII would still
be subject to the waiver provision because it was a
commercial entity. Since Iran was inseparable from CII
and of which CII was the alter ego with regard to the
matters of the case, Iran too would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court.
b) Behring
The next case dealing with the waiver provision was
Behring International Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air
American Int'l, op cit, fn. 651, p.453.
Ibid, at p. 457.
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Force^'^^ in which the court first held that since Iranian
Air Force was engaged in using its cargo planes to ship
goods purchased, in the U.S., to Iran it was engaged in
commercial activity carried on in the United States^®.
Then the court dealt with the waiver provision of the
Treaty and said that, since the Air Force was engaged in
commercial activity in the United States, that provision
prevented it from claiming immunity from the Court's
jurisdiction.^"^
c) Data. Systems
In Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Social Security
Organization of the Government of Iran et. alJ^^ apart
from the Government of Iran a number of Iranian
governmental organizations were sued for the alleged
breach of a contract for data processing services entered
into by the plaintiff and one of the defendants, namely
Social Security organization of Iran (S.S.O.): The court
in dealing with the waiver issue first held that two of
the defendants, SSO and the Ministry of Health and Welfare
of Iran were involved in commercial activities in the
United States since the plaintiff's obligation was
partially performed in the United States^°^. The court
therefore, ruled that these two defendants had waived
their immunity from jurisdiction.
As to the Government of Iran, Data Systems^ court
Behring, op cit, fn. 631.
Id. at p.267.
Id. at p. 267.
Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Social Security
Organization of the Government of Iran et. al.,
hereinafter referred to as Data Systems, "Memorandum
Opinion of the District Court for the Nth. Dist. of
Texas", 21 June 1979, lALR. p. 344.
706 Ibid, at p. 346.
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noted that Iran's activities were confined to its own
soil, nevertheless the court saw no difficulty in
attributing the acts of those two defendants to the
Government of Iran and to find an implicit waiver with
respect to the latter. Thus the alter ego theory
extended the waiver to the Government of Iran and its
immunity from jurisdiction was set aside.
It was this opinion which prompted the United States
Government to file an amicus curiae brief with the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, having seen the strong
and elaborate argumentation of the United States
Government, remanded the case to the District Court for
three main purposes:
1: Iran's right of access to the U.S. courts be studied
in light of the rapidly changing relationship between
the two countries.
2; the effect of the Freeze Order on the necessity of
the attachments.
3; the re-examination of the waiver clause in light of
the newly submitted documents by the State
Department.
2. District Court Cases That Did Not Find a Waiver
The broad interpretation of the waiver clause was not
followed in all Iranian cases. There were a few opinions
rendered by district courts in which the position of Iran
and the United States were upheld.
Ibid, at p. 347.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
order of 28 Nov. 1979, lALR. p. 87.
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a) Mashayekhi— Case:
Mr. Mashayekhi, an Iranian citizen and the former
head of the Washington D.C. office of Iran National Radio
and Television Organization, sued the said Organization
and the Government of Iran for the alleged non-payment of
his salary and benefits due to him while serving the
Organization before the Revolution. The District Court of
Columbia in its memorandum of 10 June 1981 held that the
plaintiff could not invoke the FSIA, to recover the money
allegedly due him, because the governmental not-for-profit
nature of the activities of Iran and its instrumentality
fell within the ambit of the activities for which Iran and
its instrumentalities retained immunity under the Treaty
of Amity which survived the FSIA.
b) Chicago Bridge^^'^ Case:
In this case, the plaintiff, a U.S. company, sued
Iran and a number of its agencies and some private
defendants for alleged breach of contracts, conversion and
expropriation of funds. The plaintiff sought to attach
properties, located in the U.S., which belonged to the
Government of Iran and some of the defendants. However,
the court decided that the question of jurisdiction over
defendants be discussed first. The plaintiff submitted
that jurisdiction existed on four grounds: (1) by nature
of the waiver provision of the Treaty of Amity, (2) by
nature of arbitration clauses in some of the contracts
which, in the plaintiff's view, were tantamount to the
jurisdiction of the United States courts, (3) by virtue of
the defendants presence in the United States doing
business there (4) by virtue of the contacts between the
Mashayekhi et. al. v. Iran et. al. (Dist. ct.,
D.C. 1981) 515 F. Supp. 41; lALR, p. 3187.
Chicago Bridge, op cit, fn. 679.
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transaction underlying the claim and the United States^"".
The court held that jurisdiction did not exist on the
basis of the first three grounds and ordered a discovery
proceeding with a view to seeing if jurisdiction could be
based on the fourth ground. The first issue, tackled by
the court, was the Treaty of Amity and its waiver
provision. The court, having seen the amicus curiae brief
of the U.S. and its related documents filed in the case of
Data Systems, first expressed its substantial doubts as to
whether the waiver clause covered the acts of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and its agencies within the Iranian
borders^^^ and went on to say that:^^^
Judicial opinions and comments of American
treaty draftsmen interpreting identical waiver
clauses in thirteen other Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation Treaties have concluded that
these clauses were designed to put American
companies in an equal competitive position with
foreign State-owned enterprises expanding their
operation into the United States-not to
transform U.S. courts into international courts
of claims for extra-territorial suits against
these foreign enterprises.
Second, the court pointed to the different
interpretations of the U.S. courts on the same waiver
provision in cases of prejudgment attachment, like
Behring, American Int^l, and certain other cases where in
some of them the courts had found that no waiver of
immunity from prejudgment attachment existed. The court
held that the waiver provision did not necessarily confer
personal jurisdiction because when the Treaty was signed
the law required that the plaintiff should base its claim
upon an independent ground for personal jurisdiction,
irrespective of any waiver of sovereign immunity. The
Id. at p. 511.
Id. at p. 515.
Id.
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court held that according to Kingdom of Greece case, the
defense of sovereign immunity could be raised only after
jurisdiction was acquired^^^. Therefore, in the court's
eyes, the mere silence of the parties in the waiver
provision could not be taken as an indication for their
consent to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of
other contracting party.
Since the Treaty of Amity did not confer personal
jurisdiction, the FSIA, section 1605(a)(2), would control
for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. The court made
it clear that under section 1605(a)(2) the minimum
contacts requirements of the landmark case of
International Shoe^'^^ and its other descendants must be
satisfied and that the fiction of implied consent, even if
given by the Treaty, would not obviate the need for
establishing minimum contacts with the forum. The
court, looking into the question of waiver in the context
of minimum contacts with a forum, and quoting some
passages from Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977),
where the requirement of minimum contacts had been
emphasized^^^, held that that judgement's reasoning had
placed in doubt the constitutionality of all ^consent to
jurisdiction' provisions especially those which were
implicit. The court went on to say that;
The implied consent to jurisdiction concept as
applied to the United States-Iranian Treaty of
Amity waiver clause is no less a fiction. It is
surely a leap in logic to suggest that because
Iran signed a friendship treaty with the United
States some 25 years ago waiving sovereign
immunity for certain limited acts that it
impliedly consented to personal jurisdiction
714 Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, ILR
vol. 42, p. 173, quoted by Chicago Bridge, Id, at p. 516.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945).
Chicago Bridge, op cit, fn.679, at p. 517.
Id. at pp. 517-518.
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over any future claim brought in the United
States irrespective of any contacts in or even
with that forum. We are not the first court to
question the use of waiver as a substitute for
due process fairness in the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.
The Chicago Bridge court relied on some other cases
which recognized the requirements of minimum contacts with
the forum, and noted that the primary purpose of FSIA was
to place foreign States on the same footing as commercial
enterprises when the former were engaged in commercial
activities. The court stated that eliminating the
requirement of minimum contacts between the foreign State
and the forum would put the foreign States in a far worse
position than the private parties. Therefore, the court
concluded that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction
over defendants on the basis of the waiver provision of
the Treaty.
c) Hostages' Claims
In an opinion deciding two actions brought against
Iran by some former U.S. Embassy personal detained in
Iran, the District Court of Columbia dismissed the actions
against Iran.^^° The court first examined its
jurisdiction. In so doing it observed that it could not
read sec 1605 (a) (5) standing alone and it had to take
into account the Treaty of Amity. The court went an to say
that:
That Treaty, entered into long before these
difficulties, was never abrogated, it has never
been canceled. It remains in effect. If the
Id. at p. 518.
Id. at p. 519.
720 Westly Williams et. al. v. State of Iran et.
al.; Steven M. Lauterbach et. al. v. State of Iran et,
al., District Court (D.C. June 11. 1981), lALR., p. 3185.
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grant under the Treaty is broader than the grant
of immunity under the foreign sovereign
Immunities Act, the broader grant of immunity to
Iran must prevail as a matter of law.^^^
Then the court held, inter alia, that the waiver
clause clearly referred only to commercial or business
enterprises, and there was no section of the Treaty that
the court could find that would appear to waive immunity
for tort actions.
d) Jafari Case:
In this case,^^^ three Iranians and Mr. Kianoosh
Jafari, a former Iranian who had acquired U.S.
nationality, filed an action against the Government of
Iran for the alleged wrongful expropriation of their
properties in Iran. They relied, for purposes of
jurisdiction, inter alia, on the waiver provision of the
Treaty of Amity. The court ruled that the waiver covered
only the enterprises and not the governments of Iran or
the United States^^^. The court further held that even if
the waiver did apply to the Government of Iran, which did
not, the Algerian Declarations would bar the U.S. courts
from hearing the claim of Kianoosh, because he had already
721 Ibid, at p.3186.
The court further held that sec. 1605 (a) (5) did
not apply, because the acts of hostage taking complained
of by the plaintiff had occurred within the Embassy of the
United States in Tehran, which could not be considered as
a part of the United States territory. Further the court
held that the U.S. President had the authority to waive a
U.S. national's claim and it had done so pursuant to the
Algerian Declarations. Ibid, at p. 3186.
Jafari et. al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S.
District Court (N.D. Illinois, 23 April 1982), ILR 72
(1987) p. 125.
Ibid, at p. 127.
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filed his claim before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
Although according to Dames and Moore— the court could
suspend proceedings rather than to dismiss it, the court
dismissed the claim because in applying the FSIA it found
that it did not have jurisdiction to here the case.
3. The Appellate Courts' Decisions
The review of the district courts decisions shows
that their practice on the waiver clause was divergent,
inconsistent and obscure. Iran had filed many appeals
against those decisions. However, the Algerian
Declarations mooted those cases before the Court of
Appeals. Thus during and immediately after the 1979-1981
crisis, there remained almost no opportunity for the
appellate courts to harmonize the inconsistent and
conflicting practice of the lower courts. The Algerian
Accords, however, did not moot for ever the consideration
by the United States courts, of the waiver of immunity
from jurisdiction issue. During the past 16 years or so
there were a few decisions issued by different Circuits.
a) Harris Case:
This case was the only appellate judgment issued in
1982^^^ dealing with the waiver issue = It tackled the
waiver issue halfheartedly and did not put a clear cut
precedent on that problem. The Government of Iran was not
a defendant in that case, so the appellate court had no
reason to pronounce itself upon the question whether the
waiver clause encompassed the Government of Iran as well.
Harris Judgment, however, is in contrast with the holdings
of Chicago Bridge. In Harris, Bank Melli, took the
725 Op. cit.f fn.659.
Harris Corp. v. National Radio and Television
and Bank Melli, U.S. Court of Appeals, ( 11 th. Cir., 22
Nov. 1982), ILR 72 (1987), p. 172.
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reasoning of Chicago and contended that the scope of the
waiver clause was restrictive and that:
it must be read as a territorial transactional
waiver which requires a nexus between the United
States and the particular commercial activity
sued upon^^^.
The appellate court, unlike the Chicago Bridge court,
disagreed. The Court of Appeals did not look into the
waiver provision in the context of minimum contacts
requirement. In the court's view that requirement was
embodied in the constitutional constraints on personal
jurisdiction^^®. The Harris appellate court affirmed the
lower court's decision, inter alia, its holding on the
waiver provision, by saying that the waiver clause was not
to be read as a territorial, transactional one which
required a nexus between the commercial activity sued upon
and the United States, rather it was a "doing business"
type of test.^^' The court went on to say that the FSIA
did not purport to limit the extent of waiver of sovereign
immunity through the effect of a Treaty^". Though the
court disagreed with Melli's reading of the waiver clause,
nevertheless it came along, to some extent, with Melli's
position and held that commercial, industrial, shipping or
other activities, within the United States, of the
enterprise subject to the jurisdiction of the court
constituted a "doing business" type of test and the
therefore, waiver extended, only to such enterprises.
Id. at p. 178.
Id. at p. 179.
Jd. at p. 178.
Id.
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b) Berkovitz
1
In this case,^^ an action for damages was brought
against the Government of Iran, by the family of Mr.
Berkovitz, a U.S. national who had, allegedly, been killed
by Kavir, a revolutionary group, while Mr. Berkovitz was
working in Iran for a U.S. company. The court did not
agree with the heirs argument that the Treaty of Amity
contained an express waiver clause because waiver required
"convincing evidence". In the court's view, the limited
waiver of the Treaty extended only to enterprises of Iran
and not Iran itselfFurthermore, the court referring
to Harris, held that that limited waiver extended only to
enterprises doing business in the United States^^.
Consequently, the court ruled that the waiver clause did
not cover the alleged tortious acts by the Government of
Iran and Iran continued to enjoy immunity in that regard.
c) Forsmost McKesson
The most recent opinion in this regard was rendered
in the case of Foremost McKesson,^ filed against the
Government of Iran and a number of its instrumentalities
for their alleged expropriatory acts with regard to the
plaintiffs' interest in Iran. The court held that the
Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran and others
United States Court of Appeals, (9 th. Cir., 1 May 1984),
ILR 81 (1990), p. 552, Cert, denied, 105 S.ct. 510 (1984).
Id, at p. 556.
Id.
^ Foremost McKesson et al. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Opinion of Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, June 15, 1990, lALR, p. 19093, at pp.
19105 et seq.
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waiver clause must be construed narrowly and restrictly^^
and held that the waiver clause of the Treaty would apply
to business enterprises doing business in the U.S. and not
to the Government of Iran.
III. THE CRITERION OP COMMERCIl^ ACTIVITY
Under sec. 1604^^ of FSIA a foreign State shall
enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States unless one of several exceptions, defined
in the Act, applies."^® Thus the immunity of a foreign
State seems to be the principle and its non-immunity an
exception. "The most significant of the FSIA exceptions"
is the commercial activity exception.^' The notion of
In a footnote, the court stated that it was only
deciding the effect of the waiver at the case at hand and
was not determining in what context the Treaty of Amity
might constitute a waiver of immunity. Ibid, at p.19106.
736 Ibid, at p.19106.
Sec. 1604, Under the title Immunity of a foreign
State from jurisdiction provides;
Subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party at the time
of enactment of this Act a foreign State shall
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the Untied States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter.
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover Inc. 12 june,
1992, 112 S.Ct. 2160 (1992), American International Law
Cases, Third Series, 1992, Oceana Publications, p.385, at
p.389.
Weltover, Ibid, at 389. ILC's Second Draft (op
cit, fn. 27), art. 2.1.(c)) and several national
legislation use the term" commercial transaction". See,
fore example, the United Kingdom State Immunity Act of
1978 (sec. 3 (3)); the Singapore State Immunity Act of
1979 (sec. 5 (3)) (1979); the Pakistan State Immunity
Ordinance of 1981 (sec. 5 (3)); the South Africa Foreign
State Immunities Act of 1981 (sec. 4 (3)) and the
Australia Foreign States Immunities Act No.196 of 1985
(sec. 11 (3)).
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commercial activity while the basic pillar upon which the
FSIA is founded, lacks any adequate definition.^^° Sec.
1603 (d) of the FSIA, states that:
A ^commercial activity' means either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular
transaction or act....
This circular definition provides little help for the
courts to define an activity as commercial. The
legislative history of the FSIA reveals that the ambiguity
was intentional in order that the courts have:
[a] great deal of latitude in determining what
is a ^Commercial activity' for purposes of [the
FSIA]. It has seemed unwise to attempt an
excessively precise definition of this term.
Some commentators have pointed out the
inadequacy of FSIA'S definition of the commercial
activity. For instance, a commentator criticized and
called it a "wholly circular definition" while commenting
on the bill which later became the FSIA. See: Lowenfeld,
Andreas: "Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim", The
Haiti Case, N.Y.U.L. Rev. Vol.49 (1974), p.377, at p.435
and 244.
The circular and tautological use of the term
commercial in the defintion of commercial transaction can
also be found in the ILC Second Draft where it provides in
Article 2.1:
(c) "commercial transaction: means:
any commercial contract or transaction for
the sale of goods or supply of services;
(ii) any contract for a loan or other
transaction of a financial mature, including any
obligation of guarantee or of indemnity in
respect of any such loan or transaction;
(iii) any other contract or transaction of
commercial, industrial, trading or professional
nature, but not including a contract of
employment of persons.
ILC Second Draft, op cit, fn. 27, at p.14. Apparently the
commission has not endorsed the view of one of its members
that profit making is the most important criterion to
determine whether a transaction is commercial. Ibid, at
p.19.
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even if that were practical^^^
A. Classification of Activities and Its Test
However, since the FSIA, and its commercial exception
in particular, codifies the doctrine of restrictive
immunity, the meaning of "commercial", is the meaning
generally attached to that term under the restrictive
theory at the time the FSIA was enacted. Sec. 1603 (d)
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1976) at 16. The 1982 State Immunity Act of Canada in its
sec.2 gives a definition to the commercial activity which
parallels the definition of the FSIA, by providing that
commercial activity is "any particular transaction, act or
conduct that by reason of its nature is of a commercial
character". The Canadian Act, like the FSIA, adopts also
the nature rather than the purpose test. To follow the
FSIA, the Canadian Act has relinquished to the courts the
task of defining the meaning and the scope of the
commercial activity. See Molot H.L & Jewett M.L., "The
State Immunity Act of Canada", The Canadian Yearbook of
Int'l.L^ vol.XX (1982), p.79, at pp.96 et seq. But see the
ILC Second Draft where it adopts a two-pronged approach
which takes into account not only the nature but, in some
instances, also the purpose of the transaction. Article
2.2 provides:
2. In determining whether a contract or
transaction is a "commercial transaction" under
paragraph 1 (c), reference should be made
primarily to the nature of the contract or
transaction, but its purpose should also be
taken into account if, in the practice of the
State which is a party to it, that purpose is
relevant to determining the non-commercial
character of the contract or transaction.
ILC Second Draft, op cit, fn.27, at p. 14. See Hess,
Burkhard: "The International Law Commission's Draft
Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Properties" European Journal oflnt'l.L., vol.4
(1993) No.1.p.269, at pp.272-274, where he appreciates the
two fold classification method of the Draft since if
looked at as a conflict of law rules, the primary focus on
the nature of the act test excludes the laws of the
defendant State in favour of lex fori, while the secondary
focus on the purpose of the act in accordance with the
laws of the defendant State, strikes a balance between two
conflicting sovereignties.
742 Weltover, op. cit., fn.738, at p.391.
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adds that:
the commercial character of an activity shall
be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
Indeed the State Department which was the drafter of
the FSIA, instead of giving a clear and helpful definition
of the term, left the matter to the U.S.- courts, to work
out progressively on a case by case basis, and using such
guidance as has already been developed in the huge body of
pre-existing case law on the distinction between
commercial and governmental activities.^^^ Sec. 1603 has,
apparently chosen the "nature of the act" test as opposed
to the "purpose of the act" one.
The leading pre-FSIA case in classification of the
activities as commercial and non-commercial was Victory
Transport/'"'' where claims against a foreign State arising
from a category of political or public acts were immune.
The court while recognizing the difficulty of finding a
workable distinction between acts jure imperil and acts
jure gestionis adopted Lalive's formula^^® for that
distinction. In the court's view public acts included
1) administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
2) Legislative acts such as nationalization;
3) Acts concerning the armed forces;
4) Acts concerning diplomatic activities; and
743 Testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep't.
State, in: "Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against
Foreign States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary." 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976)
(hereinafter cited as 1976 FSIA Hearings).
744 Op. cit., fn. 608
Lalive, Recueil Des Cours, op. cit, fn. 74, at pp.
285-286.
Victory Transport, Op. cit., fn. 608, at p.
116.
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5) Public loans
The "nature of the act" test has been thus far
indorsed by a large body of immunity case-law in the
United States. There seems to be no questions about the
applicability of that test. The problem is how,
restrictive or broad, the nature of an act can be
classified and whether in determining the nature of the
act, the context in which the act has taken place and
sometimes the purpose of the act or the circumstances
surrounding it have any role to play.^^® Depending on how
a given activity has been looked at, the United States
courts have classified that activity as commercial or
governmental. For example in Mol v. Bangladesh/'*'^
Bangladesh was sued for breach of a contract concerning
the export from that courtly of Rhesus monkeys. The court
by looking into the context in which the contract had been
signed, namely Bangladesh's assertion that it gave
licenses to export monkeys as its right to regulate its
natural resources, ruled that the contract was not simply
The court, in many places of its judgment and
specially at the end, refers to Lalive's formula. See
ibid.
See for instance: Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti
Press Agency, Tass et al. U.S. D.C. (S.D.N.Y 1978), ILR
63 (1982), p.127. The case involved a libel action against
Novosti, Tass and another organ of the former Soviet
Union. The court ruled that neither of three clauses of
commercial activity exception of sec. 1605 (a)(2) applied
since the defendants, by collaborating in the publication
of articles which allegedly defamed the plaintiff, were
engaged not in commercial activity, but in acts of intra-
governmental co-operation. Furthermore, the articles must
be considered as official commentary of the Soviet
Government, which was essentially governmental in nature.
Ibid, at pp.133-134. Thus, it appears that the court took
into account, the context in which the articles had been
published, and their purpose, i.e. serving policies of the
Soviet Union, in characterizing the activity as
governmental.
Mol Inc. V. the People's Republic of Bangladesh,
U.S. Court of Appeals, (9th. Cir. 1984) ILR 80 (1989),
p.583.
263
a contract for trade in monkeys, and consequently held
that Bangladesh was immune from suit.
Had the court isolated the core of the contract to
selling or exporting monkeys, an activity that a private
zoo owner too might be engaged in, it would have come to
a different result. The nature of the act test was
definitely upheld, by the United States Supreme Court. In
Weltover^'^ the court considered the Argentina's issuance
of bonds as commercial activity and said:
[w]hen a foreign government acts, not as
regulator of a market, but in the manner of a
private player within it, the foreign
sovereign's actions are "commercial" within the
meaning of the FSIA. Moreover, because the Act
provides that the commercial character of an act
is to be determined by reference to its "nature"
rather than its "purpose" 28 U.S.C. $ 16003(d),
the question is not whether the foreign
government is acting with a profit motive or
instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely
sovereign objectives. Rather the issue is
whether the particular actions that the foreign
State performs (whatever the motive behind them)
are the type of actions by which a private party
engages in.^^
Ibid, at p.585 see also International
Association of Machinists And Aerospace Workers v.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries et al.
(Dist. Ct. California, sept. 1979), ILR 63 (1982) p. 284,
where price fixing activities of Opec countries were
considered to be sovereign in nature; and De Sanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicaragua, (5th. Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d 1385
ILR 88 (1992), p.75, in which the Court of Appeals held
that:
often the essence of an act is defined by its
purpose
and that unless:
we can inquire into the purposes of such acts,
we can not determine their nature.
Ibid, at p.85.
Op. cit. fn. 738.
Ibid, at pp.392-393.
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Consequently the Supreme Court held that Argentina's
issuance of the bonds was a "commercial activity" under
the FSIA because those bonds were "in almost all respects
garden-variety debt instruments"^^ which the private
parties could hold, that they were negotiable in
international markets, etc.^^ The court, specifically
noting the Victory Transport formula on categorizing
public loans as governmental activities, ruled that since
FSIA had clearly opted for the nature of the act test, the
Victory Transport classification would no longer stand in
that respect^® and that public debts too, would fall into
the category of commercial activities.
Despite almost two decades of case-law making by the
U.S. courts, the difficulty of distinguishing between
commercial and governmental activities still remains and
a workable criterion which can be applied in all
circumstances is not available yet. Indeed courts and
commentators are still grappling with the problem for
finding a satisfactory solution.
B. Classification Of Iran's Activities
In 1979, when plaintiffs began to sue Iran in the
United States courts, the post-FSIA case-law provided
little help in defining the commercial activities.
paucity of post-FSIA cases on the subject coupled with the
"great deal of latitude"^^® which the courts have in
753 Ibid, at 393.
754 Ibid.
755 Ibid.
756 Crawford, op cit, fn. 150, at pp.91 et seq.
757 Buchman, op cit, fn. 678, at p. 58.
758 H.R. No. 94-1487, 94th. Cong., 2d Sess., 1
Code Cong.St AD.News, 6604, at 6615.
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determining what is commercial activity were two factors
that contributed to the way in which Iranian cases
developed.
The commercial activity notion, itself an exception
to the immunity of a foreign State, comes into play in
three different situations leading to loss of immunity.
Those exceptions are enumerated in section 1605 (a)(2)and
involve three different situations:
in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign State; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign State elsewhere; or upon
an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign State elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.
In most of Iranian cases, the commercial activity
exception was not dealt with in the context envisaged by
FSIA, rather it was alluded to in the context of the
examination of the waiver provision of the Treaty of
Amity. There, the question was whether Iran had waived its
immunity for commercial activities rather than focusing on
the activities themselves to determine if they were
commercial or governmental. Thus, the examination of the
activity was, actually, evaded.^' Nevertheless, there are
some cases in which the actions allegedly giving rise to
the complaint have been dealt with by the courts. It is
the purpose of this discussion to study those
determinations and to see how, the FSIA was applied in the
classification of an activity as commercial or
governmental. Those cases can be categorized as follows;
1) Cases involving purchase of services or military
equipment for armed forces.
2) Non-military Contractual Cases.
3) Nationalization Cases.
Buchman, op. cit., fn. 678, p. 41 et seq.
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4) Tortious Cases.
1. Military Equipment Cases:
a) The Case of Behring:
As for the first category mention has to be made of
Behring International^^^, in which the facts were these:
Behring a Texas corporation engaged in the business of
International commercial freight forwarding had entered,
prior to the 1979, into contracts with the Imperial
Iranian Air Force, to provide the latter with the freight
forwarding services. After the Revolution of 1979, the
claimant sought to recover payment for services allegedly
rendered under the contract. The court, while heavily
concentrating on the waiver clause, held in dicta that
freight forwarding of aircraft parts from the U.S. to Iran
constituted commercial activities. The court reasoned that
the Iranian Air Force was engaged in commercial activity
carried on in the United States. Because it was using its
cargo planes to ship equipment purchased in the U.S- to
Iran, and its contract with Behring obligated the later to
prepare the goods for shipment by the Air Force,and
because the Air Force had an office in the U.S., all of
which indicating that the Air force's activities had
substantial contacts with the U.S. and were commercial by
looking into their nature, rather than their purpose.
This case clearly indicates that the holdings of
some pre-FSIA cases such as Victory Transport^^^ and other
760
761
Op cit, fn. 631.
Ibid, at p. 267.
Op cit, fn. 608. See also Aerotrade, Inc., and
Aerotrade International Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, U.S.
(S.D.N.Y., 24 May 1974); 376 F. Supp. 1281 (1974); ILR 63
(1982), p. 41. Where the claim of two U.S. corporations,
based on contract to supply military equipment and
services in that connection to the armed forces of Haiti,
was dismissed. The court relying on the Victory precedent
held that in accordance with the restrictive theory.
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ones following it, which considered acts concerning the
armed forces as public acts are no longer valid. Behring^s
holding has also rejected the U.S. State Department's
position where it maintained that purchase of supplies by
the Government of Iran or its departments for the
fulfillment of their public functions was not commercial
activity covered by Treaty waiver provision.
b) The Case of Mc Doimel Douglas—
This case involved a claim based on an agreement
dated 1975, between the plaintiff and the Imperial Iranian
Air Force, for the sale of certain parts for damaged F-4
aircraft. The appellate court rejected Iran's immunity. It
ruled that purchase of spare parts for military aircraft
was a commercial activity and that the Victory analysis
had become obsolete by FSIA^*^^. The court referred to the
legislative history of the Act where it specifically
established that a transaction retained its commercial
nature even though the purchase of goods was for military
purposes.The court alluded to cases such as Behring
procuring military supplies came within the category of
public or political acts in respect of which the Republic
of Haiti was entitled to sovereign immunity. Even if, as
alleged by the plaintiffs, a part of equipment was put to
civilian use, this fact did not alter the nature of the
equipment so as to make it a commercial one. (id. at
pp.44-45).
U.S. State Department letter of July 24, 1979 to
the County Counsel of the County of Santa Clara reproduced
in lALR, p. 335.
MC Donnel Douglas corp. V. Islamic Republic of
Iran et al. Court of Appeals (8th Cir. 1985), lALR. P.
10327.
JJbld, at p. 1033 3.
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As the definition indicates, the fact that goods
or services to be procured through a contract
are to be used for a public purpose is
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International^ and Texas Trading —where the Second
Circuit had ruled that contract by a foreign State "for
the sale of army boots" constituted commercial activity.
Indeed it was in Texas Trading where the court
specifically had noted that that aspect of pre-FSIA cases
which considered a contract by a foreign State for a
public purpose, e.g. bullets for the army, to be a public
act had been overruled by FSIA and the definition of
commercial activity had been "concomitantly expanded to
include such contracts"^^. Mc Donnell Douglas court
accordingly rejected Iran's reliance on Victory Transport
and Aerotrade and gave support to the line taken by
Behring International.
2. Tortious Cases:
There were some tort cases filed against Iran in
which the plaintiffs attempted to characterize as
commercial Iran's actions allegedly giving rise to claims.
For instance in Berkovitz^ the Court of Appeals, while
affirming the District Court, held that assassination of
a U.S. national working in Iran, by a revolutionary group
Kavir, was a non-commercial act which did not fall within
irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial
nature of an activity or transaction that is
critical. Thus, a contract by a foreign
government to buy provisions or equipment for
its armed forces or to construct a government
building constitutes a commercial activity. The
same would be true of a contract to make repairs
on an embassy building. Such contracts should be
considered to be commercial contracts, even if
their ultimate object is to further a public
function.
H. R. op cit, fn. 758, at 6615.
^67 Texas Trading Milling V. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, (2<i Cir. 1981), ILR 63 (1982), P.552.
^68. Ibid.
Op cit, fn. 731 and the accompanying text.
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the commercial activity exception, namely the third clause
of 1605 (a)(2). Berkovitz's murder, no matter what its
purpose was, did not have the nature of commercial
activity. The court went on to say that even if
Berkovitz's employment with the Iranian company was a
commercial activity, by analogy the act of murder might
then become the act for the purposes of section 1605
(a)(2). However, since that commercial activity did not
have a substantial connection with the act of murder, and
it did not cause direct effect in the U.S. sec. 1605
(a)(2) was inapplicable.^"
In Cicippio^^ two American nationals, formerly held
hostage in Lebanon by some para-military groups, allegedly
with some sympathy with the Islamic Republic of Iran,
filed actions against Iran, accusing Iran of commercial
terrorism and thus not entitled to sovereign immunity. The
lower courts, the District Court and the Court of Appeals,
held that the acts attributed to the Government of Iran,
such as kidnapping, hostage taking and similar ventures,
were not the sort of enterprises within the ambit of the
commercial activity exception of the FSIA. The plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court of the U.S. That Court,
affirmed, on 10 Jan 1995, without comment, the rulings of
the lower courts.
3. Nationalization Cases.
a) The Freeze-Feriod
An interesting aspect of some of Iranian
nationalization cases is the U.S. courts' classification
of Iran's activities. The courts, by broad interpretation
770
. Ibid, at pp. 554-5.
Joseph J. Cicippio et al v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, U.S. Court of Appeals For the District of Columbia
Circuit, 29 July 1994.
^ lALR, p. 22830.
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of the third clause of FSIA's commercial activity
exception (sec.1605 (a)(2)), opened a new avenue for
asserting jurisdiction in cases which would otherwise be
classified as expropriation cases and outside the limited
scope of the FSIA'S expropriation exception (sec. 1605
(a)(3)). In American Int'l^ the court, while clearly
cognizant of the case as a nationalization case, held that
Iran's nationalization, without adequate and prompt
compensation, of the plaintiffs' shares in some Iranian
insurance companies, was a breach of the Treaty of Amity
and of international law. The court went on to say that
based on the third clause of sec 1605 (a) (2) Iran's
failure to provide compensation for plaintiffs which
resulted in an increase of the State insurance monopoly
from 25 or 50% to 100% was "an act outside the territory
of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign State (Iran and its Central
Insurance) elsewhere" that caused a direct effect in the
U.S.^^ In so doing the court gave a very broad
interpretation to that clause which had so far been
construed restrictively.
In Pfizer, the plaintiffs sued Iran seeking 14.4
million U.S. dollars as damages for nationalization of
their property in Pfizer Laboratories, an Iranian
pharmaceutical company.^ Iran, among other things,
American Int'l, op cit. fn. 651.
Id. p. 457. Crawford takes the example of American
Int'l in order to make his point that the terms "based
upon" or "preformed in connection with" might not get the
proper interpretation they require, and that "an
undifferentiated notion of commercial transaction" with
emphasis on the nature without regard to the purpose can
cause problems. See Crawford,Australian YBIL, op cit, fn.
33, at pp.83-84.
Pfizer et al v. Islamic Republic of Iran et
al,"Memorandum of the Dist. Court of Columbia", Dec. 1,
1980, lALR, p. 1968.
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relied on sec 1605 (a) (3)^^ and contended that is was
entitled to immunity since that section removed the
immunity of a foreign State only in cases of unlawful
expropriation where the expropriated property found its
way into the United States. However, the court found it
unnecessary to consider that section, because in its view
the immunity exception contained in sec. 1605 (a) (2) was
applicable.^ The court referred to the fact, undisputed
by Iran, that the action was based on the nationalization
and expropriation of Pfizer Laboratories and characterized
the nationalization as an "act outside the territory of
the United States". Then the court found that the
continued operation under Iranian control of Pfizer
Laboratories was "a commercial activity of the foreign
State elsewhere" and ruled that the act had a "direct
effect" in the United States^®, leading to the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court.^
b) Post-1981 or Post-Freeze Period
American Int'l and Pfizer were decided during the
Freeze Period. After the Freeze Period the case of
Foremost McKesson seems to have followed the same line.
The section removes the immunity of a foreign
State from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in cases;
in which rights in property taken in violation
of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such
property is present in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign State; or
that property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign State and that
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States.
Pfizer, op cit, fn. 775, at p. 1970.
Ibid, at p. 1971.
^ See infra. Chapter 6.
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(i) Foremost-Mckesson
The procedural history of the action is a complicated
one,^®° but the main facts are as follows. Foremost-
McKesson and a number of its subsidiaries alongside
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a wholly
owned corporation of the U.S. Government revived their
action in 1986 in the U.S. after the Iran U.S. Claims
Tribunal ruled that as of 19 January 1981, its
jurisdictional cutoff date, no expropriation of Foremost's
property had occurred in Iran. The plaintiffs sought $7
million in damages, alleging that Iran acting through
certain agencies and organizations conducted a series of
actions that culminated in the expropriation of Foremost's
minority interest in Sherkat Sahami Labaniat Pasteurize
Pak (Pak Dairy) one of the largest dairy companies in
Iran. Though the complaint alleged an expropriation by the
Government of Iran, Foremost relying on the third
exception of Sec. 1605 (a)(2) maintained that Iran was not
entitled to immunity.
The lower court agreed with Foremost and
characterized expropriation in Iran of Foremost equity
interest as the "act" and Iran's shareholding interest in
and management of Pak Dairy as the "commercial activity"
for the purposes of sec. 1605 (a) (2) . The court further
held that the nature of the actions complained of by
Foremost i.e. the non-election of its representatives in
the board of directors of the Pak Dairy and its inability
to expatriate its share dividends to the U.S, sounded in
the nature of a corporate dispute between majority and
minority shareholders and as such were sufficiently
commercial in nature as defined by the FSIA. Since in the
court's view, Iran's act of expropriation was in
connection with those commercial activities and the act
had a direct effect in the U.S., sec. 1605 (a)(2) did
780
. Foremost McKesson, op cit, fn. 734, at p. 19094.
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apply^i.
Iran appealed and the Court of Appeals upheld, inter
alia, this part of the lower court's ruling. The appellate
court in upholding said that no formal nationalization by
a decree or through a "process of law" had taken place and
that it was apparent that the complaint alleged actions
that were both commercial and governmental in nature.
The court alluded to Millen Indus and held that
when transaction partakes of both commercial and sovereign
elements, jurisdiction will not obtain but one allegation
might be sufficient to create jurisdiction. The court went
on to say that some of the acts alleged by plaintiffs were
commercial in nature and Iran had offered no
countervailing evidence that those commercial acts were
subsumed within a sovereign activity.
IV. ACTIONS IN TORT IN CASES OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
Modern conditions and sometimes complex situations in
international community have increased the occasions in
which acts or omissions of officials occur, or have
effiect, outside the territory of the State on whose behalf
they act. The variety of tort proceedings is evidence to
this point. In the United States, tort proceedings have
been frequently brought against foreign States, involving
various incidents such as traffic accidents, imprisonment
of individuals, assassinations, etc. Tort proceedings have
also been instituted against the Islamic Republic of Iran,
some of which as will be seen, might have drastic
Foremost McKesson et al v. Islamic Republic of
Iran et al. Memorandum Opinion, District Court for the
District of Columbia, 18 Apr. 1989, lALR. p. 17165, at pp.
17171 et seq.
Millen Indus. Inc., V. Coordination Council for
No. Am. Affairs 855 f 2d 879, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1988), quoted
by the Court of Appeal's opinion op cit, fn. 734, at p.
19104.
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implications. Therefore, it falls within the ambit of this
work to examine the immunity law aspects of tort
proceedings in general and to focus on Iranian cases in
particular. Before that a look at the tort provisions of
the FSIA seems to be in order.
A. The FSIA And Tort Proceedings:
Among several exceptions limiting the general rule of
State immunity, the FSIA contains three exceptions
restricting the immunity of a foreign State in tortious
claims.
The first one is the non-commercial tort exception
which explicitly covers claims of personal injuries, death
and damage to property. According to sec.1605 (a)(5):
not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2)
above, in which money damages are sought against
a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any
official or employee of that foreign state while
acting within the scope of his office or
employment; except this paragraph shall not
apply to-
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights.
The second one is an implicit exception. Sees.1605
(a)(5) and 1605 (a)(7) as their language shows, cover only
those claims which are "not otherwise encompassed in
paragraph 2 above", i.e., the commercial activity
exception of sec.1605 (a)(2). This means clearly that sec.
1605 (a) (2), which is a sufficiently widely drafted
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exception, contains an implicit exception to immunity^®^
in those claims which are capable of falling within the
broad ambit of commercial activity.
The third exception, namely the antiterrorism
exception, is based on the 1996 amendments to the FSIA,
dealing with certain actions which can be brought against
those foreign States which are designated, by the U.S.
State Department, as sponsor of terrorism.
The non-commercial tort exception (1605 (a)(5)) is
directed primarily at the problem of traffic accidents in
the United States, caused by automobiles operated by a
foreign embassy, but it is formulated in general terms
and with certain exceptions includes all tort actions not
covered by the commercial activity exception in sec. 1605
(a) (2) The Supreme Court of the United States has
affirmed that the express tort exception is predicated on
the basis of territorial jurisdiction.^®^ In Amerada Hess
Shipping, after ruling that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act is the sole jurisdictional basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign State in the United
States, the Supreme Court ruled that none of the
exceptions enumerated in the FSIA applied to the case
arising out of Argentina's attack on a commercial ship.
With regard to sec. 1605 (a)(5) the court held that;
Section 1605 (a)(5) is limited by its terms.
^ McKeel V. Islamic Republic of Iran, op cit, fn.
677, ILR 81 (1990), at p.547.
The U.K. Act too, contains an express and an
implicit exception to immunity in tortious claims, see
Lady Fox H., "State Responsibility and Tort Proceedings
Against a Foreign State in Municipal Courts", NYIL,
vol.XX, 1989. p.3, at p.22.
See H.R. No. 1487, op cit, fn. 591, at 7, 20-21.
^ McKeel v. Iran, op cit, fn. 677, at 547.
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, op
cit, fn. 674.
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however, to those cases in which the damage to
or loss of property occurs in the United States.
Congress' primary propose in enacting sec.1605
(a)(5) was to eliminate a foreign state's
immunity for traffic accidents and other torts
committed in the United States, for which
liability is imposed under domestic tort
law.^®®
thus in the Supreme Court's view sec. 1605(a)(5) "covers
only torts within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States".^®' Following the Algerian Declarations of
1981, it was partly on the basis of the territorial
principle that U.S. courts rejected a number of claims
filed against Iran by some U.S. citizens formerly held as
hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.^"
B. Human Rights Cases
In the United States, the application of the non-
Ibid, ILR 81 (1990), at p. 666.
Ibid, at p. 668. See also Frolova v. U.S.S.R.
7th. Cir. 1 May 1985. ILR 85 (1991), p.236.
The other main argument for the rejection of
such claims was based on paragraph 11 of the Algerian
General Declaration of 1981 which, among other things,
requires the United States to preclude and bar the
prosecution against Iran of any pending or future claim
relating to "the seizure of 52 United States nationals on
November 4, 1979". See: Mckeel v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, op cit, fn. 677; Westly Williams et al. v. State of
Iran et al; (D.D.C., June 11, 1981), lALR, p.3185;
Persinger v. the Islamic Republic of Iran, D.C. Cir. 13
March 1984, ILR 90 (1992), p.586, (Case note by Smith
Scott Hartwell, North Carolina Journal of Int'l.L and
Commercial Regulation, vol.10 (1985), p.285), where the
Court of Appeals, on a revision of its earlier judgment of
8 Oct. 1982 (ILR 72, p.132), held that the U.S. Embassy
premises in Tehran was not a part of the U.S. territory as
provided by sec. 1605 (a)(5) of the FSIA and that both the
tortious act or omission and the injury must occur within
the United States.
Ill
commercial tort exception has some limitations^'^ and it
has rarely been applied against foreign States for
homicide cases. Among those rare cases mention has to be
made of Letelier^^ in which the Government of Chile and
other defendants' plea of immunity was rejected and they
were condemned by a default judgment to pay, the survivors
of the assassination and personal representatives of the
victims, $ U.S. 4.9 million dollars as pecuniary
damages.
Other cases show reluctance on the part of the courts
to base jurisdiction on the non-commercial tort exception
Ysssinin- volpin v. Novostl Press Agency, op cit,
fn. 748, where immunity of Novosti press service was
upheld because the libel action brought against it was
specifically excluded from the area of the non-commercial
tort exception. See also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson (113 S.Ct.
1812 (1993)), where the U.S. citizen's attempt to cover,
by the commercial activity exception, his torture and
imprisonment claim against Saudi-Arabia (sec. 1605 (a)(2)
of the FSIA) was rejected by the Supreme Court.
See Letelier et al. v. Republic of Chile et al.,
U.S., (D.D.C., 11 March 1980), ILR 63 (1982), P.378, Court
of Appeals, (2d Cir. 20 Nov. 1984), ILR 79 (1989), p. 561.
Mention has to be made also of Liu v. Republic of China,
(642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1986) unreported order, 1987
WL 49413 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27.1987) , rev'd., 892 F.2d 1419
(9th. Cir. 1989), Cert, dismissed. 111 S.Ct. 27 (1990),
quoted and commented by Christopher, Brent E: "State
Responsibility and Non-Commercial Torts Under The FSIA:
Searching for an Applicable Respondeat Superior Doctrine
Through Liu v. Republic of China", Texas Int'l L.J. Vol.27
(1992), p. 137. The case was brought against the Republic
of Taiwan for the assassination, in the United States, of
a U.S. national. The murder was allegedly masterminded by
a Taiwanese high ranking official. The district court
dismissed the case on the basis of the act of State
doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
case by ruling that the Taiwan Government could be sued,
for the assassination, under the FSIA. However, due to an
out of court settlement the Supreme Court dismissed the
Republic of China's writ of Certiorari.
The case was finally settled by arbitration
proceedings under international law between Chile and the
United States which disposed the earlier default judgment
and awarded the sum of USD 2,611,892 as compensation to
the victims' heirs. See Re Letelier & Moffit, ILR 88
(1992), p.727.
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under sec.1605^^ (a)(5).
In Tel Oren,^^^ filed against Libya, PLO and a number
of other defendants for an alleged terrorist attack on an
Israeli bus, as a result of which 34 people were killed,
the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and
because of the statute of Limitations. With regard to
Libya, the only foreign State defendant in the case, it
was specifically stated by two of the concurring appellate
judges that the case against Libya must be dismissed
because of the plain language of the FSIA.^'^
In Von Dardel v. USSR^^^ regarding the detention and
imprisonment, by the former Soviet Union, of Rauol
Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, the district court in a
default judgment denied immunity, among other things, on
the ground that the FSIA, through the international
agreements exception of section 1604, contained an
exception to immunity for violations of universally
accepted law of nations. The USSR, had impliedly waived
its immunity by subscribing to treaties, including the
United Nations Charter, which codified universally
accepted rules of diplomatic immunity and human rights.^'®
It is why human rights cases are generally filed
against individuals and not against foreign States. See
Stephens B. & Ratner M., International Human Rights
Litigation In U.S. Courts, Transnational Publishers, Inc.,
New York, 1996, pp.39 & 125-137.
^ Tel Oren V. Libyan Arab Republic, (D.D.C. 30
June 1981; D.C.Cir. 3 Feb 1984), ILR 77 (1988, p.193.
The United States Government stated that this
interpretation was correct. See: " The Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae" submitted to the Supreme Court in
Response to Court's Invitation in Reviewing Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari", in the case of Tel Oren v. Libya,
ILM, vol. XXIV (1985), p.427, at pp.430 and 433.
Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, U.S., (D.D.C. 15 Oct. 1985) ILR 77 (1988),
p.258.
798 Ibid, at pp. 262-268.
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However, the Von Dardel approach did not prevail, because
the Supreme Court decision in Amerada Hess made it clear
the FSIA was the sole jurisdictional basis for claims
against foreign States and that:
immunity is granted in those cases involving
alleged violations of international law that do
not come within one of the FSIA's
exceptions.
In another human rights case, namely the case of
Princz,^°° in which flagrant violations of fundamental
human rights were at issue, Germany was sued for slave
labor performed by the plaintiff as a prisoner in a Nazi
concentration camp and injuries he suffered there. The
appellate court reversed the decision of the district
court, ruling that assuming the FSIA applied retroactively
to the events occurring in 1942-1945, no exception to the
general grant of immunity in that statute would put the
case within the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. If the
FSIA did not apply retroactively then there was no federal
subject matter jurisdiction over the case which sounded in
tort and quasi contract.®®^ The dissenting appellate
judge, however, supporting the decision of the lower
court, opined that the Third Reich by enslaving and
imprisoning Pirncz violated Jus Cogens and thereby
implicitly®"^ waived its immunity from suit. The
Amerada Hess, op. ext. fn. 674, at p.664.
Hugo Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,
(D.C. Cir.1994), 33 ILM. 1483 (1994).
Id. at p. 1485.
Cf. Frolova V. USSR, op cit, fn. 789, where the
court held that signing the U.N. Charter by the former
Soviet Union did not constitute a waiver of immunity for
tort proceedings; Berkovitz, op cit, fn. 731, where the
court of Appeals ruled that waiver would require
"convincing evidence". The Supreme Court in Amerada Hess,
closed the possibility of implied treaty waiver opened by
Von Dardel by saying that waiver will be established where
the international agreements expressly conflict with the
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dissenting opinion, put up in strong sympathy for the
victims of violations of Jus Cogens^ is evidence to the
growing tendency, especially in the U.S., to make
violators of human rights answer and pay for their violent
acts.
C. The Alien Tort Statute
To surmount the obstacle of the territorial
jurisdiction of sec. 1605 (a)(5), in cases where personal
injury or damage to property were alleged to have incurred
outside the U.S., in several cases®°^ attempts were made,
especially in 1980s, to obtain jurisdiction over foreign
States on the basis of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The
argument was that the ATS which was enacted by the first
Congress of the United States in 1789, created an implied
exception to the FSIA. According to the ATS:
FSIA provisions (Amerada Hess, op cit, fn. 674,at p.668).
Following the Amerada Hess ruling, the Court of Appeals in
Siderman De Blake v. the Republic of Argentina (9th Cir.
1992), 965 F.2d 699, cert, denied 113 S.Ct. 1812), while
ruling that even the non-American nationals could sue
their own governments for expropriation under the FSIA's
commercial activity exception, rejected the torture claim,
because FSIA did not confer jurisdiction for violations of
jus congens.
For that tendency see for example, Richman
Scott; "Can FSIA Grant Immunity For Violations of Jus
Cogens Norms", Case Note on Siderman De Blake v. Republic
of Argentina", Brooklyn J. Int'l. L. vol. XIX, (1993),
No.3. p.967; Vagts Detlev F., "Restitution For Historical
Wrongs, The American Courts And International Law", AJIL,
vol. 92 (1998), p.232.
Amerada Hess Shipping op cit, fn. 674; In re
korean Air Lines Disaster, Misc. No. 830345 (D.D.C. Aug.
2. 1985; Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-
1772- RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar.7. 1985); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, op. cit. fn. 795; Sanchez, Espinoza
et al V. Reagan et al, D.C. Cir. 13 Aug 1985, ILR 80
(1989), p.587; Saltany et al v. Reagan et al, D.D.C. 23
dec. 1988, ILR 80 (1989), p.19, D.C. Cir. 29 Sept. 1989,
ILR 87 (1992), p.680; Von Dardel v. USSR, op cit fn. 797
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The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a Treaty of the United States.
Except for the Second Circuit's decision in Amerada
Hess Shipping,and a default judgment in Von
Dardell,^^^ all other cases rejected the proposition that
the ATS provided an implied exception to the FSIA.
However, the uncertainty created by Von Dardell and the
Second Circuit was removed by the Supreme Court in Amerada
Hess Shipping, where the court held that the ATS did not
provide jurisdiction over a foreign State®°® because the
court thought:
[t]hat the text and structure of FSIA
demonstrate Congress' intention that the FSIA be
the sole basis for obtaining iurisdiction over
a foreign state in our courts®°'
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irla brought against a
Paraguayan police officer for acts of torture and killing,
the Paraguayan Government was not joined as a defendant.
The Court of Appeals, interpreting the Alien Tort Statute
in the light of the contemporary customary international
law, ruled that official torture was a gross violation of
human rights and prohibited by the law of nations.
Consequently U.S. courts had jurisdiction to decide the
805
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808
p. 661.
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28 U.S.C. sec.1350.
Op cit, fn. 674
Op citf fn. 797
Amerada Hess Shipping, op cit, fn. 674, at
Ibid, at p.663.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irla, U.S. (2nd Cir. 30 June
1980), (Dist. Ct. E.D. N.Y. 10 June 1984), ILR 77 (1988),
p.169.
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case. The exercise of such jurisdiction was, in the
court's view, consistent with the traditional competence
of municipal courts to decide disputes among parties who
happened to be present in the territory of the forum
State.®" Thus under Filartiga, State officials who have
committed gross violations of human rights, under the
color of official authority, can be sued in U.S. courts,
provided that there is some basis for the competence of
those courts such as transitory or brief presence in the
United States of the parties.
This possibility does not apparently affect the
general immunity that a foreign State and its agencies or
instrumentalities enjoy before U.S. courts, subject to
sec. 1605 (a)(5) and sec 1605 (a)(7), for violations of
human rights. However, bearing in mind that generally
State officials act under the authority of State or in the
guise of such authority and their wrongful acts or
omissions, in international law level, engages the
international responsibility of their States and not
themselves, stripping such officials of their immunity in
violations of human rights, is an indirect blow to the
rule of State immunity if not a direct one. The reason is
that the color of official authority can no longer shield
the State officials from amenability to foreign courts'
jurisdiction and personal liability. Therefore, before
committing a gross violation of human rights, they will
think twice, and in not committing the violation a
possible plea of immunity by their respective State will
be pre-empted.
D. The 1996 Antiterrorism Amendments of the PSIA
These amendments, the first of which is an additional
exception to immunity, a new paragraph (para 7 to the
subsection (a) of section (1605) of the FSIA), and became
811 Ibid, at pp.179-183.
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law in April 1996, dramatically amend the FSIA.®^^ Sec.
1605 (a)(7) explicitly permits U.S. nationals, to obtain
jurisdiction over a foreign State, designated by the U.S.
State Department as sponsor of terrorism, for claims of
personal injury or death arising out of acts such as
torture, kidnapping extrajudicial killing ..., or the
provision of material support for such acts.®^^This
amendment also offers definitions for certain terms
Mealy International Arbitration Report,
vol.11, Nov.1996, p.15, quoting Bruno A. Ristau, one of
the drafters of the FSIA.
813 Sec.1605 (a) provides;
(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in
which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death that was
caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or
the provision of material support or resources
(as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for
such an act if such act or provision of material
support is engaged in by an official, employee,
or agent of such foreign state while acting
within the scope of his or here office,
employment, or agency except that the court
shall decline to hear a claim under this
paragraph-
(A) if the foreign state was not designated as
a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6(i)
of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2405 (j) or section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371)
at the time the act occurred, unless later so
designated as a result of such act; and
•• (B) even if the foreign state is or was so
designated, if-
"(i) the act occurred in the foreign state
against which the claim has been brought and the
claimant has not afforded the foreign state a
reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in
accordance with accepted international rules of
arbitration; or
"(ii) the claimant or victim was not a national
of the United States (as that term is defined in
section 101 (a) (22) of the Immigration and
nationality Act) when the act upon which the
claim is based occurred.
Quoted from MealylAR, ibid, at Al.
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contained in paragraph (7), defines the statute of
limitations for bringing an action for damages and
limitations on discovery.
Another important facet of the April 1996 amendment
is the additional exceptions that it makes to the general
rule of immunity from attachment. That general rule is in
sec. 1609 and the exceptions to it are enumerated in
section 1610. Thus, according to the new exceptions,
namely sees.1610 (a)(7), and 1610 (b)(2) a foreign State
shall lose its immunity from execution if "the judgment
relates to a claim for which that foreign state is not
immune under section 1605 (a)(7), regardless of whether
the property is or was involved with the act upon which
the claim is based". The same is true with agencies or
instrumentalities of the foreign State.
In September 1996 a second amendment, called as
Flatow Amendment, was made to the FSIA which allows U.S.
courts to award money damages which may include economic
damages, solatium, pain, suffering and punitive damages if
the acts were among those described in sec. 1605 (a)(7).
The amendment purports to make liable, in addition of the
defendant State designated as a State sponsor of
terrorism, its employees, officials and agents whose acts
have caused the injury or death, while acting within the
scope of their office.®^®
The amendment does not seem to affect the
immunity of property not used for commercial activity and
the specific immunity accorded to "certain types of
property immune from execution" such as central bank
funds, military properties etc., under section 1611.
This amendment under the title "Civil Liability
for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism" provides:
(a) An official, employee, or agent of a foreign
state designated as a State sponsor of terrorism
designated under section 6 (j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 [section 2405 (j) of
the Appendix to Title 50, War and National
Defense] while acting within the scope of his or
her office, employment, or agency shall be
liable to a United States national or the
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The legislative history of the amendment shows that
its purpose was to boost the deterrent effect of the lift
of immunity which was done by sec.1605 (a)(7), by
providing for a substantial civil liability for a foreign
State which commits and sponsors acts of terrorism.
1. The Flatotr Case
This case was filed by Mr. Flatow and his family
against the Islamic Republic of Iran and a number of
Iranian defendants, including some high ranking Iranian
officials,®^^ pursuant to the two aforementioned
camendments of the FSIA, for providing material support to
a Palestinian group, the Shaqaqi faction, which was
national's legal representative for personal
injury or death caused by acts of that official,
employee, or agent for which the courts of the
United States may maintain jurisdiction under
section 1605 (a)(7) of title 28, United States
Code [subsec. (a)(7) of this section] for money
damages which may include economic damages,
solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive
damages if the acts were among those described
in section 1605 (a) (7) [subsec. (a) (7) of this
section].
(b) Provisions related to statue of limitations
and limitations on discovery that would apply to
an action brought under 28 U.S.C. 1605 (f) and
(g) [subsecs. (f) and (g) of this section] shall
also apply to actions brought under this
section.
No action shall be maintained under this action
[SIC] if an official, employee, or agent of the
United States, while acting within the scope of
his or her office, employment, or agency would
not be liable for such acts if carried out
within the United States.
Flatow et al v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al
D.D. C., 11 March 1998, Mealy's lAR, vol.13. Issue, 5, May
1998, c-1, at c-5.
The other defendants were the Iranian Ministry
of Information and Security, the Leader of the Islamic
Republic of Iran Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, former
Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanyani and former
Iranian Minster of Information Ali Fallahian Khusestani.
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involved, according to the plaintiffs, in a terrorist
activity leading to the death of Mr. Flatow's daughter,
Alisa Michel Flatow. Alisa. M. Flatow was killed by a bomb
blast on 9 April, 1995, while she was travelling in an
Israeli bus guarded by Israeli officials, touring the
occupied territory of the Gaza Strip.
The district court judge in a default judgment®^®
held the defendants responsible and awarded the plaintiffs
the total amount of $247 million, which includes $225
million as punitive damages. The court found that both
1996 amendments applied retroactively for the purposes of
personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The court
alluded to the background of some of the difficulties
between Iran and the United States and said:
The Islamic Republic of Iran in particular has
been aware of United States policy condemning
international terrorism at least since the 1979-
1981 hostage crisis in Tehran. It has been
continuously designated a State sponsor of
terrorism since January 19, 1984. Its continued
support of terrorist groups has prompted the
United States to suspend diplomatic relations
and participate in the international embargo,
including extraordinary enforcement measures
such as trade restrictions.
In the court's view, therefore, the 1996 amendments
implicated no constitutionally protected interest which
would prohibit the application of sec.1607 (a)(7) of the
FSIA to the conduct of the defendants prior to the
amendments. The court noticing the fundamental change made
by the amendments in U.S. immunity law stated:
The state sponsored terrorism provisions
represent a sea change in the United States'
approach to foreign sovereign immunity.
"For the first time. Congress has expressly
created an exception to immunity designed to
influence the sovereign conduct of foreign
states and effect the substantive law of
liability for non-immune acts.
818 Flatow case, op cit, fn. 816
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In order to conclude that the extraterritorial
application of the amendments were proper, the main
argument of the court was that:
Congressional intent and legislative purpose
demonstrate that 28 U.S.C. $ 1605 (a) (7) not
only applies to extraterritorial conduct, but
that one of its express purposes is to affect
the conduct of terrorist states outside the
United States, in order to promote the safety of
United States citizens traveling overseas.
As to the subject matter jurisdiction the court ruled
that the plaintiffs' claim contained all necessary
statutory elements. In this connection the court stated
that suicide bombing was "an act of extrajudicial killing"
and that that act was perpetrated by Shaqaqi faction "a
terrorist group" which was funded by the Islamic Republic
of Iran. The financial support to that "terrorist group"
was "an act" performed by agents and officials of the
Iranian government within the domain of their agency,
employment or office. The court went on to say that Iran
was designated a State sponsor of terrorism®^' whose
sponsorship resulted in the death, by suicide bombing, of
Michel Flatow who was at the time of the bombing a United
States national.
Dealing with the issue of personal jurisdiction the
court first ruled that Iran "was not a person" for the
purpose of Constitutional Due Process analysis. Sovereign
immunity, the court held, was a matter of grace and comity
, both under common law and the FSIA, and not a matter of
right under United States law. The court continued to say
that:
[e]ven if a foreign state is accorded the status
The foreign States currently designated, by the
U.S. State Department, as sponsors of terrorism, are Syra,
Iraq, Libya, Sudan, North Korea, Cuba and Iran, Flatow
case, ibid, at p.10.
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of a 'person' for the purposes of Constitutional
Due Process analysis, a foreign state that
sponsors terrorist activities which causes the
death or personal injury of a United States
national will invariably have sufficient
contacts with the United States to satisfy Due
Process.
Dismissing the defense of act of State doctrine the
court had this to say;
[b]us bombings and other acts of international
terrorism are not valid acts of state of the
type which bar consideration of this case, nor
was the bombing complained of perpetrated within
the Islamic Republic of Iran; therefore the
defense of the Act of State Doctrine is not
available.
The defenses of head of State immunity and foiram non
conveniens too, were inapplicable because of the language
of sec.1605 (a)(7).
As to the issue of punitive damages, the court,
relying on the second 1996 amendment, simply held that;
Foreign State sponsors of terrorism are
susceptible to punitive damages.
Furthermore, the punitive damages could be awarded "in
cases arising from pre-enactment conduct by foreign State
sponsors of terrorism"
Iran's response to this judgment has been one of
sharp dismissal and condemnation. In a Press Release of 13
March 1998, issued by Iran's Permanent Mission to the
U.N., Iran characterized that judgment as "baseless and
irresponsible in the extreme and representative of a
dangerous trend" which "should be condemned". Focusing on
the issues of legal and factual basis of the case as well
as the issue of attributability the Press Release says:
The allegations raised in the hurried
proceedings of the court are without a shred of
substantiation, have no basis in fact and fail
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V. SUMMARY
1. Since early 1979, in a number of cases involving
Iran, the waiver provision of the Treaty of Amity was
decided by the U.S. courts. Majority of district courts,
especially during the Freeze Period, gave the clause a
broad interpretation which would remove the immunity from
jurisdiction. There were also some judgments at the
district court level, particularly after the Freeze
Period, which found that the waiver provision had a
limited scope and affected only those commercial
any standard of evidence. The Islamic Republic
of Iran as a major victim of terrorism has
consistently condemned terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations and categorically
rejected any part in the incident leading to the
death of Ms. Flatow. The court ruling based on
testimony of witness totally lacking objectivity
and credibility represent a flagrant violation
of the minimum standards of internationally
accepted due process.
Furthermore, the basis for court's jurisdiction
is a combination of a piece of legislation that
flouts one of the most fundamental principles of
international law and the State Department's
terrorism list which merely represent a listing
of U.S. diplomatic foes. The politically
motivated ruling of the district court
represents a dangerous precedent, where the
dignity and reputation of an entire nation can
be maliciously targeted for short-sighted
political objectives in violation of
internationally recognized principles on which
civilized conduct of inter-state relations are
founded.
As a victim of terrorism, Iran sympathized with
all who fell victim to this international
menace. But, this court decision and the
dangerous legislation which is itself contrary
to rules and principles of international law and
had been tailor-made to serve the political
agenda of this case neither serve justice nor
the fight against terrorism. It thus should be
rejected in the interest of both Justice and the
international campaign to eradicate terrorism.
quoted from the Internent, http:/ www. undp.
org/missions/iran/press/153. html.
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enterprizes which were doing business in the United States
or Iran.
2. After the Freeze Period, a few judgments rendered
by appellate courts seem to have removed the uncertainty
and inconsistency in the case law as to the domain of the
waiver provision of the Treaty of Amity with respect to
immunity from jurisdiction. Those judgments show that the
position taken by the governments of Iran and the United
States, with respect to the waiver issue in the 1979-81
crisis, was a correct one.®^^ Thus, the U.S. courts'
current view on waiver is consistent with the generally
held view in international law that does not construe
waiver provisions lightly.
3. Because of the broad interpretation that courts
gave to the waiver provision of the Treaty of Amity, they
seem to have regarded it unnecessary to analyze and
classify the activities giving rise to the claims.
However, during the Freeze Period in contractual and
expropriation cases the U.S. courts asserted their
jurisdiction by finding that Iran was engaged in
commercial activity. In a number of contractual claims
That position was in line with the recognition
given to the limited nature of the waiver contained in the
FCN Treaties in the land mark case of Victory Transport,
in which The court stated:
After World War II the United States began to
restrict immunity by negotiating treaties
obligating each contracting party to waive its
sovereign immunity for state-controlled
enterprises engaged in business activities
within the territory of the other party.
Fourteen such treaties were negotiated by our
State Department in the decade 1948 to 1958.
Victory Transport, op cit, fn. 608. The Federal
Constitutional Court of the former West Germany too,
construed the U.S.-German Treaty, containing a waiver
provision merely identical to that of the U.S. Iran Treaty
waiver provision, as pertaining to State-controlled
enterprises. See the Philippine case, op cit, fn. 407, at
p. 179.
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courts gave the notion of commercial activity a broad
interpretation by focussing on the nature of the act test
to the extent that it included the supply of military
equipment.
4. The Reshaping of expropriation claims by broad
interpretation of the third clause of the commercial
activity exception was done for the first time in Iranian
cases and was rejected by later cases, except in Siderman.
Siderman and Iranian cases, though still a minority,
nevertheless open a new possibility for victims of
nationalizations.
5. Before 1996 there were some tort claims too, which
were decided after the Hostage Crisis was resolved. In
those cases, contrary to expropriation claims, the third
clause of sec. 1605 (a) (2) was found to be inapplicable
because, either the activity was not commercial, or if it
was, it had little connection with the cause of action or
there was no direct effect in the United States.
6. In 1996, by the Anti-Terrorist Amendments of the
FSIA, a sea change in the immunity law of the United
States occurred, by virtue of which Iran was held liable
in Flatow case, because of alleged sponsorship of
terrorism.
